<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?> 
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rc4docs.xsl"?>
   <Document>
      <DocumentName><![CDATA[DOE O 226.1 Implementation of Department of Energy Oversight Policy]]></DocumentName>
      <DocumentId><![CDATA[DOE O 226.1]]></DocumentId>
      <DocumentOpenDate>03/18/2005</DocumentOpenDate>
      <DocumentCloseDate>04/08/2005</DocumentCloseDate>
      <DocumentResolutionDate>06/07/2005</DocumentResolutionDate>
      <MajorComments>
         <Section>
            <SectionTitle><![CDATA[Overall Comments]]></SectionTitle>
            <SectionContent><![CDATA[Please provide your overall comments about this document.
Note: this 'paragraph' is not part of the original document.]]></SectionContent>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Ames Labortatory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Argonne National Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Associate Manager for Science & Technology, Richland]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Bechtel Hanford]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Bechtel Nevada]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Berkeley Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Bonneville Power Administration]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Janet Lubach]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[BPA DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Bonneville Power Administration]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <ApproverName><![CDATA[]]></ApproverName>
               <Comments><![CDATA[This package represents the official, consolidated comments from Subject Matter Experts, srsander@bpa.gov, rlwindus@bpa.gov, and rfair@bpa.gov:  

BPA has reviewed this draft order and agrees that under section 3, APPLICABILITY, part c.  EXCLUSIONS, item (3) "Consistent with Secretarial Delegation Order Number 00-033.00A to the Administrator and Chief Executive Officer, Bonneville Power Administration, this Order, draft DOE O 226.1, does not apply to oversight of environmental programs or occupational safety and health programs at Bonneville Power Administration.  Based on this statement, BPA has no additional specific comments to offer.
 
BPA is very supportive of the way the writer has drafted the applicability section of this draft order, 3.c (3) to exclude BPA, consistent with the delegation order 00-033.00A to BPA, of 9/27/02.]]></Comments>
               <Response>
                  <ResponseLevel><![CDATA[Accepted]]></ResponseLevel>
                  <ResponseContent><![CDATA[No action required]]></ResponseContent>
               </Response>
               <Concurrence><![CDATA[Concur/No Comment]]></Concurrence>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Brookhaven National  Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Jessie Wilke]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[BNL DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Brookhaven National  Laboratory]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <ApproverName><![CDATA[]]></ApproverName>
               <Comments><![CDATA[a. Major Comment regarding policy objectives and missions:
Sarbanes â€“Oxley was created in response to inappropriate financial accounting activities in public companies, which generally do not operate within the DOE complex.   The current assurance/oversight processes in place under DOE contractual requirements appear to be more than sufficient for the mostly nonprofit and not-for-profit institutions at DOE sites.   In light of the general inapplicability of Sarbanes-Oxley, DOE should clarify what the specific problem is that DOE is trying to fix that the current oversight program does not address.
 
b. Major Comment (inefficiency in reporting on assurance processes):
There appears to be significant duplication and overlap of requirements imposed on DOE and the M&O Contractors as a result of this order.  The order will result is unnecessary and redundant reporting and potentially conflicting reporting of the Laboratory on assurance processes. There appears to be no value-added in implementing the CRD reporting requirements because current reporting requirements in the M&O contracts, such as Performance Based Management systems which include Integrated Assessment Program, Performance Measures, Quality Assurance, ISM, Occurrence Reporting and PAAA, are sufficient.

c. Major Comment: It is not clear what the relationship is between this proposed Order and DEAR 970.5203-1(c), which requires an annual assurance from the contractor to DOE that the contractorâ€™s system of management controls is effective and efficient.

d.Major Comment (inefficiency in reporting on assurance processes) The draft DOE Order appears to duplicate what is in DOE O 413.1A, Management Control Program.  It is unclear if this replaces the annual assurance process and letter currently submitted by the Director to DOE.

e.Major Comment: OMB Circular A - 123 has been revised.  It is not clear if this draft order addresses the requirements of the new OMB A-123, or if the Laboratories have to incorporate OMB Circular A-123 requirements as well.]]></Comments>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[BWXT Pantex, LLC]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Carlsbad Area Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Carlsbad Field Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[CH2MHill]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Chicago Operations Office]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Lynette Kane]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[CH DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Chicago Operations Office]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <ApproverName><![CDATA[Marvin Gunn]]></ApproverName>
               <Comments><![CDATA[Jessie Wilke (BNL DPC) for Brookhaven National  Laboratory
a. Major Comment regarding policy objectives and missions:
Sarbanes Ã¢â‚¬â€œOxley was created in response to inappropriate financial accounting activities in public companies, which generally do not operate within the DOE complex.   The current assurance/oversight processes in place under DOE contractual requirements appear to be more than sufficient for the mostly nonprofit and not-for-profit institutions at DOE sites.   In light of the general inapplicability of Sarbanes-Oxley, DOE should clarify what the specific problem is that DOE is trying to fix that the current oversight program does not address.
 
b. Major Comment (inefficiency in reporting on assurance processes):
There appears to be significant duplication and overlap of requirements imposed on DOE and the M&O Contractors as a result of this order.  The order will result is unnecessary and redundant reporting and potentially conflicting reporting of the Laboratory on assurance processes. There appears to be no value-added in implementing the CRD reporting requirements because current reporting requirements in the M&O contracts, such as Performance Based Management systems which include Integrated Assessment Program, Performance Measures, Quality Assurance, ISM, Occurrence Reporting and PAAA, are sufficient.

c. Major Comment: It is not clear what the relationship is between this proposed Order and DEAR 970.5203-1(c), which requires an annual assurance from the contractor to DOE that the contractorÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s system of management controls is effective and efficient.

d.Major Comment (inefficiency in reporting on assurance processes) The draft DOE Order appears to duplicate what is in DOE O 413.1A, Management Control Program.  It is unclear if this replaces the annual assurance process and letter currently submitted by the Director to DOE.

e.Major Comment: OMB Circular A - 123 has been revised.  It is not clear if this draft order addresses the requirements of the new OMB A-123, or if the Laboratories have to incorporate OMB Circular A-123 requirements as well.]]></Comments>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Critique]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Departmental Representatives Office]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[David Compton]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[Departmental Representatives Office DPOC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Departmental Representatives Office]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <Comments><![CDATA[Essential<br>

1.  The Order needs to match the Policy-this is hard to judge without an approved Policy.  The Order should describe 4 levels of oversight and the Order should include the 2004-1 IP figure on Oversight showing the 4 levels.  

2.  A "shall, should, may" matrix needs to be prepared to clearly identify the requirements contained in the order.  Many parts of Section 1, Requirements, of Attachment 4, do not contain requirements, and should not be included in this section. 

3. The order should identify where other orders have already established related requirements.  The order repeats too many requirements that appear elsewhere.  These requirements and their sources should be referenced, with only top level requirements in the Order.

4.  The magnitude of the changes needed to this Order appear to merit a re-issuance in RevCom after changes are made. <br><br>



Editorial<br>

1.  The Order needs to incorporate more guidance and requirements by reference, rather than repeating or revising it.  

2.  The basis for the list of orders to be changed is unclear.  For example, why does P 450.4 need to be changed? Why does O 414.1B need to be changed?  It seems very irregular to include requirement 4.a.]]></Comments>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Directives Management Team]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Fernald]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Fluor Hanford Inc]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Golden Field Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Grand Junction]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters CI]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters CIO]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters CN]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters CR]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters ED]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters EE]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters EH]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Mohandas Bhat]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[Delegate]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Headquarters EH]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <Comments><![CDATA[we defer to the comments made by other EH offices.]]></Comments>
               <Response>
                  <ResponseLevel><![CDATA[Accepted]]></ResponseLevel>
                  <ResponseContent><![CDATA[NO change requested]]></ResponseContent>
               </Response>
               <Concurrence><![CDATA[Concur/No Comment]]></Concurrence>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Kathy Knight]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[Delegate]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Headquarters EH]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <Comments><![CDATA[Subject Matter Expert richard.black@eh.doe.gov wrote on 04/01/2005 14:48:51 Mountain Time:
1. DOE O 226.1 needs to be coordinated with the activities and deliverables of DNFSB 2004-1 to properly reflect safety oversight functions and responsibilities.
2. DOE O 226.1 needs to be better interfaced with other oversight functions that are the subject of the Order such as emergency preparedness. 
3. While OA can establish oversight policy and requirements for DOE functions relating to independent oversight, security and cyber security that are currently assigned to OA, it cannot establish safety oversight policy, requirements, functions and responsibilities that are currently assigned to line management or EH in existing DOE directives such as DOE P 450.5 and DOE M 411.1B .

Subject Matter Expert mary.haughey@eh.doe.gov wrote on 04/01/2005 12:52:56 Mountain Time:
1. The requirements delineated in the Order generally duplicate requirements and guidance in other DOE safety directives, most notably those for Quality Assurance (QA) and Integrated Safety Management Systems (ISMS). The attached table provides a partial list of the duplications. Considerable resources would be required to develop a complete list as it would be extensive.
2. Rather than the authors of this Order working to capture requirements and guidance in other directives through references, DOE O 226 requires authors of current directives with the requirements and guidance that are duplicated in this Order (both the specifically listed directives, as well as any others that were missed in the list) to revise their directives to be consistent with this Order. This will have the following consequences:
a. Substantial resources will be needed in a number of DOE offices (particularly in EH) to revise many of their directives to be consistent with this Order.
b. The QA Order and guides are written to be consistent with 10 CFR Part 830. These proposed changes would cause the Order to be inconsistent with the QA provisions in the rule.
c. Even more substantial resources would be needed in the field for contractors, DOE field, and GOGOs to revise their many safety directives, processes and procedures to be consistent with this Order rather than existing directives.
d. This Order does not contain the depth of requirements and guidance currently in related directives. If current directives are revised to be consistent with this Order, important safety requirements might be missed with concurrent erosion of safety in the field.
e. While this process may be easier for the author of this Order, it requires enormous resources for the rest of DOE to conform to this Order rather than the author of this Order working to take advantage of existing directives, processes, and procedures.
3. This Order contains a mixture of requirements and guidance which is all captured as requirements. DOE has spent a decade or more separating requirements and guidance in the directives system so that the requirements define performance expectations and the guidance provides the “how to.” This Order reverses that progress.
4. Oversight activities should be focused on ensuring that established requirements are met and findings are tracked to closure, not on establishing new policy, requirements, and implementation guidance.
5. Consistent with DOE O 414 and 10 CFR Part 830, oversight is divided into Management (or line management) oversight and Independent oversight. The requirements for these two types of oversight are contained in Attachment 4 (Line Management) and Attachment 5 (Independent Oversight). This could provide a baseline for oversight requirements, but much of the information in those attachments is more appropriate for guidance, not requirements. Information in these attachments could be worked into the existing guide on assessments DOE G 414.1-1A.
6. DOE O 226.1 needs to be coordinated with the activities and deliverables of DNFSB 2004-1 to properly reflect safety oversight functions and responsibilities.
7. DOE O 226.1 needs to be better interfaced with other oversight functions that are the subject of the Order such as emergency preparedness. 
8. While OA can establish oversight policy and requirements for DOE functions relating to independent oversight, security and cyber security that are currently assigned to OA, it cannot establish safety oversight policy, requirements, functions and responsibilities that are currently assigned to line management or EH in existing DOE directives such as DOE P 450.5 and DOE M 411.1B]]></Comments>
               <Response>
                  <ResponseLevel><![CDATA[Accepted with Modification]]></ResponseLevel>
                  <ResponseContent><![CDATA[(SUPERSEDED BY EH REDLINE COMMENTS PROVIDED JUNE 2, 2005) Agree.  Specific feedback from the 2004-1 IP team on the policy was factored into the order such as making it clear that there are four tiers or essential elements of oversight.  

The development and coordination of DOE P 226.1, DOE Oversight Policy has been in progress for two full years now.  It was initiated as a result of a performance based contracting review of Departmental directives.  It was developed by a cross-organizational working group in 2003; went through the Field Management Council process for review as a directive in Fall 2003; and was delayed at request of DNFSB while they conducted hearings that led to Recommendation 2004-1 (on safety oversight).  Furthermore, the order was identified as a deliverable by September 2004 in Plan of Action Memorandums for both the ES&H and the Security Management Challenges established by the former Deputy Secretary in 2004 (championed by EH-1 and SSA respectively, each of whom had working groups responsible for revising and finalizing).  It has now been sent out through Review and Comment System for another (albeit accelerated) review.  The comment period closed on April 8, 2005.  The accelerated review reflects the previous review process, the commitment made by the former Secretary to issue a final Order by April 30, 2005, and a commitment that we would convene working group meetings to work through issues/comments real time.  We have met with the 2004-1 IP core and working groups and have resolved the few remaining concerns they had.

DOE Policy & Order 226.1 have been developed in accordance with the activities and deliverables of the approved Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2004-1.  Written comments were provided by the 2004-1 Core Team, and were incorporated, as appropriate, in the policy and order.

2.	Answer:  (SUPERSEDED BY EH REDLINE COMMENTS PROVIDED JUNE 2, 2005)  No specific change requested.  The Order addresses oversight of emergency management in Attachment 3 (Contractor Assurance System), Attachment 4 (Line Management Oversight Processes), and Attachment 5 (Independent Oversight Processes).  Additionally, consistent with the 2004-1 IP, the Department will develop a new Safety Oversight Manual that will provide specifics of safety management oversight. 

3.	Answer:  (SUPERSEDED BY EH REDLINE COMMENTS PROVIDED JUNE 2, 2005)  No change
Per the Secretary of Energy approved 2004-1 IP, OA serves as the Departments OPI on oversight policy.  OA-1 is assigned responsibility for drafting DOE P&O 226.1 in the IP.  Additionally, the IP states With publication of the new DOE Safety Oversight Manual, the previous DOE Oversight Policy 450.5 will be cancelled.  A cross-walk of requirements between DOE P 450.5 and DOE P&O 226.1 has been prepared and demonstrates that 450.5 may be cancelled upon issuance of the order.  The DOE Safety Oversight Manual will contain specific requirements and guidance for the conduct of safety oversight.

4.  Answer: (SUPERSEDED BY EH REDLINE COMMENTS PROVIDED JUNE 2, 2005)  No change
The development and coordination of DOE P 226.1, DOE Oversight Policy has been in progress for two full years now.  It was initiated as a result of a performance based contracting review of Departmental directives.  It was developed by a cross-organizational working group in 2003; went through the Field Management Council process for review as a directive in Fall 2003; and was delayed at request of DNFSB while they conducted hearings that led to Recommendation 2004-1 (on safety oversight).  Furthermore, the order was identified as a deliverable by September 2004 in Plan of Action Memorandums for both the ES&H and the Security Management Challenges established by the former Deputy Secretary in 2004 (championed by EH-1 and SSA respectively, each of whom had working groups responsible for revising and finalizing).  It has now been sent out through Review and Comment System for another (albeit accelerated) review.  The comment period closed on April 8, 2005.  The accelerated review reflects the previous review process, the commitment made by the former Secretary to issue a final Order by April 30, 2005, and a commitment that we would convene working group meetings to work through issues/comments real time.  We have met with the 2004-1 IP core and working groups and have resolved the few remaining concerns they had.

DOE Policy and Order 226.1 are meant to describe, at a high level, oversight requirements along the four tier oversight model for multiple DOE operational aspects such as environment, safety and health; safeguards and security; cyber security; emergency management; and business operations.  These requirements are not duplicative of safety management systems but serve to integrate existing requirements and establish new requirements that are needed to strengthen oversight processes for all business areas.  Current DOE directives will be reviewed and revised to comply with the minimum requirements of the policy and order as part of the regular directives review process or within 1 year of the effective date of this order, whichever is sooner.  The Secretary has placed a high priority on the improvement of Departmental oversight.  It is necessary to meet the Secretarys expectations for a strengthened integrated oversight process, and while the effort required to accomplish these revisions may be challenging, they are achievable.  The 2004-1 IP addresses enhancements to QAPs in sections 5.1.4 and ISMS in 5.3.1.

5.	Answer:   (SUPERSEDED BY EH REDLINE COMMENTS PROVIDED JUNE 2, 2005)  Consistent with the Secretary of Energy approved 2004-1 IP, DOE Policy & Order 426.1 are being developed with the objective of providing the overall framework for all DOE oversight activities.  It is unclear where changes due to this policy or order would cause DOE O 414.1B, Quality Assurance to be made inconsistent with 10 CFR 830 QA requirements.  In any event, current DOE directives will be reviewed and revised to comply with the minimum requirements of the policy and order as part of the regular directives review process or within 1 year of the effective date of this order, whichever is sooner.   These requirements are not duplicative of safety management systems but serve to integrate existing requirements and establish new requirements that are needed to strengthen oversight processes for all business areas.  The Secretary has placed a high priority on the improvement of Departmental oversight.  It is necessary to meet the Secretarys expectations for a strengthened integrated oversight process, and while the effort required to accomplish these revisions may be challenging, they are achievable.  DOE Policy &Order 226.1 are meant to describe, at a high level, oversight requirements along the four tier oversight model.  The DOE Safety Oversight Manual will contain specific requirements and guidance for the conduct of safety oversight.

6.  This Order contains a mixture of requirements and guidance which is all captured as requirements. DOE has spent a decade or more separating requirements and guidance in the directives system so that the requirements define performance expectations and the guidance provides the how to.  This Order reverses that progress.  Answer:  (SUPERSEDED BY EH REDLINE COMMENTS PROVIDED JUNE 2, 2005)  Agree, DOE Policy & Order 226.1 are envisioned to be requirement documents.  The order was revised to ensure the appropriate use of can, and may statements in the documents.  Inappropriate uses of these auxiliary verbs were changed to will or shall.  

7.  Oversight activities should be focused on ensuring that established requirements are met and findings are tracked to closure, not on establishing new policy, requirements, and implementation guidance.  Answer:  (SUPERSEDED BY EH REDLINE COMMENTS PROVIDED JUNE 2, 2005)  Agree with first part of comment; however no change is required since compliance to requirements, corrective action tracking and issues management are addressed by the policy and order.  It is reasonable that additional policy and requirements will be required to improve performance in Departmental oversight.

8. 	Consistent with DOE O 414 and 10 CFR Part 830, oversight is divided into Management (or line management) oversight and Independent oversight. The requirements for these two types of oversight are contained in Attachment 4 (Line Management) and Attachment 5 (Independent Oversight). This could provide a baseline for oversight requirements, but much of the information in those attachments is more appropriate for guidance, not requirements. Information in these attachments could be worked into the existing guide on assessments DOE G 414.1-1A.  Answer:  (SUPERSEDED BY EH REDLINE COMMENTS PROVIDED JUNE 2, 2005)  Agree.  Attachments 4 and 5 have been reviewed for the appropriate use of can, and may statements.  Inappropriate uses of these auxiliary verbs were changed to will or shall.  

9.  DOE O 226.1 needs to be coordinated with the activities and deliverables of DNFSB 2004-1 to properly reflect safety oversight functions and responsibilities.  Answer:  (SUPERSEDED BY EH REDLINE COMMENTS PROVIDED JUNE 2, 2005)  Agree, specific feedback from the 2004-1 IP team on the policy was factored into the order such as making it clear that there are four tiers or elements of oversight.  Overall DOE Policy & Order 226.1 have been developed in accordance with the activities and deliverables of the approved Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2004-1.

10.  Answer:  (SUPERSEDED BY EH REDLINE COMMENTS PROVIDED JUNE 2, 2005)  No specific change requested.  The Order addresses oversight of emergency management in Attachment 3 (Contractor Assurance System), Attachment 4 (Line Management Oversight Processes), and Attachment 5 (Independent Oversight Processes).  Additionally, consistent with the 2004-1 IP, the Department will develop a new Safety Oversight Manual that will provide specifics of safety management oversight. 

11.	Answer:  (SUPERSEDED BY EH REDLINE COMMENTS PROVIDED JUNE 2, 2005)  Per the Secretary of Energy approved 2004-1 IP, OA serves as the Departments OPI on oversight policy.  OA-1 is assigned responsibility for drafting DOE P&O 226.1 in the IP.  Additionally, the IP states With publication of the new DOE Safety Oversight Manual, the previous DOE Oversight Policy 450.5 will be cancelled.  A cross-walk of requirements between DOE P 450.5 and DOE P&O 226.1 has been prepared and demonstrates that 450.5 may be cancelled upon issuance of the order.  The DOE Safety Oversight Manual will contain specific requirements and guidance for the conduct of safety oversight.

12 Danielson's comment. Answer:  (SUPERSEDED BY EH REDLINE COMMENTS PROVIDED JUNE 2, 2005)  Changes made to clarify requirements  DOE Policy & Order 226.1 are envisioned to be requirement documents.  The order was reviewed for the appropriate use of can and may statements in the documents.  Inappropriate uses of these auxiliary verbs were changed to will or shall.  

Consistent with the Secretary of Energy approved 2004-1 IP, DOE Policy &Order 226.1 are being developed with the objective of providing the overall framework for all DOE oversight activities.  DOE Policy & Order 226.1 are meant to describe, at a high level, oversight requirements along the four tier oversight model.  The new DOE Safety Oversight Manual will contain specific safety oversight requirements and guidance.  These requirements are not duplicative of safety management systems but serve to integrate existing requirements and establish new requirements that are needed to strengthen oversight processes for all business areas.  

The development and coordination of DOE P 226.1, DOE Oversight Policy has been in progress for two full years now.  It was initiated as a result of a performance based contracting review of Departmental directives.  It was developed by a cross-organizational working group in 2003; went through the Field Management Council process for review as a directive in Fall 2003; and was delayed at request of DNFSB while they conducted hearings that led to Recommendation 2004-1 (on safety oversight).  Furthermore, the order was identified as a deliverable by September 2004 in Plan of Action Memorandums for both the ES&H and the Security Management Challenges established by the former Deputy Secretary in 2004 (championed by EH-1 and SSA respectively, each of whom had working groups responsible for revising and finalizing).  It has now been sent out through Review and Comment System for another (albeit accelerated) review.  The comment period closed on April 8, 2005.  The accelerated review reflects the previous review process, the commitment made by the former Secretary to issue a final Order by April 30, 2005, and a commitment that we would convene working group meetings to work through issues/comments real time.  We have met with the 2004-1 IP core and working groups and have resolved the few remaining concerns they had.

13.  Answer:  (SUPERSEDED BY EH REDLINE COMMENTS PROVIDED JUNE 2, 2005)  No change
The development and coordination of DOE P 226.1, DOE Oversight Policy has been in progress for two full years now.  It was initiated as a result of a performance based contracting review of Departmental directives.  It was developed by a cross-organizational working group in 2003; went through the Field Management Council process for review as a directive in Fall 2003; and was delayed at request of DNFSB while they conducted hearings that led to Recommendation 2004-1 (on safety oversight).  Furthermore, the order was identified as a deliverable by September 2004 in Plan Of Action Memorandums for both the ES&H and the Security Management Challenges established by the former Deputy Secretary in 2004 (championed by EH-1 and SSA respectively, each of whom had working groups responsible for revising and finalizing).  It has now been sent out through Review and Comment System for another (albeit accelerated) review.  The comment period closed on April 8, 2005.  The accelerated review reflects the previous review process, the commitment made by the former Secretary to issue a final Order by April 30, 2005, and a commitment that we would convene working group meetings to work through issues/comments real time.  We have met with the 2004-1 IP core and working groups and have resolved the few remaining concerns they had.

DOE Policy & Order 226.1 have been developed in accordance with the activities and deliverables of the Secretary of Energy approved Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2004-1.  DOE Policy & Order 226.1 are meant to describe, at a high level, oversight requirements along the four tier oversight model.  These requirements are not duplicative of safety management systems but serve to integrate existing requirements and establish new requirements that are needed to strengthen oversight processes for all business areas.  Current DOE directives will be reviewed and revised to comply with the minimum requirements of the policy and order as part of the regular directives review process or within 1 year of the effective date of this order, whichever is sooner.  The Secretary has placed a high priority on the improvement of Departmental oversight.  It is necessary to meet the Secretarys expectations for a strengthened integrated oversight process, and while the effort required to accomplish these revisions may be challenging, they are achievable.  Additionally, the IP states With publication of the new DOE Oversight order, the previous DOE Oversight Policy 450.5 will be cancelled.


]]></ResponseContent>
               </Response>
               <Concurrence><![CDATA[Concur/No Comment]]></Concurrence>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Gina Simpson]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[Delegate]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Headquarters EH]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <Comments><![CDATA[Comments submitted by Bud Danielson/Bob Loesch, EH-31, 301-903-2954 & 301-903-4443

1.	General Comment

This directive should be significantly reduced to delineate only the requirements of the policy and should not be redundant with existing requirements, manuals and guidance.  Alternatively, it could be changed to a manual. 

Reason:  A significant amount of the information in this draft order is either redundant with existing requirements and guidance (DOE O 231.1A, DOE M 231.1-1A, DOE O 414.1B, DOE P 450.4, DOE G 450.4-1, 10 CFR 830 Subpart A) or is only guidance in an of itself.  This redundancy will lead to conflicts of requirements and confusion on the part of DOE and contractor organizations.

Comment submitted by Frank Tooper, EH-32, 202-586-1772

EH-3 believes it would be beneficial to revisit the need for this policy and DOE Order.  The Department has a satisfactory oversight policy and Order.  Further, the Orders that are cited in the draft Order that address other aspects of safety management are also adequate.  Hence, we do not see the value-added of a new Order.]]></Comments>
               <Response>
                  <ResponseLevel><![CDATA[Accepted with Modification]]></ResponseLevel>
                  <ResponseContent><![CDATA[Changes made to clarify requirements
DOE Policy & Order 226.1 are envisioned to be requirement documents.  The order was reviewed for the appropriate use of can and may statements in the documents.  Inappropriate uses of these auxiliary verbs were changed to will or shall.  

Consistent with the Secretary of Energy approved 2004-1 IP, DOE Policy &Order 226.1 are being developed with the objective of providing the overall framework for all DOE oversight activities.  DOE Policy & Order 226.1 are meant to describe, at a high level, oversight requirements along the four tier oversight model.  The new DOE Safety Oversight Manual will contain specific safety oversight requirements and guidance.  These requirements are not duplicative of safety management systems but serve to integrate existing requirements and establish new requirements that are needed to strengthen oversight processes for all business areas.  

The development and coordination of DOE P 226.1, DOE Oversight Policy has been in progress for two full years now.  It was initiated as a result of a performance based contracting review of Departmental directives.  It was developed by a cross-organizational working group in 2003; went through the Field Management Council process for review as a directive in Fall 2003; and was delayed at request of DNFSB while they conducted hearings that led to Recommendation 2004-1 (on safety oversight).  Furthermore, the order was identified as a deliverable by September 2004 in Plan of Action Memorandums for both the ES&H and the Security Management Challenges established by the former Deputy Secretary in 2004 (championed by EH-1 and SSA respectively, each of whom had working groups responsible for revising and finalizing).  It has now been sent out through Review and Comment System for another (albeit accelerated) review.  The comment period closed on April 8, 2005.  The accelerated review reflects the previous review process, the commitment made by the former Secretary to issue a final Order by April 30, 2005, and a commitment that we would convene working group meetings to work through issues/comments real time.  We have met with the 2004-1 IP core and working groups and have resolved the few remaining concerns they had.
]]></ResponseContent>
               </Response>
               <Concurrence><![CDATA[Concur/No Comment]]></Concurrence>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters EIA]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters EM]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Joni Boone]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[EM DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Headquarters EM]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <ApproverName><![CDATA[]]></ApproverName>
               <Comments><![CDATA[Subject Matter Expert joseph.arango@em.doe.gov
Cancellations Section 2.: The purpose and scope of the draft Policy 226.1 which this Order implements covers the purpose and scope of the current line oversight Policy 450.5.  It is duplicative to have two oversight policies for the Department so suggest that P 450.5 be cancelled by this Order by adding the following to Section 2: 'This Order cancels DOE P 450.5, Line Environment, Safety and Health Oversight, dated 6-26-97.'  (EM-3.2 will attempt to coordinate a meeting with EH, DR, NNSA, and OA to further discuss the Department's strategy and path forward with regard to our oversight policies.)

Susan Coleman (Office of River Protection DPC) for Office of River Protection
1.  It is not clear whether this Order takes precedence until the multiple other Orders (listed on pages 2 and 3) can be revised to reflect this new Order.  Specify on page 3 and 4.a. or 4.b. which takes precedence.

2.  We already have most of the "assurance programs/processes," specified in this Order.  Why are you not referring to other Orders and using this Order just to define the "framework" of how you expect the Oversight Policy to be implemented.  This framework would refer to other Orders where requirements are now held and only focus on "new" expectations not defined in those Orders.

3.  Throughout Attachments 2, 3, 4, and 5, make it clear what is a "shall" vs. "can or may".  Right now a lot of this sounds like guidance vs. requirements.  For example, Attachment 3 has shall, will, canbe, maybe, must, are, is, throughout making it confusing as to what is required vs. not required.]]></Comments>
               <Response>
                  <ResponseLevel><![CDATA[Accepted with Modification]]></ResponseLevel>
                  <ResponseContent><![CDATA[The Secretary of Energy approved 2004-1 IP states With publication of the new DOE Safety Oversight Manual, the previous DOE Oversight Policy 450.5 will be cancelled.  A cross-walk of requirements between DOE P 450.5 and DOE Policy & Order 226.1 has been prepared and demonstrates that 450.5 may be cancelled upon issuance of the order.


The Secretary of Energy approved 2004-1 IP states With publication of the new DOE Safety Oversight Manual, the previous DOE Oversight Policy 450.5 will be cancelled.  A cross-walk of requirements between DOE P 450.5 and DOE Policy & Order 226.1 has been prepared and demonstrates that 450.5 may be cancelled upon issuance of the order.  Per the draft order, current DOE directives will be reviewed and revised as necessary to comply with the minimum requirements of this Order as part of the regular directives review process or within 1 year of the effective date of this order, whichever is sooner. The Secretary has placed a high priority on the improvement of Departmental oversight.  It is necessary to meet the Secretarys expectations for a strengthened integrated oversight process, and while the effort required to accomplish these revisions may be challenging, they are achievable.  Specific provisions of these directives (e.g., minimum frequency of self-assessments and line management assessments) remain in effect until modified.

Consistent with the Secretary of Energy approved 2004-1 IP, DOE Policy & Order 226.1 are being developed with the objective of providing the overall framework for all DOE oversight activities.  DOE Policy & Order 226.1 are meant to describe, at a high level, oversight requirements along the four tier oversight model for multiple DOE operational aspects such as environment, safety and health; safeguards and security; cyber security; emergency management; and business operations.  Additionally, the 2004-1 IP commits to the development of a DOE Safety Oversight Manual after issuance of DOE Policy & Order 226.1.  The DOE Safety Oversight Manual will contain specific safety oversight requirements and guidance.

DOE Policy & Order 226.1 are envisioned to be requirement documents.  The order was reviewed for the appropriate use of can and may statements.  Inappropriate uses of these auxiliary verbs were changed to will or shall.  In a number of cases, a can statement is utilized to provide some flexibility in approach to be utilized in meeting a stated requirement


]]></ResponseContent>
               </Response>
               <Concurrence><![CDATA[Concur/No Comment]]></Concurrence>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters FE]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters GC]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Richard Farman]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[GC DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Headquarters GC]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <ApproverName><![CDATA[]]></ApproverName>
               <Comments><![CDATA[

Subject Matter Expert steve.duarte@hq.doe.gov
1)  If this Order is intended to apply to defense nuclear facilities, it must have a separate finding that the order is necessary for the protection of human health and the environment or safety, the fulfillment of current legal requirements, or the conduct of critical administrative functions, as specified in 42 USC 7274k.  Please contact ME-43 for details.

2)  The draft does not appear to establish requirements on members of the public that necessitate a notice and comment rulemaking.  No action by the OPI is required.

3)  The directive is a "rule" as that term is defined by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. 801-804, which requires that, when issued in final form, the directive be reported to Congress.  No action by the OPI is required.  GC will report this directive to Congress when it is issued.

]]></Comments>
               <Response>
                  <ResponseLevel><![CDATA[Accepted]]></ResponseLevel>
                  <ResponseContent><![CDATA[A "Necessity Findings Statement" will be developed and processed as required.]]></ResponseContent>
               </Response>
               <Concurrence><![CDATA[Concur/No Comment]]></Concurrence>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters HG]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters IG]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters IN]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters LM]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters MBE]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters NA]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Diane Gillis]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[NA Directives Point of Contact]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Headquarters NA]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <ApproverName><![CDATA[]]></ApproverName>
               <Comments><![CDATA[Comment:  The purpose of this Order is to provide directions for implementing DOE P 226.1, however, there is neither an existing DOE P 226.1 nor a draft DOE P 226.1 in REVCOM for concurrent review.  Until at least a draft policy is put out for review, it is not possible to determine with certainty if this draft Order provides sufficient directions for implementing the policy.  (NA-124/Day - SME/Sykes)

Comment:  This Order does not reflect some of the elements of old 2004-1 IP, let alone the new one currently being developed.  (NA-124/Day - SME/Singh)

Comment:  Implementation:  (a) The proposed order is extremely broad, sweeping, and impacting.  The new Order would impose many dozens of new requirements upon Contractors as well as upon DOE Organizational elements.  The profundity and significance of the Order cannot be overstated.  Undoubtedly, many problems will shake out during implementation.  An orderly transition into the new paradigm imposed by such a sweeping Order might be considered prudent.  However, the implementation of the Order is exercised by fiat, with limited reservation, and with limited conditions.  Thought out to be given to having a shake down implementation of the Order, a phasing in of its dictates, or a pilot/prototype approach to the Order.   The wholesale implementation of the Order as supposed will likely prove to be overwhelming, both to Contractors and to feds.  (b) In a separate but related vein, one would probably like to understand the costs to implement this Order before one unilaterally and unconditionally demands its implementation.  (NA-124/Day - SME/Rhoads)

Comment:  The terms "oversight" and "line management" are used repeatedly throughout the Order.  Definitions for these terms should be supplied.  (NA-124/Day - SME/Rhoads)

Comment:  The Contractor and line management functions ought to be tied to fee evaluation/contract incentives and, for line-item projects, the information falling out from the Order ought to be tied into the Critical Decision process in some manner.  (NA-124/Day - SME/Rhoads)

Comment:  The University of California supports the establishment of contractor assurance systems for the UC managed DOE Laboratories. The concepts identified in the contractor requirements document in the draft order, such as assessments, reporting, feedback, lessons learned, and performance indicators/measure, touch on the same things that we have been addressing in our effort to develop a formal contractor assurance system description.  However, we have not had an opportunity to analyze the draft DOE P 226.1, Oversight Policy, which this draft order implements.  Our desire would be to provide substantive comments that would further the effective implementation of those objectives, but since we have not seen the Policy we are at a disadvantage to do so.  Furthermore, it is difficult to provide specific comments on the draft order without fully understanding its impact on related guidance and direction that we have recently been made aware of on the matter of contractor assurance.  For example, at LANL and LLNL, we have been working very closely with NNSA over the past year to implement the draft NNSA Policy Letter (NAP) on NNSA Line Oversight and Contractor Assurance System (CAS) Policy, using the system attributes to develop a formal CAS system description. We assume, but it is not clear, that the NAP objectives are consistent with the draft order. Also, one of the key attributes included in the NAP is the development of necessary and sufficient requirements using risk-based approaches.  Again, it is not clear that this would be consistent with the draft order, but we would assume that it is. This assumption is reinforced by the fact that a contract provision in the LANL draft RFP (H.004 Contractor Assurance System) contains requirements aligned with the draft NAP. On the other hand, in the LBNL RFP, no such provision exists. Nevertheless, we have previously made LBNL aware of the assurance system design approach at LANL and LLNL, and are incorporating elements tailored to the assurance system appropriate for the LBNL situation. If the draft NNSA NAP is aligned with the DOE Oversight Policy, and there is flexibility to continue to use the work smart standards process to implement this order, we would anticipate little or no difficulty in implementing assurance systems that we believe would satisfy DOE’s expectations.  (Livermore/Cyganowski - SME/Vinson)

Comment:  The Policy discusses deficiencies and opportunities for improvement - it would be helpful if this were to clarify if these are findings, observations or to present a definition of what is meant by these terms. 

The Policy does not contain language regarding validation of the assurance system once the contractor states that they are completed. Validation should be a part of the oversight but of course could be done by a third party - i.e., ISO system validation. 

The Policy statement does not refer to the LOCAS attributes - does that mean that they go away or is this a mistake? 

The Policy statement calls for oversight of the oversight - It would be helpful if there were language to clarify what type of oversight would be performed by HQs versus the level of oversight provided by the field. 

Finally - the Policy statement calls for incorporation of assurance systems in the contract - this has been done for Sandia but should be incorporated either through direction in the Directives appendix or when the contract is recompeted/renegotiated.
(Sandia/Martinez)

Comment: 
1.	Clarify whether several “systems or a single system is required of contractors. (CRD 2. a. “establish contractor assurance systems, CRD 2. b. “Establish contractor assurance systems, CRD 2.c. “provide, for DOE line management review and approval, detailed program descriptions of the contractor assurance system as applied to Attachment 4, 1. k. “The effectiveness of the contractor assurance system will be determined, Attachment 4, 1. n. (2) “Ensuring the adequacy of contractor assurance systems. (etc.) 
2.	Clarify the relationship among “contractor assurance systems (CRD 2. a. and footnote to 2. a. “As used in this CRD, contractor assurance systems encompass all aspects of the activities “contractor assurance processes (Attachment 3 1. a.), and “activities (Attachment 3 1. a. and Attachment 3 1.b.).  See also Attachment 3, c, “Results of assurance processes are periodically.
3.	It is difficult to tell what must be documented, how many assurance system description documents are required, what data are to be available, what process are to be analyzed, compiled and reported to DOE. 
4.	Consider consistent usage. Attachment 3, 2. (Assessments) second paragraph requires assessments of “facilities, systems, and organizational elements , Attachment 3, 7. (Performance Measures) requires considerations of “facilities, programs, and organizations” and Attachment 4, 2. d. (Assessments of Contractor Assurance Systems) “DOE requires that contractor assurance systems address all organizations, facilities, and program elements.” 
5.	The provisions of this draft Order are substantially different than the clause H-3 in the Sandia Model contract,“Contractor Assurance System.”  In particular, the model contract requires (H-3, (a)) “The Contractor shall develop a Contractor Assurance System that is approved and monitored by the Sandia Board of Directors,” as opposed to CRD 2. c. in the draft Order requiring review and approval of Contractor Assurance System description documents for ES&H, S&S, etc. to be approved by DOE line management.  Is DOE prepared to provide adequate funding to cover budgetary shortfalls when programs are implemented?
(Sandia/Martinez - SME/Pruitt) 

Comment:  This document is not ready for issuance. It should be carefully evaluated by ME-60, NA-63 and OGC Contracts Counsel.  (Savannah River/Wright - SME/Simpson)]]></Comments>
               <Response>
                  <ResponseLevel><![CDATA[Accepted with Modification]]></ResponseLevel>
                  <ResponseContent><![CDATA[Subsequently, OA provided a draft copy of the Policy for information through the NNSA Directives Point of Contact.  The Policy, Order, and associated Manual are being developed in accordance with the Secretary of Energy approved 2004-1 IP.  Improving Departmental oversight along the 4 tier model is considered a high priority by the Department and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.  The implementation methodology and timelines are prescribed by the approved IP.

DOE Policy & Order 226.1 have been developed in accordance with the activities and deliverables of the approved Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2004-1.  A cross walk between the principles of 2004-1 IP and the attributes of the oversight policy confirmed that the policy and order are consistent with the IP and that no IP elements lost. 

The development and coordination of DOE P 226.1, DOE Oversight Policy has been in progress for two full years now.  It was initiated as a result of a performance based contracting review of Departmental directives.  It was developed by a cross-organizational working group in 2003; went through the Field Management Council process for review as a directive in Fall 2003; and was delayed at request of DNFSB while they conducted hearings that led to Recommendation 2004-1 (on safety oversight).  Furthermore, the order was identified as a deliverable by September 2004 in Plan Of Action Memorandums for both the ES&H and the Security Management Challenges established by the former Deputy Secretary in 2004 (championed by EH-1 and SSA respectively, each of whom had working groups responsible for revising and finalizing).  It has now been sent out through Review and Comment System for another (albeit accelerated) review.  The comment period closed on April 8, 2005.  The accelerated review reflects the previous review process, the commitment made by the former Secretary to issue a final Order by April 30, 2005, and a commitment that we would convene working group meetings to work through issues/comments real time.  We have met with the 2004-1 IP core and working groups and have resolved the few remaining concerns they had.

The Policy, Order, and associated Manual are being developed in accordance with the Secretary of Energy approved 2004-1 IP.  Improving Departmental oversight along the 4 tier model is considered a high priority by the Department and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.  The implementation methodology and timelines are prescribed by the IP.  

Per the Secretary of Energy approved 2004-1 IP, a baseline assumption was listed that Implementation plan execution is based on target-level funding approved by Congress in an atmosphere of stable mission requirements. Initial funding can be accommodated from existing budgets. The Department will vigorously pursue necessary funding for steady-state activities. 

.  These terms are defined in the policy.  

DOE Policy & Order 226.1 are requirements documents.  Per the draft order, paragraph 3.b.(1), The CRD applies to all DOE contracts consistent with the clause entitled, Laws, regulations, and DOE directives, 48CFR970.5204-2.  The details of how this order is implemented, including evaluation/contract incentives would be included in more specific implementation requirements

Subsequently, OA provided a draft copy of the Policy for information through the NNSA Directives Point of Contact. The Policy, Order, and associated Manual are being developed in accordance with the Secretary of Energy approved 2004-1 IP.  Improving Departmental oversight along the 4 tier model is considered a high priority by the Department and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.  The implementation methodology and timelines are prescribed by the approved IP. The approach taken in DOE Policy & Order 226.1 is consistent with the NNSA Draft NAP Line Oversight/Contractor Assurance System (e.g., there are numerous examples of similarity in requirements for the conduct of DOE line oversight between the NNSA LO/CAS document and Attachment 4 of the 226.1 order).  The necessary and sufficient process is a safe haven for all DOE directives.

A Terminology section is in the policy.  The order was reviewed and revised where additional clarification was needed.  

DOE Policy & Order 226.1 do not cancel the draft NNSA NAP, Line Oversight/Contractor Assurance System.  Information on Line Management Oversight Processes (including headquarters) is included in Attachment 4 of the order.  Additionally, the 2004-1 IP commits to the development of a DOE Safety Oversight Manual after issuance of DOE Policy & Order 226.1.  The DOE Safety Oversight Manual will contain specific oversight requirements.  Per the draft order, paragraph 3.b.(1), The CRD applies to all DOE contracts consistent with the clause entitled, Laws, regulations, and DOE directives, 48CFR970.5204-2.

The order and CRD were reviewed and revised to ensure a consistent reference to contractor assurance system.  Each of the cited references refers to the comprehensive contractor assurance system as described in the footnote of the CRD.

The order and CRD were reviewed and revised to ensure a consistent reference to assurance system.  Each of the cited references refers to the comprehensive contractor assurance system as described in the footnote of the CRD.

Agree with modification.  The order and CRD were reviewed and revised to ensure a consistent reference to assurance system.  Each contractor would produce a single contractor assurance system description document for each contract that it has in place with DOE.  Content and data would be as discussed and approved by appropriate DOE Line Management.

Consistent usage, as described above was considered, and appropriate changes were made throughout the order

No change requested.  Implementation of the Policy, Order, and associated Manual are considered to be within the scope of existing contracts.  Per the Secretary of Energy approved 2004-1 IP, a baseline assumption was that Implementation plan execution is based on target-level funding approved by Congress in an atmosphere of stable mission requirements. Initial funding can be accommodated from existing budgets. The Department will vigorously pursue necessary funding for steady-state activities.]]></ResponseContent>
               </Response>
               <Concurrence><![CDATA[Concur/No Comment]]></Concurrence>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters NE]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Barbara Cramer]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[NE DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Headquarters NE]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <ApproverName><![CDATA[]]></ApproverName>
               <Comments><![CDATA[Karen Moses (ID DPC) for Idaho Operations Office
Requirements Management (INL-NE DPC) for INL - NE
Terms need to be defined throughout the document so everyone is implementing the document consistently. 

This Order goes into much too much detail regarding how the Contractor is to do things and is inconsistent with the objectives of a contractor assurance system which, if demonstrated to be effective, is supposed to allow reduction in the number of DOE assessments.  The effect of this order will be to increase assessments.  For example, it requires DOE to validate corrective action completion and effectiveness.  Since this means that DOE will accept or at least share liability if the problem recurs, they will certainly not sign off without an assessment.  This will delay closure and increase workload for the contractor.  Validating completion and effectiveness is a contractor responsibility, which the CAS  is supposed to assure.  The DOE role should be to assess the CAS for its effectiveness not to repeat the contractor responsibility for each individual CA.  Other examples of specifying the how are the specifics on how the issues management system is to be designed and the direction to not only ensure that assessment personnel have the right experience, knowledge skills and abilities, but to do this by establishing and maintaining 'qualification standards'. (Comment submitted by D. K. Jensen, Performance Assurance Manager) (Comment Concurrence Received from F. B. Williams, ESH&QA Director & Juan Alvarez, Facilities & Site Services Director)

Subject Matter Expert john.serocki@hq.doe.gov
It is difficult to make meaningful comments on a draft directive that is intended to provide implementation requirements supporting a new DOE policy document (DOE P 226.1) that has not been issued yet.  Since a draft of this policy directive has not been provided for perspective and a basis for establishing implementing procedures, the comments supplied herein on the subject document (Draft DOE O 226.1) are strictly tentative.  It is strongly urged that the review period for this draft directive be postponed until said policy document has been issued for RevCom review and comment.]]></Comments>
               <Response>
                  <ResponseLevel><![CDATA[Accepted with Modification]]></ResponseLevel>
                  <ResponseContent><![CDATA[A Terminology section is in the policy.  The order was reviewed and revised where additional clarification was needed.  The Policy, Order, and associated Manual are being developed in accordance with the Secretary of Energy approved 2004-1 IP.  Improving Departmental oversight along the 4 tier model is considered a high priority by the Department and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.  The scope and frequency of DOE Line Management Oversight of the Contractor Assurance System will be determined by appropriate DOE line managers in headquarters and in the field organization. The implementation methodology and timelines are prescribed by the IP.  Personnel being trained and qualified to ensure their ability to perform their assigned work is a requirement of DOE O 414.1A, Quality Assurance; 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety; DOE O 360.1B, Federal Employee Training; and, DOE O 5480.20A, Personnel Selection, Qualification, and Training Requirements For DOE Nuclear Facilities, among others.

Subsequently, OA provided a draft copy of the Policy for information through the NE Directives Point of Contact.  The Policy, Order, and associated Manual are being developed in accordance with the Secretary of Energy approved 2004-1 IP.  Improving Departmental oversight along the 4 tier model is considered a high priority by the Department and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.  The implementation methodology and timelines are prescribed by the approved IP.]]></ResponseContent>
               </Response>
               <Concurrence><![CDATA[Concur/No Comment]]></Concurrence>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters NTEU]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters OA]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters OPI]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters PC-1]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters PO]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters RW]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters SC]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters SO]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Honeywell FM&T (Kansas City Plant)]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Idaho Operations Office]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Karen Moses]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[ID DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Idaho Operations Office]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <ApproverName><![CDATA[Tom Wichmann/NE-ID OPI]]></ApproverName>
               <Comments><![CDATA[Requirements Management (INL-NE DPC) for INL - NE
Terms need to be defined throughout the document so everyone is implementing the document consistently. 

This Order goes into much too much detail regarding how the Contractor is to do things and is inconsistent with the objectives of a contractor assurance system which, if demonstrated to be effective, is supposed to allow reduction in the number of DOE assessments.  The effect of this order will be to increase assessments.  For example, it requires DOE to validate corrective action completion and effectiveness.  Since this means that DOE will accept or at least share liability if the problem recurs, they will certainly not sign off without an assessment.  This will delay closure and increase workload for the contractor.  Validating completion and effectiveness is a contractor responsibility, which the CAS  is supposed to assure.  The DOE role should be to assess the CAS for its effectiveness not to repeat the contractor responsibility for each individual CA.  Other examples of specifying the how are the specifics on how the issues management system is to be designed and the direction to not only ensure that assessment personnel have the right experience, knowledge skills and abilities, but to do this by establishing and maintaining 'qualification standards'. (Comment submitted by D. K. Jensen, Performance Assurance Manager) (Comment Concurrence Received from F. B. Williams, ESH&QA Director & Juan Alvarez, Facilities & Site Services Director)]]></Comments>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Idaho Operations Office-EM]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[INL - NE]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Requirements Management]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[INL-NE DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[INL - NE]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <ApproverName><![CDATA[]]></ApproverName>
               <Comments><![CDATA[Terms need to be defined throughout the document so everyone is implementing the document consistently. 

This Order goes into much too much detail regarding how the Contractor is to do things and is inconsistent with the objectives of a contractor assurance system which, if demonstrated to be effective, is supposed to allow reduction in the number of DOE assessments.  The effect of this order will be to increase assessments.  For example, it requires DOE to validate corrective action completion and effectiveness.  Since this means that DOE will accept or at least share liability if the problem recurs, they will certainly not sign off without an assessment.  This will delay closure and increase workload for the contractor.  Validating completion and effectiveness is a contractor responsibility, which the CAS  is supposed to assure.  The DOE role should be to assess the CAS for its effectiveness not to repeat the contractor responsibility for each individual CA.  Other examples of specifying the how are the specifics on how the issues management system is to be designed and the direction to not only ensure that assessment personnel have the right experience, knowledge skills and abilities, but to do this by establishing and maintaining 'qualification standards'. (Comment submitted by D. K. Jensen, Performance Assurance Manager) (Comment Concurrence Received from F. B. Williams, ESH&QA Director & Juan Alvarez, Facilities & Site Services Director)]]></Comments>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[INL-ICP-EM]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Requirements Management]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[INL-ICP-EM DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[INL-ICP-EM]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <ApproverName><![CDATA[]]></ApproverName>
               <Comments><![CDATA[The ICP contractor will have to develop a formal contractor assurance program as one currently does not exist. Most of the pieces are already in place but quite a bit of work would be required to ensure we are meeting all of the CRD requirements and develop a program description document. (Comment Provided by J. C. Kvamme, Performance Assurance) (Comment Concurrence Received from R. C. Nugent, General Manager, Safety and Health)]]></Comments>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Kaiser-Hill Company, LLC]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Kansas City Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Livermore Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Walter  Cyganowski]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[LSO DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Livermore Site Office]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <ApproverName><![CDATA[]]></ApproverName>
               <Comments><![CDATA[Sandy Vinson (UCOP DPC) for University of California
The University of California supports the 
establishment of contractor assurance systems for 
the UC managed DOE Laboratories.  The concepts 
identified in the contractor requirements document 
in the draft order, such as assessments, reporting, 
feedback, lessons learned, and performance 
indicators/measure, touch on the same things that 
we have been addressing in our effort to develop a 
formal contractor assurance system description.  
However, we have not had an opportunity to 
analyze the draft DOE P 226.1, Oversight Policy, 
which this draft order implements. Our desire 
would be to provide substantive comments that 
would further the effective implementation of those 
objectives, but since we have not seen the Policy we 
are at a disadvantage to do so.  

Furthermore, it is difficult to provide specific 
comments on the draft order without fully 
understanding its impact on related guidance and 
direction that we have recently been made aware of 
on the matter of contractor assurance.   For 
example, at LANL and LLNL, we have been working 
very closely with NNSA over the past year to 
implement the draft NNSA Policy Letter (NAP) on 
NNSA Line Oversight and Contractor Assurance 
System (CAS) Policy, using the system attributes to 
develop a formal CAS system description.  We 
assume, but it is not clear, that the NAP objectives 
are consistent with the draft order.  Also, one of the 
key attributes included in the NAP is the 
development of necessary and sufficient 
requirements using risk-based approaches.  Again, 
it is not clear that this would be consistent with the 
draft order, but we would assume that it is.  This 
assumption is reinforced by the fact that a contract 
provision in the LANL draft RFP (H.004 Contractor 
Assurance System) contains requirements aligned 
with the draft NAP.  On the other hand, in the LBNL 
RFP, no such provision exists.   Nevertheless, we 
have previously made LBNL aware of the assurance 
system design approach at LANL and LLNL, and are 
incorporating elements tailored to the assurance 
system appropriate for the LBNL situation.  If the 
draft NNSA NAP is aligned with the DOE Oversight 
Policy, and there is flexibility to continue to use the 
work smart standards process to implement this 
order, we would anticipate little or no difficulty in 
implementing assurance systems that we believe 
would satisfy DOEs expectations.]]></Comments>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Nancy Shimosaka]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[Delegate]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Livermore Site Office]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <Comments><![CDATA[

Sandy Vinson (UCOP DPC) for University of California
The University of California supports the 
establishment of contractor assurance systems for 
the UC managed DOE Laboratories.  The concepts 
identified in the contractor requirements document 
in the draft order, such as assessments, reporting, 
feedback, lessons learned, and performance 
indicators/measure, touch on the same things that 
we have been addressing in our effort to develop a 
formal contractor assurance system description.  
However, we have not had an opportunity to 
analyze the draft DOE P 226.1, Oversight Policy, 
which this draft order implements. Our desire 
would be to provide substantive comments that 
would further the effective implementation of those 
objectives, but since we have not seen the Policy we 
are at a disadvantage to do so.  

Furthermore, it is difficult to provide specific 
comments on the draft order without fully 
understanding its impact on related guidance and 
direction that we have recently been made aware of 
on the matter of contractor assurance.   For 
example, at LANL and LLNL, we have been working 
very closely with NNSA over the past year to 
implement the draft NNSA Policy Letter (NAP) on 
NNSA Line Oversight and Contractor Assurance 
System (CAS) Policy, using the system attributes to 
develop a formal CAS system description.  We 
assume, but it is not clear, that the NAP objectives 
are consistent with the draft order.  Also, one of the 
key attributes included in the NAP is the 
development of necessary and sufficient 
requirements using risk-based approaches.  Again, 
it is not clear that this would be consistent with the 
draft order, but we would assume that it is.  This 
assumption is reinforced by the fact that a contract 
provision in the LANL draft RFP (H.004 Contractor 
Assurance System) contains requirements aligned 
with the draft NAP.  On the other hand, in the LBNL 
RFP, no such provision exists.   Nevertheless, we 
have previously made LBNL aware of the assurance 
system design approach at LANL and LLNL, and are 
incorporating elements tailored to the assurance 
system appropriate for the LBNL situation.  If the 
draft NNSA NAP is aligned with the DOE Oversight 
Policy, and there is flexibility to continue to use the 
work smart standards process to implement this 
order, we would anticipate little or no difficulty in 
implementing assurance systems that we believe 
would satisfy DOEs expectations.

]]></Comments>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Los Alamos National Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Yvonne Salaz]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[LANL DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Los Alamos National Laboratory]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <Comments><![CDATA[The following comments are submitted by Bill Wadt, LANL (wadt@lanl.gov) as written by Jim Hirahara, UCOP (jim.hirahara@ucop.edu) 
The University of California supports the establishment of contractor assurance systems for the UC managed DOE Laboratories.  The concepts identified in the contractor requirements document in the draft order, such as assessments, reporting, feedback, lessons learned, and performance indicators/measure, touch on the same things that we have been addressing in our effort to develop a formal contractor assurance system description.  However, we have not had an opportunity to analyze the draft DOE P 226.1, Oversight Policy, which this draft order implements. Our desire would be to provide substantive comments that would further the effective implementation of those objectives, but since we have not seen the Policy we are at a disadvantage to do so.  

Furthermore, it is difficult to provide specific comments on the draft order without fully understanding its impact on related guidance and direction that we have recently been made aware of on the matter of contractor assurance.   For example, at LANL and LLNL, we have been working very closely with NNSA over the past year to implement the draft NNSA Policy Letter (NAP) on NNSA Line Oversight and Contractor Assurance System (CAS) Policy, using the system attributes to develop a formal CAS system description.  We assume, but it is not clear, that the NAP objectives are consistent with the draft order.  Also, one of the key attributes included in the NAP is the development of necessary and sufficient requirements using risk-based approaches.  Again, it is not clear that this would be consistent with the draft order, but we would assume that it is.  This assumption is reinforced by the fact that a contract provision in the LANL draft RFP (H.004 Contractor Assurance System) contains requirements aligned with the draft NAP.  On the other hand, in the LBNL RFP, no such provision exists.   Nevertheless, we have previously made LBNL aware of the assurance system design approach at LANL and LLNL, and are incorporating elements tailored to the assurance system appropriate for the LBNL situation.  If the draft NNSA NAP is aligned with the DOE Oversight Policy, and there is flexibility to continue to use the work smart standards process to implement this order, we would anticipate little or no difficulty in implementing assurance systems that we believe would satisfy DOE's expectations.]]></Comments>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Los Alamos Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[NA Service Center]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[National Energy Technology Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[National Renewable Energy Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Nevada Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Oak Ridge National Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Oak Ridge Operations Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Oakland Operations Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Office of Energy Assurance]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Office of River Protection]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Susan Coleman]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[Office of River Protection DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Office of River Protection]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <ApproverName><![CDATA[]]></ApproverName>
               <Comments><![CDATA[1.  It is not clear whether this Order takes precedence until the multiple other Orders (listed on pages 2 and 3) can be revised to reflect this new Order.  Specify on page 3 and 4.a. or 4.b. which takes precedence.

2.  We already have most of the "assurance programs/processes," specified in this Order.  Why are you not referring to other Orders and using this Order just to define the "framework" of how you expect the Oversight Policy to be implemented.  This framework would refer to other Orders where requirements are now held and only focus on "new" expectations not defined in those Orders.

3.  Throughout Attachments 2, 3, 4, and 5, make it clear what is a "shall" vs. "can or may".  Right now a lot of this sounds like guidance vs. requirements.  For example, Attachment 3 has shall, will, canbe, maybe, must, are, is, throughout making it confusing as to what is required vs. not required.]]></Comments>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Ohio Field Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[OSTI]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Pacific Northwest National Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Terry Dahl]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[PNNL DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Pacific Northwest National Laboratory]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <ApproverName><![CDATA[]]></ApproverName>
               <Comments><![CDATA[SME (Bryan Mohler) There is no clear statement of purpose for contractor assurance tied to the contractor's outcomes and mission.  In this approach, assurance is performed on the operations side of the business without regard to mission and strategic accomplishment.  The business context outside of operational compliance is completely missing.

The order confuses the contractual performance management process (via the PEMP and self-evaluation report) with Assurance.  It further confuses and is inconsistent with contractor and Federal roles in performance-based contracts.

Assurance results would be required for periodic analysis and reporting to DOE, which is redundant with existing processes for managing and overseeing performance against the annual PEMP.

There is no concept of risks and limits of risk in relation to accomplishing objectives â€“ it appears that everything would be overseen based on the concept of zero defect, including DOE approval of contractor corrective action plans.  There appears to be no mechanism for agreeing on risk boundaries.

This order distinguishes between 'corporate' and 'contractor' assurance programs.  Is that intended?  

The DOE oversight process requires a large number of redundant assessments and performance data that feeds the DOE management need, but, may not be needed for contractor management roles.  Again, this creates new cost in terms of systems and people.

Overall, this is poorly written and inconsistent with the principles of an M&O and performance-based contract as well as the intent of a GOCO arrangement.  It’s creates new and significant cost as well as redundant processes and systems.]]></Comments>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Pantex Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Portsmouth Paducah Project Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Richland Operations Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Rocky Flats Field Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Sandia National Laboratories]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Rebecca Cayen]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[SNL DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Sandia National Laboratories]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <ApproverName><![CDATA[]]></ApproverName>
               <Comments><![CDATA[The following meets the major comment  criteria of accomplishing policy objectives and mission.  Comments were provided by Joan Harris, ES&H Performance Assuraance Department.

1. Clarify whether several â€œsystemsâ€ or a single â€œsystemâ€ is required of contractors. (CRD 2. a. â€œestablish contractor assurance systems,â€ CRD 2. b. â€œEstablish contractor assurance systems,â€ CRD 2.c. â€œprovide, for DOE line management review and approval, detailed program descriptions of the contractor assurance system as applied to â€¦.â€ Attachment 4, 1. k. â€œThe effectiveness of the contractor assurance system will be determinedâ€¦â€, Attachment 4, 1. n. (2) â€œEnsuring the adequacy of contractor assurance systems.â€ (etc.)

2. Clarify the relationship among â€œcontractor assurance systemsâ€ (CRD 2. a. and footnote to 2. a. â€œAs used in this CRD, contractor assurance systems encompass all aspects of the activitiesâ€¦..â€), â€œcontractorâ€™s assurance processesâ€ (Attachment 3 1. a.), and â€œactivitiesâ€ (Attachment 3 1. a. and Attachment 3 1.b.). See also Attachment 3, c, â€œResults of assurance processes are periodically â€¦.â€ 

3.	It is difficult to tell what must be documented, how many assurance system description documents are required, what data are to be available, what process are to be analyzed, compiled and reported to DOE.

4.	Consider consistent usage. Attachment 3, 2. (Assessments) second paragraph requires assessments of â€œfacilities, systems, and organizational elementsâ€¦â€ , Attachment 3, 7. (Performance Measures) requires considerations of â€œfacilities, programs, and organizationsâ€¦â€ and Attachment 4, 2. d. (Assessments of Contractor Assurance Systems) â€œDOE requires that contractor assurance systems address all organizations, facilities, and program elements.â€  

5.	The provisions of this draft Order are substantially different than the clause H-3 in the Sandia Model contract, â€œContractor Assurance System.â€ In particular, the model contract requires (H-3, (a)) â€œThe Contractor shall develop a Contractor Assurance System that is approved and monitored by the Sandia Board of Directors,â€ as opposed to CRD 2. c. in the draft Order  requiring review and approval of Contractor Assurance System description documents for ES&H, S&S, etc. to be approved by DOE line management.

Is DOE prepared to provide adequate funding to cover budgetary shortfalls when programs are implemented? (Dirk Pruitt, 702-295-8129)]]></Comments>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Sandia Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Bernadette Martinez]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[SSO DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Sandia Site Office]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <ApproverName><![CDATA[]]></ApproverName>
               <Comments><![CDATA[The Policy discusses deficiencies and opportunities for improvement - it would be helpful if this were to clarify if these are findings, observations or to present a definition of what is meant by these terms.

The Policy does not contain language regarding validation of the assurance system once the contractor states that they are completed. Validation should be a part of the oversight but of course could be done by a third party - i.e., ISO system validation.

The Policy statement does not refer to the LOCAS attributes - does that mean that they go away or is this a mistake?

The Policy statement calls for oversight of the oversight - It would be helpful if there were language to clarify what type of oversight would be performed by HQs versus the level of oversight provided by the field.

Finally - the Policy statement calls for incorporation of assurance systems in the contract - this has been done for Sandia but should be incorporated either through direction in the Directives appendix or when the contract is recompeted/renegotiated.


Rebecca Cayen (SNL DPC) for Sandia National Laboratories wrote on 03/25/2005 17:25:21 Mountain Time:
The following meets the major comment criteria of accomplishing policy objectives and mission. Comments were provided by Joan Harris, ES&H Performance Assuraance Department.

1. Clarify whether several â€œsystemsâ€ or a single â€œsystemâ€ is required of contractors. (CRD 2. a. â€œestablish contractor assurance systems,â€ CRD 2. b. â€œEstablish contractor assurance systems,â€ CRD 2.c. â€œprovide, for DOE line management review and approval, detailed program descriptions of the contractor assurance system as applied to â€¦.â€ Attachment 4, 1. k. â€œThe effectiveness of the contractor assurance system will be determinedâ€¦â€, Attachment 4, 1. n. (2) â€œEnsuring the adequacy of contractor assurance systems.â€ (etc.)

2. Clarify the relationship among â€œcontractor assurance systemsâ€ (CRD 2. a. and footnote to 2. a. â€œAs used in this CRD, contractor assurance systems encompass all aspects of the activitiesâ€¦..â€), â€œcontractorâ€™s assurance processesâ€ (Attachment 3 1. a.), and â€œactivitiesâ€ (Attachment 3 1. a. and Attachment 3 1.b.). See also Attachment 3, c, â€œResults of assurance processes are periodically â€¦.â€ 

3. It is difficult to tell what must be documented, how many assurance system description documents are required, what data are to be available, what process are to be analyzed, compiled and reported to DOE.

4. Consider consistent usage. Attachment 3, 2. (Assessments) second paragraph requires assessments of â€œfacilities, systems, and organizational elementsâ€¦â€ , Attachment 3, 7. (Performance Measures) requires considerations of â€œfacilities, programs, and organizationsâ€¦â€ and Attachment 4, 2. d. (Assessments of Contractor Assurance Systems) â€œDOE requires that contractor assurance systems address all organizations, facilities, and program elements.â€ 

5. The provisions of this draft Order are substantially different than the clause H-3 in the Sandia Model contract, â€œContractor Assurance System.â€ In particular, the model contract requires (H-3, (a)) â€œThe Contractor shall develop a Contractor Assurance System that is approved and monitored by the Sandia Board of Directors,â€ as opposed to CRD 2. c. in the draft Order requiring review and approval of Contractor Assurance System description documents for ES&H, S&S, etc. to be approved by DOE line management.

Is DOE prepared to provide adequate funding to cover budgetary shortfalls when programs are implemented? (Dirk Pruitt, 702-295-8129)]]></Comments>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Savannah River EM Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Savannah River Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Linda C. Wright]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[SRSO DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Savannah River Site Office]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <ApproverName><![CDATA[]]></ApproverName>
               <Comments><![CDATA[

Subject Matter Expert ronald02.simpson@nnsa.srs.gov
This document is not ready for issuance.  It should be carefully evaluated by ME-60, NA-63 and OGC Contracts Counsel.

]]></Comments>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Southeastern Power Administration]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Southwestern Power Administration]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Stanford Linear Accelerator Center]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Stanford Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[University of California]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Sandy Vinson]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[UCOP DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[University of California]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <ApproverName><![CDATA[]]></ApproverName>
               <Comments><![CDATA[The University of California supports the 
establishment of contractor assurance systems for 
the UC managed DOE Laboratories.  The concepts 
identified in the contractor requirements document 
in the draft order, such as assessments, reporting, 
feedback, lessons learned, and performance 
indicators/measure, touch on the same things that 
we have been addressing in our effort to develop a 
formal contractor assurance system description.  
However, we have not had an opportunity to 
analyze the draft DOE P 226.1, Oversight Policy, 
which this draft order implements. Our desire 
would be to provide substantive comments that 
would further the effective implementation of those 
objectives, but since we have not seen the Policy we 
are at a disadvantage to do so.  

Furthermore, it is difficult to provide specific 
comments on the draft order without fully 
understanding its impact on related guidance and 
direction that we have recently been made aware of 
on the matter of contractor assurance.   For 
example, at LANL and LLNL, we have been working 
very closely with NNSA over the past year to 
implement the draft NNSA Policy Letter (NAP) on 
NNSA Line Oversight and Contractor Assurance 
System (CAS) Policy, using the system attributes to 
develop a formal CAS system description.  We 
assume, but it is not clear, that the NAP objectives 
are consistent with the draft order.  Also, one of the 
key attributes included in the NAP is the 
development of necessary and sufficient 
requirements using risk-based approaches.  Again, 
it is not clear that this would be consistent with the 
draft order, but we would assume that it is.  This 
assumption is reinforced by the fact that a contract 
provision in the LANL draft RFP (H.004 Contractor 
Assurance System) contains requirements aligned 
with the draft NAP.  On the other hand, in the LBNL 
RFP, no such provision exists.   Nevertheless, we 
have previously made LBNL aware of the assurance 
system design approach at LANL and LLNL, and are 
incorporating elements tailored to the assurance 
system appropriate for the LBNL situation.  If the 
draft NNSA NAP is aligned with the DOE Oversight 
Policy, and there is flexibility to continue to use the 
work smart standards process to implement this 
order, we would anticipate little or no difficulty in 
implementing assurance systems that we believe 
would satisfy DOEs expectations.]]></Comments>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Wackenhut Services Inc (SRS)]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Wackenhut Services Inc. (Nevada)]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[West Valley Demonstration Project]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Western Area Power Administration]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Westinghouse Savannah River Corp.]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Westinghouse Savannah River Corp. for SR-EM]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[WIPP]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Y-12 (BWXT)]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Y-12 (WSI)]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Y-12 Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
         </Section>
         <Section>
            <SectionTitle><![CDATA[1. OBJECTIVE]]></SectionTitle>
            <SectionContent><![CDATA[1.	OBJECTIVE.  This Order provides directions for implementing Department
of Energy (DOE) P 226.1, Department of Energy Oversight Policy, dated XX-XX-05, which 
establishes DOE policy for assurance activities performed by DOE contractors and 
oversight programs performed by DOE line management and independent oversight 
organizations.

2.	CANCELLATIONS.  None.

]]></SectionContent>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Ames Labortatory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Argonne National Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Associate Manager for Science & Technology, Richland]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Bechtel Hanford]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Bechtel Nevada]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Berkeley Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Bonneville Power Administration]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Brookhaven National  Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[BWXT Pantex, LLC]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Carlsbad Area Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Carlsbad Field Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[CH2MHill]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Chicago Operations Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Critique]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Departmental Representatives Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Directives Management Team]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Fernald]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Fluor Hanford Inc]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Golden Field Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Grand Junction]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters CI]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters CIO]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters CN]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters CR]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters ED]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters EE]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters EH]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters EIA]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters EM]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Joni Boone]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[EM DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Headquarters EM]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <Comments><![CDATA[Subject Matter Expert kayla.lozano@em.doe.gov
This draft order does not purport to cancel any other orders.  Rather, it adds another layer of requirements to many other orders that already discuss assessments and evaluations of the effectiveness of programs.  These include, from a security perspective, the Survey and Self-Assessment Chapters of the current DOE O 470.1, the current Integrated Safeguards and Security Management Policy in DOE P 470.1, and the requirements to assess program effectiveness in DOE 5480.19, Conduct of Operations.  This seems contrary to the current "streamlining" initiatives which are attempting to eliminate redundant or conflicting requirements.]]></Comments>
               <Response>
                  <ResponseLevel><![CDATA[Not Accepted]]></ResponseLevel>
                  <ResponseContent><![CDATA[No change.  The Policy, Order, and associated Manual are being developed in accordance with the Secretary of Energy approved 2004-1 IP.  Improving Departmental oversight along the 4 tier model is considered a high priority by the Department and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.  DOE Policy & Order 226.1 are meant to describe, at a high level, oversight requirements along the four tier oversight model.  Some duplication of requirements is expected.  Current DOE directives will be reviewed and revised to comply with the minimum requirements of the policy and order as part of the regular directives review process or within 1 year of the effective date of this order, whichever is sooner.  The Secretary has placed a high priority on the improvement of Departmental oversight.  It is necessary to meet the Secretarys expectations for a strengthened integrated oversight process, and while the effort required to accomplish these revisions may be challenging, they are achievable]]></ResponseContent>
               </Response>
               <Concurrence><![CDATA[Concur/No Comment]]></Concurrence>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters FE]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters GC]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters HG]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters IG]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters IN]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters LM]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters MBE]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters NA]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Diane Gillis]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[NA Directives Point of Contact]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Headquarters NA]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <Comments><![CDATA[Comment:  The overall DOE Order in confusing in Scope in that it is not clear what activities above ES&H, S&S, and Emergency Management that all the provision should be applied to. Recommend that scope be limited to these three areas and that the Objective be revised to focus on these programs.  (Kansas City/Hoopes)

Comment:  Does DOE P 226.1 exist?   (Livermore/Cyganowski SME/Promani)

Comment:   The Objective should make it clear that this Oversight Policy is subject to the legal limitations of each applicable contract, and that the contract must create a framework for the conduct of an oversight program by DOE representatives.   (Savannah River/Wright - SME/Simpson)]]></Comments>
               <Response>
                  <ResponseLevel><![CDATA[Accepted with Modification]]></ResponseLevel>
                  <ResponseContent><![CDATA[Agree with modification.  The purpose and scope section of the oversight policy provides clear definition.  The purpose and scope section of the policy document has been reviewed, and appropriate information has been incorporated into the objective, applicability, and requirements section of the Order.  

The Policy, Order, and associated Manual are being developed in accordance with the Secretary of Energy approved 2004-1 IP.  Subsequently, OA provided a copy of the Policy for information to the NNSA Directives Point of Contact.

The applicability and CRD sections of the order were revised based on feedback received from General Counsel and Procurement to ensure this directive is included in the appropriate contracts.  The policy, order, and the associated manual are broader in scope than DOE oversight of the contractor. DOE Policy & Order 226.1 are meant to describe, at a high level, oversight requirements along the four tier oversight model.  The DOE Safety Oversight Manual will contain specific oversight requirements.  Per the draft order, paragraph 3.b.(1), The CRD applies to all DOE contracts consistent with the clause entitled, Laws, regulations, and DOE directives, 48CFR970.5204-2.]]></ResponseContent>
               </Response>
               <Concurrence><![CDATA[Concur/No Comment]]></Concurrence>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters NE]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters NTEU]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters OA]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters OPI]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters PC-1]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters PO]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters RW]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters SC]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters SO]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Honeywell FM&T (Kansas City Plant)]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Idaho Operations Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Idaho Operations Office-EM]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[INL - NE]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[INL-ICP-EM]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Kaiser-Hill Company, LLC]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Kansas City Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Pat Hoopes]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[Delegate]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Kansas City Site Office]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <Comments><![CDATA[The overall DOE Order in confusing in Scope in that it is not clear what activities above ES&H, S&S, and Emergency Management that all the provision should be applied to.  Recommend that scope be limited to these three areas and that the Objective be revised to focus on these programs.]]></Comments>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Livermore Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Walter  Cyganowski]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[LSO DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Livermore Site Office]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <Comments><![CDATA[Does DOE P 226.1 exist?
SME:  Ronna Promani, LSO]]></Comments>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Los Alamos National Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Los Alamos Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[NA Service Center]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[National Energy Technology Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[National Renewable Energy Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Nevada Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Oak Ridge National Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Oak Ridge Operations Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Oakland Operations Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Office of Energy Assurance]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Office of River Protection]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Ohio Field Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[OSTI]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Pacific Northwest National Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Pantex Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Portsmouth Paducah Project Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Richland Operations Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Rocky Flats Field Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Sandia National Laboratories]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Sandia Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Savannah River EM Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Savannah River Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Linda C. Wright]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[SRSO DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Savannah River Site Office]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <Comments><![CDATA[

Subject Matter Expert ronald02.simpson@nnsa.srs.gov
The Objective should make it clear that this Oversight Policy is subject to the legal limitations of each applicable contract, and that the contract must create a framework for the conduct of an oversight program by DOE representatives.

]]></Comments>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Southeastern Power Administration]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Southwestern Power Administration]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Stanford Linear Accelerator Center]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Stanford Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[University of California]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Wackenhut Services Inc (SRS)]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Wackenhut Services Inc. (Nevada)]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[West Valley Demonstration Project]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Western Area Power Administration]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Westinghouse Savannah River Corp.]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Westinghouse Savannah River Corp. for SR-EM]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[WIPP]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Y-12 (BWXT)]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Y-12 (WSI)]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Y-12 Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
         </Section>
         <Section>
            <SectionTitle><![CDATA[3. APPLICABILITY]]></SectionTitle>
            <SectionContent><![CDATA[3.	APPLICABILITY.  

a.	Departmental Elements..  Except for the exclusions in paragraph 3c, 
this Order applies to all Departmental Elements (see Attachment 1 for a complete 
list of Departmental Elements).  This Order automatically applies to Departmental 
Elements created after it is issued.

The Administrator of NNSA shall assure that NNSA employees and contractors 
comply with their respective responsibilities under this Order.
b.	DOE Contractors.

(1)	Except for the exclusions in paragraph 3c, the Contractor Requirements 
Document (CRD), Attachment 2, sets forth requirements of this Order that 
will apply to contractors whose contracts include the CRD.  The CRD 
applies to all DOE contracts consistent with the clause entitled, Laws, 
regulations, and DOE directives, 48CFR970.5204-2.  

(2)	This CRD will also be made applicable to other DOE contracts that are 
governed by 48 CFR 952.204-2, Security; 48 CFR 952.204-70, 
Classification/Declassification; and/or 48 CFR 952.223-71, Integration 
of Environment, Safety and Health into Work Planning and Execution.

]]></SectionContent>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Ames Labortatory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Argonne National Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Associate Manager for Science & Technology, Richland]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Bechtel Hanford]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Bechtel Nevada]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Berkeley Site Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Bonneville Power Administration]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Brookhaven National  Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[BWXT Pantex, LLC]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Carlsbad Area Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Carlsbad Field Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[CH2MHill]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Chicago Operations Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Critique]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Departmental Representatives Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Directives Management Team]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Fernald]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Fluor Hanford Inc]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Golden Field Office]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Grand Junction]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters CI]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters CIO]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters CN]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters CR]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters ED]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters EE]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters EH]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters EIA]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters EM]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters FE]]></OrganizationName>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
               <OrganizationName><![CDATA[Headquarters GC]]></OrganizationName>
               <Source>
                  <SourceUsername><![CDATA[Richard Farman]]></SourceUsername>
                  <SourceTitle><![CDATA[GC DPC]]></SourceTitle>
                  <SourceSite><![CDATA[Headquarters GC]]></SourceSite>
               </Source>
               <Comments><![CDATA[

Subject Matter Expert laura.fullerton@hq.doe.gov
The language in 3.b. fails to adequately inform the reader about how the directives system is implemented in contracts and includes language which may confuse some readers.  This section must be revised to read along the following lines:
"3. b.(1) The Contractor Requirements Document (CRD), Attachment 2, sets forth requirements that are to be applied to contractors with responsibility for worker safety and health at DOE sites or facilities. 
(2) Except for the exclusions in paragraph 3c, the CRD sets forth requirements of this Order that will apply to contractors whose contracts include the CRD. 
(3) The office identified in the Responsibilities paragraph is responsible for notifying the contracting officer which contracts are affected by the requirements described in this directive.  Once notified, the contracting officer is responsible for incorporating the CRD into each affected contract via the Laws, regulations, and DOE directives clause (48 CFR 970.5204-2) of the contract.
(4) Regardless of the performer of the work, the contractor is responsible for compliance with the requirements of the CRD that are incorporated in its contract. An affected contractor is responsible for flowing down the requirements of the CRD to subcontractors at any tier to the extent necessary to ensure the contractor’s compliance with the requirements and the safe performance of work."

]]></Comments>
               <Response>
                  <ResponseLevel><![CDATA[Accepted]]></ResponseLevel>
                  <ResponseContent><![CDATA[Agree.  Your comment has been incorporated into the order
]]></ResponseContent>
               </Response>
               <Concurrence><![CDATA[Concur/No Comment]]></Concurrence>
            </Organization>
            <Organization>
          