The subject Order has included these type exclusions since first issued as DOE 5480.25 (11-3-92). There has been no confusion or difficulty in this regard.

The Office of Science provides below the OPI response to a major comment submitted during the RevCom review process that is helpful in clarifying misperceptions related to interpretation of subject Order.

Delegate Mark Williams for Headquarters EH Comments DOE 420.2X, Safety of Accelerator Facilities 3. APPLICABILITY Section 3. b. (2) The existing language makes implementation of the Order very unclear. It allows the CRD to not be included in the management contracts without DOE review of the alternative if they are "superceded by an alternative standard that is in accordance with the terms of the contract laws, regulations, and DOE directives clause." Since the objective of the Order is to establish standardized accelerator-specific safety requirements, the exemption process with specific DOE safety approval is preferable to allow contractors alternative. Section 3. b. (5) (b) 2. "This paragraph requires flowdown of the requirements to sub-contractors but also requires that the prime contractor only incur cost that would be incurred by a prudent person in the conduct of a competitive business." This requirement is more appropriately included in the contract, rather than in the safety requirements Order. It is a safety management strategy that needlessly complicates and compromises the Order requirements.

OPI Resolution:

Not Accepted-The existing language is clear and allows (under Laws, Regulations, and DOE Directives Clause) an alternative standard to be applied through a DOE approved process that involves DOE review and approval. The subject Order reflects the Modified Directives Process that was approved by Secretary Abraham on December 3, 2002, and is being implemented through DOE O 151.1A Change 1. It also contains the current DOE model language addressing flowdown. ]]>
(6) Entire DOE/NNSA accelerator facilities or modules thereof when and only when accelerators and their operations involve or produce a sufficient inventory of fissionable materials to create the potential for criticality.

Rationale For Revision

Consistency with Performance Based Contracting - A major initiative in DOE over the past few years has been the emphasis on performance based contracting. In this regard, Richard Hopf's memorandum of October 16, 2001, which initiated the current Order Review, states: 'The assessment objectives are to identify requirements, standards, and process approaches which are unnecessary, inappropriate, outdated, overly prescriptive or proscriptive or otherwise inconsistent with Government-wide contracting concepts.'

The revised DOE 420.2X is consistent with the objectives of the Hopf Order Review in that the subject exclusion clearly defines the conditions under which accelerator facilities are excluded from unnecessary applications of DOE rules, directives, and standards. The revised exclusion removes any ambiguity in the identification of an accelerator facility in contrast to a nuclear facility and removes any potential confusion with processes developed for nuclear facilities.

Consistency with Nuclear Safety Rulemaking - DOE has recognized the basic technological differences between accelerator facilities and nuclear facilities going back to DOE 5480.5, Safety of Nuclear Facilities (9-23-86), which excluded them from the "nuclear facility" definition. Several safety directives issued in 1992 [i.e. Safety of Accelerator Facilities, DOE 5480.25 (11-3-92); Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, DOE 5480.23 (4-30-92) and Nuclear Criticality Safety, DOE 5480.24 (8-12-92)] confirmed the fundamental differences between these two distinctive technologies. In addition, accelerator facilities are designed to be low hazard facilities with negligible impact beyond site boundaries.

Continuing safe operation of accelerator facilities has been accomplished under the safety requirements of Safety of Accelerator Facilities (DOE O 420.2A) and its predecessor orders [DOE O 420.2 in 1998 and DOE 5480.25 in 1992] for nearly twelve years. The distinction between safety requirements for accelerator facilities and nuclear facilities was confirmed again in the promulgation of 10CFR830 in 1994, which noted that "Accelerators are specifically excluded from the definition of a nonreactor nuclear facility, and as such, are excluded from the provisions of 830. Accelerators are not excluded from the radiation protection provisions of proposed [sic] Part 835 since that part covers nuclear activities rather than nuclear facilities." The revised exclusion [3.c.(6)] of DOE O 420.2X makes clear that accelerator facilities or modules thereof are addressed by 10CFR830 when and only when accelerators and their operations involve or produce a sufficient inventory of fissionable materials to create the potential for criticality.

Clear Delineation of Accelerator Facilities in Contrast to Nuclear Facilities - Consistent with the best management practices identified in the Hopf Review and in the context of the evolution of DOE standards for these two technologies, there is no reason for any conflict or ambiguity in the distinction between accelerator and nuclear technologies and their corresponding DOE requirements for safety. It is therefore important to unambiguously recognize this basic distinction and to subject accelerator facilities or modules thereof to the safety requirements of DOE O 420.2X, not 10CFR830, unless there is potential for criticality. It is for this reason that DOE O 420.2X exclusion 3.c.(6) has been revised to define when and only when accelerator facilities or portions thereof become subject to nuclear safety requirements. Therefore, the continuing achievement of safe operations of both accelerator and nuclear facilities can be accomplished without potential confusion and unnecessary or unintended applicability of DOE directives and standards.

During the REVCOM process, a question was raised as to whether "...even though the accelerator is not a nuclear facility, that for some accelerators, the target area or a hot cell area for an accelerator could be categorized as a nuclear facility subject to 10CFR830 if the limits in DOE STD1027 were met."? The revised exclusion makes clear when accelerators and their operations are excluded from DOE 420.2X and become subject to 10CFR830. The 10CFR830 requirements replace DOE O 420.2X requirements when accelerators and their operations involve or produce a sufficient inventory of fissionable materials to create the potential for criticality. The revised exclusion 3.c.(6) in DOE O 420.2X therefore removes any applicability confusion with and is entirely consistent with 10CFR830 where accelerators and their operations are not a nonreactor nuclear facility by definition and because they also are not a nuclear reactor, they are not a nuclear facility subject to any requirements of 10CFR830 and its implementing guides/standards, including DOE-STD-1027.

Conclusion - The revised subject exclusion in DOE Order 420.2X is entirely consistent with DOE management policy, nuclear safety directives and rules, and differences in the inherent safety of accelerator facilities in contrast to nuclear facilities. All hazards, including radiological, associated with DOE accelerator facilities are addressed comprehensively and will continue to be so managed to provide appropriate and adequate protection of workers, the public, and the environment under DOE O 420.2X and in accord with 10CFR835, "Occupational Radiation Protection," which applies to all DOE facilities regardless of the source and type of ionizing radiation. ]]>

The Office of Science provides below the OPI response to a major comment submitted during the RevCom review process that is helpful in clarifying misperceptions related to interpretation of subject Order.

Delegate Mark Williams for Headquarters EH Comments DOE 420.2X, Safety of Accelerator Facilities 4. REQUIREMENTS 4.c. Unreviewed Safety Question - The section mixes restrictions for work involving a USQ with the definition of a USQ, and a definition of a USQ is not in the Order. The paragraph should include all 4 elements of a USQ specified in 10CFR830.3, or cite that regulation. Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) means a situation where (1) The probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or the malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the documented safety analysis could be increased; (2) The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the documented safety analysis could be created; (3) A margin of safety could be reduced; or (4) The documented safety analysis may not be bounding or may be otherwise inadequate.

OPI Resolution:

Not Accepted-Section 4. REQUIREMENTS is the appropriate location for restrictions relating to commencement of accelerator operations. Moreover, the terminology being applied is "Unreviewed Safety Issues", not "Unreviewed Safety Questions"; DOE accelerator facilities are not Nuclear facilities. The Unreviewed Safety Issue definition has been part of existing mode of DOE accelerator operations since the first Safety of Accelerator Facilities order (DOE 5480.25) was issued, November 3, 1992. ]]>