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U.S. Department of Energy
Washington, D.C. 20585 NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE
DOE G 420.1-3
9-27-07
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR DOE
FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY SERVICES PROGRAMS
for Use with DOE O 420.1B, Facility Safety
[This Guide describes suggested nonmandatory approaches for
meeting requirements. Guides are not requirements documents and
are not construed as requirements in any audit or appraisal for
compliance with the parent Policy, Order, Notice, or Manual.]
FOREWORD
This document replaces Department of Energy (DOE) G 440.1-5,
Implementation Guide for use with DOE Orders 420.1 and 440.1 Fire
Safety Program.
Comments should be sent to the Office of Nuclear Safety and
Environment within the Office of Health, Safety and Security,
phone 202-586-5680, or email jim.bisker@hq.doe.gov.
DOE implementation guides are part of the DOE Directives Program
and are issued to provide supplemental information regarding the
Department's expectations for fulfilling its requirements
as contained in rules, Orders, Notices, and regulatory standards.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Guide is to facilitate implementation of
requirements in Department of Energy (DOE) Order (O) 420.1B,
Facility Safety, by providing supplementary information that
describes an acceptable approach to meet the DOE O 420.1B
requirements for Fire Protection Programs. This document also
addresses, in part and where appropriate, the relationship of
fire protection requirements in DOE O 420.1B and the following
DOE documents:
• 10 CFR Part 851, Worker Safety and Health Program
• DOE O 440.1B, Worker Protection Program for DOE
(Including the National Nuclear Security
Administration) Federal Employees
• DOE Guide (G) 440.1-8, Implementing Guide for Use with
10 CFR Part 851, Worker Safety and Health Programs1
• DOE G 450.1-4, Implementation Guide, Wildland Fire
Management Program for Use with DOE O 450.1,
Environmental Protection Program
• DOE O 151.1C, Comprehensive Emergency Management System
• DOE-STD-1066-99, Fire Protection Design Criteria
• DOE-STD-1088-95, Fire Protection for Relocatable
Structures
These additional documents are available at the DOE Fire
Protection Website:
(http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/nsea/fire//) and/or at
the DOE Directives Website (http://www.directives.doe.gov/)
and/or at the DOE Technical Standards Website
(http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/techstds/).
2.0 APPLICABILITY
DOE and contractor fire safety programs include all activities
pertaining to fire hazards and related perils including:
emergency services, operations and maintenance activities such as
hot work or combustible material handling or storage;
construction activities related to fire safety;
installation and testing of fire protection systems; water supply
and distribution systems; fire safety training; assessments;
facility and site walk downs; and other fire protection
activities that are not explicitly identified here.
This Guide applies to all Departmental Elements and Contractors
as delineated in DOE O 420.1B. It provides an acceptable means
to implement the fire protection requirements detailed in Chapter
II and associated Attachment 2, Contractor Requirements Document
(CRD) of DOE O 420.1B.
Implementation of alternate or innovative fire safety
configurations and practices that will meet the requirements of
DOE O 420.1B and achieve a level of fire protection and emergency
response determined to be equal to that attained by conformance
with this Guide is allowed according to Sections 4c and 5b(5) of
DOE O 420.1B.
3.0 DEFINITIONS
Documented Safety Analysis – An analysis of the extent to which a
nuclear facility can be operated safely with respect to workers,
the public, and the environment, including a description of the
conditions, safe boundaries, and hazard controls that provide the
basis for ensuring safety (10 CFR 830.3).
Emergency Services – The performance of activities pertaining to
the inherent responsibilities of the site fire department,
brigade, or other organization that performs any or all of the
following functions:
• Fire Suppression
• Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Response
• Emergency Medical Services
• Technical Rescue
• Confined Space Entry
• Training
• Off-site Assistance to Other Emergency Services
Organizations (Mutual Aid)
• Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Fire Protection
Equipment or Apparatus
• Facility Fire Prevention and Life Safety Inspections
Fire Protection – A broad term which encompasses the aspects of
fire and life safety, concerned with minimizing the direct and
indirect consequences of fire and other perils, such as
explosions and natural phenomenon events as they relate to fire.
Aspects of fire protection include, but are not limited to, fire
suppression and detection systems, fire water systems and
emergency process safety control systems, building construction
and fixed building features such as fire doors, fire walls and
barriers, and fire dampers. Also included are the fire
department and emergency response forces.
Fire Protection Assessment – A formal documented review conducted
by DOE or Contractors in accordance with DOE requirements that
examine the essential fire protection elements as they relate to
a specific facility or overall fire protection program.
Fire Prevention – The process of managing and regulating
potential fire hazards (fuels and heat energy sources) and the
mechanisms that bring them together to either eliminate the
hazard(s) or reduce the risk associated with the hazard(s) to
acceptable levels.
Pre-Incident Plan – A document owned and developed by a fire
department which provides information to responding personnel
that will help them safely and effectively manage emergencies
with available resources at a specific facility or area.
4.0 IMPLEMENTATION INSTRUCTIONS
DOE O 420.1B establishes facility and programmatic safety
requirements for a comprehensive fire protection program for DOE
sites, facilities, and emergency service organizations to
minimize: (1) the potential for occurrence of a fire or related
event; (2) fires that cause an unacceptable onsite or offsite
release of hazardous or radiological material that could impact
the health and safety of employees, the public, or the
environment; (3) unacceptable interruption of vital DOE programs
as a result of fire and related hazards; (4) property loss from
fire exceeding limits established by DOE; and (5) fire damage to
critical process controls and safety systems structures and
components (as documented by appropriate safety analysis).
Comprehensive fire safety and emergency response programs at DOE
sites and facilities include, but are not limited to, appropriate
policies, requirements, technical criteria, analyses,
administrative procedures, and related documentation. In
addition they feature adequately designed, installed and
maintained fire safety systems, hardware, structural features,
and related devices. These programs include access to fully
capable emergency response forces featuring trained personnel and
an adequate inventory of apparatus and equipment that enable
these forces to respond in a timely and effective manner. Where
the local emergency response capability is deemed insufficient,
appropriate compensatory measures are implemented to address
baseline needs. The professional staff, general worker
population, and visiting public at these sites and facilities are
appropriately trained on the fire hazards and related conditions
that they are likely to encounter.
Additional guidance on how to meet DOE expectations for the above-
referenced programs is delineated below. This guidance
supplements general industry criteria, and contractual
obligations and should be implemented by qualified and
experienced fire safety professionals. Where confusion exists as
to their intent or application, it is expected that the Authority
Having Jurisdiction2 (AHJ) be consulted. This additional
guidance is referenced to the specific sections of the DOE O
420.1B where additional guidance was deemed warranted by DOE and
DOE contractor fire safety professionals.
4.1 Program Objectives
Information in this section pertains to Section 1 of Chapter
II in DOE O 420.1B (and the corresponding CRD Section in
Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
The following paragraphs describe in broad terms the
approach to achieve the objectives of a DOE fire protection
and emergency response program:
1. Contractors can achieve a comprehensive, multi-faceted
emergency response capability in a number of ways.
They can rely on an on-site emergency services
organization, such as what currently exists at many DOE
sites; or they can rely completely on off-site fire
departments to meet DOE determined response objectives.
Contractors can also combine the capabilities of both
on-site and off-site emergencies services organizations
so as to assure the timely and effective response to
the spectrum of emergency conditions (fires, medical
emergencies, technical rescue, hazardous material
response, etc.) that they may encounter (e.g. mutual
aid agreements).
a. If an on-site fire department will be relied upon
to provide complete emergency services, the full
scope of its capabilities including: mission
responsibilities, personnel, apparatus, equipment,
facilities, programs, incident reporting, etc.
should be delineated in a Baseline Needs
Assessment (BNA) as further explained below. The
BNA should address compliance with the National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes and
standards and other requirements that define the
character of its mission and responsibilities.
(This does not mean that the BNA has to be written
to confirm code conformance on the basis of line-
by-line comparisons. A reasonable degree of
documentation is expected.) It should also
address applicable contract provisions and aid
agreements with other contractors on site as well
as off-site organizations. The goal is to capture
in one document information that will confirm that
the fire department is fully capable of meeting
emergency response requirements and needs. Note
that there is a “model” BNA that can be downloaded
and edited, available on the DOE fire protection
website at
http://www.hss.energy.doe.gov/nuclearsafety/nsea/f
ire/models/models.html.
b. If a contractor will rely completely on (non-DOE)
off-site emergency services organizations to
satisfy the emergency response requirement, then
the contractor should first define completely its
emergency services needs against the services
available by the off-site organization. This can
be done via a BNA or comparable document,
commensurate with the off-site organization’s
responsibilities. This document should delineate
what is required (capability), why is it required
(hazards, accident potential, code requirements,
etc), and how this capability is assured by the
off-site emergency services organization.
c. If a contractor will rely on a combination of on-
site and off-site emergency services
organizations, the contractor should
comprehensively demonstrate that an adequate
emergency response capability exists on the basis
of some combination of the efforts described in
“a” and “b,” above.
2. Contractors can achieve and maintain a comprehensive
site and facility fire protection program through
implementation of applicable industry codes and
standards (principally from the NFPA), as modified by
DOE fire safety criteria. Site and facility fire
protection programs are characterized by defense-in-
depth. This means that adequate safety is assured by
reliance on multiple levels of fire protection (fire
safety policies, administrative procedures, active fire
protection systems, passive fire safety features,
trained people, and an adequate emergency response
capability, among other possible facets).
Additionally, the long-term adequacy of site and
facility fire safety programs required routine self-
assessments with a corrective action program that
facilitates the timely remediation of significant fire
protection and emergency response deficiencies. Such
programs include appropriate notification, reporting,
and tracking and trending of findings.
3. Subcontractors can achieve compliance with DOE fire
safety objectives through an established and
appropriately documented relationship with a prime
contractor’s fire protection and emergency response
program.
4.2 Highly Protected Risk Status
Information in this section pertains to Section 3a(1) of
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and the corresponding CRD
section in Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
Highly Protected Risk (HPR) is a rating given to property
that qualifies for insurance coverage by the Factory Mutual
System, the Industrial Risk Insurers, and other industrial
insurance companies that limit their insurance underwriting
to the best-protected class of industrial risk.
The requirement of the applicable building code and NFPA
codes and standards are considered minimum levels of
protection and do not necessarily meet the HPR status. DOE
facilities are expected to meet or exceed the applicable
building code and NFPA codes and standards. DOE facilities
may also need to meet criteria in DOE-STD-1066-99 to
minimize: 1) unacceptable onsite or offsite release of
radiological or hazardous materials, 2) interruptions of
vital programs and 3) property damage. A means to achieve
HPR status or the best-protected class of industrial risks
includes compliance with insurance industry standards such
as those published by the Factory Mutual Global (Loss
Prevention Data Sheets and technical advisory bulletins). A
graded approach and experience in the application of
insurance industry standards is necessary to determine the
appropriate HPR provisions for a given facility or process.
4.3 Maintaining Safety Systems
Information in this section pertains to Section 3a(2) of
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and the corresponding CRD
section in Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
Refer to Section 4.21 of this Guide for information related
to this topic.
4.4 Program Policy Statements
Information in this section pertains to Section 3b(1) in
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and the corresponding CRD
section in Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
1. The intent of documenting policy statements is to have
the uppermost levels of DOE and Contractor management
state in writing their fire protection program
expectations. Such policy statements should not
conflict with regulatory, DOE, or contractual
obligations. For site emergency services
organizations, this policy statement should include
fundamental statements regarding the level of service
that DOE expects and the level of capability that the
contractors intend to provide. (For example: “DOE
expects that the site fire department will maintain a
capability to provide Advanced Life Support, as defined
in the State of…” or “…will provide an emergency
services capability that fully conforms with the
requirements of the State of…, DOE directives, and NFPA
codes and standards, unless explicit relief has been
granted by DOE.”)
2. Section 5d(10) of DOE O 420.1B assigns the
responsibilities for the AHJ, in most cases, to the DOE
heads of field elements under advisement of a qualified
fire protection engineer (as defined in DOE-STD-1066-
99) as the subject matter expert (SME). The AHJ may
designate a contractor as the site’s Fire Marshall to
act as his representative for day-to-day activities
such as: issuing of permits; reviewing and approving
construction documents and shop drawings (new
construction, modification, or renovation); approving
routine fire protection equipment, materials,
installation, and operational procedures (fire system
inspection and testing), interpretation of building
codes or standards; and other activities that would
require formal approval. Fire Marshall activities,
inclusive of this authority, should be well documented
and available for AHJ review.
4.5 Program Documentation
Information in this section pertains to Section 3b(2) of
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and the corresponding CRD
section in Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
1. The program should be completely documented. This
includes a description of applicable fire safety
requirements in contracts and leases, where
appropriate.
2. Documentation should also include a description of the
fire protection organization and its roles and
responsibilities in relation to other organizational
entities. It is preferable, although not always
essential, to have all fire protection-related line
activities under a single line manager to avoid
unnecessary duplication and costs.
3. Training and qualification records of individuals
having fire protection program responsibilities should
be readily available and in an auditable form.
4. Appropriate fire protection documentation includes
copies of all fire hazard analyses (FHAs) and at least
the two most recent facility assessment reports in a
continually updated filing system. The FHAs and
facility assessment reports may be combined, provided
that they address all essential elements as defined
below. The DOE Fire Protection Web Site contains
copies of "models" of separate and combined FHAs and
assessment reports. Facility documentation should also
include copies of any exemptions, equivalencies or
deviations that have been approved by DOE.
5. Construction projects should feature a file in which
all significant decisions and reports concerning fire
protection can be found. Supporting documents in this
file should be maintained for future reference.
6. The inspection, testing and maintenance (ITM) program
for fire protection features, apparatus and equipment
should be based on industry standards, such as those
established by the NFPA unless an alternative has been
approved by the AHJ. The organizations responsible for
ITM of fire protection features should maintain system
inspection and test records according to Section 11.4
of DOE Administrative Records Schedule 18, “Security,
Emergency Planning and Safety Records” or, if not
specifically addressed in the Schedule 18 document, for
a minimum of three review cycles. In addition,
responsible authorities should retain records of all
ITM procedures for as long as such equipment remains in
service.
7. Site fire departments and other related emergency
response organizations (such as brigades or emergency
squads) should maintain a current file with all
standard operating procedures and fire pre-incident
plans, firefighter training and certification programs,
and appropriate documentation governing related
activities. The level of documentation should be
reasonable and commensurate with the contractor’s
responsibilities. A program should be in place to
ensure that this documentation is updated at
appropriate intervals. Pre-incident plans should be
developed on the basis of NFPA 1620, Recommended
Practice for Pre-Incident Planning, with input from the
site fire protection engineering staff as well as
emergency responders.
8. Emergency response records must conform to DOE
reporting requirements in DOE O 231.1A, Environment,
Safety, and Health Reporting, and should be based on
standard fire incident reporting practices, such as the
National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) or NFPA
901, Standard Classifications for Incident Reporting
and Fire Protection Data, in lieu of state or site-
specific reporting formats.
9. Computerized information management techniques for the
creation, maintenance and dissemination of relevant
documentation pertaining to the fire protection program
are acceptable.
10. Access to classified matter during an emergency must be
documented after the emergency and individuals who were
provided access must complete nondisclosure forms as
required by DOE Manual (M) 470.4-4, Information
Security.
4.6 Fire Hazards Analyses
Information in this section pertains to Section 3b(5) of
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and the corresponding CRD
section in Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
1. A FHA is required for all Hazard Category 1, 2 and 3
nuclear facilities (as defined in DOE Standard 1027),
high-hazard facilities (as determined by the AHJ),
significant new facilities and facilities that store or
process significant quantities of hazardous materials
in excess of the allowances described in NFPA 1,
Uniform Fire Code. These examples include planned
facilities as well as significant renovations to
existing facilities as determined necessary by the AHJ.
NFPA 801 also requires a graded FHA for radiological
facilities that exceed the thresholds in 10 CFR Part
30. Examples of facilities not generally requiring an
FHA include small utility buildings, trailers, and
office buildings.
2. The purpose of an FHA is to conduct a comprehensive,
qualitative assessment of the risk from fire within
individual fire areas in a DOE facility to ascertain
whether the DOE fire safety objectives of DOE O 420.1B
are met. This should include an assessment of the risk
from fire and related hazards (wildland fire exposure,
direct flame impingement, hot gases, smoke migration,
fire-fighting water damage, etc.) in relation to
existing or proposed fire safety features to ensure
that the facility can be safely controlled and
stabilized during and after a fire. In accordance with
the "graded approach" concept, the level of detail
necessary for an acceptable FHA is directly related to
the complexity of the facility and the potential risk
to the public and facility operators. The scope and
content of an FHA should be limited to only those
issues that are significant and relevant to the
facility. To facilitate the development of graded fire
hazards analyses, "model" FHAs have been developed.
These models are located at the following URL:
http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/nsea/fire//mode
ls/models.html
3. Analysis of significant planned facilities included in
the FHA process should begin early in the design phase
to ensure that an acceptable level of protection is
being incorporated in the evolving design. This
project or preliminary FHA should be updated whenever
significant changes occur within an individual fire
area and should form the basis for post-construction
FHA included in the review and revision schedule per
Chapter II, Section 3b(5)(b) and 3b(5)(c) of
DOE O 420.1B. The analysis shall also support the
conclusions of a preliminary Documented Safety Analysis
(DSA) where required. In situations where the AHJ
has determined that an FHA is necessary for
a significant new facility that is not considered
hazardous; then post-construction FHA reviews and
revisions are not required.
4. In accordance with DOE O 420.1B, the FHA must be
performed under the direction of a qualified fire
protection engineer (Reference DOE-STD-1066-99 and DOE-
STD-1137-2000, Fire Protection Engineering Functional
Area Qualification Standard.) This should include
directing all of the technical aspects of an FHA’s
development including support from emergency services,
systems, electrical, and mechanical engineers, as well
as operations staff as needed.
5. An FHA should contain, but not be limited to, a
conservative assessment of the following fire safety
issues:
• Description of construction
• Description of critical process equipment
• Description of high-value property
• Description of fire hazards
• Description of operations
• Potential for a toxic, biological and/or
radiological incident due to a fire
• Natural hazards (earthquake, flood, wind, lightning,
and wildland fire) impact on fire safety
• Damage potential: Include both the Maximum Possible
Fire Loss (MPFL) as defined in DOE-STD-1066-99 and
the DSA of the design basis fire scenario
• Fire protection features
• Protection of essential safety class systems
• Life safety considerations
• Emergency planning
• Fire Department/Brigade response
• Recovery potential
• Security and Safeguards considerations related to
fire protection
• Exposure fire potential and the potential for fire
spread between two fire areas
• Effect of significant fire safety deficiencies on
fire risk
• Environmental impacts from a fire including
suppression system run-off considerations
6. The FHA should evaluate the consequences of a single,
worst-case automatic fire protection system
malfunction; i.e., a detection system that also
activates a pre-action type sprinkler system, but fails
to transmit an alarm to the site emergency response
force. This FHA evaluation may also include the
failure of a valve in the underground main that could
impair multiple systems, either in the same building or
in adjacent buildings evaluated as an exposure.
7. In determining the value of the MPFL, which is used in
part to assess the need for fire protection systems,
the basic assumption should be that there is no
automatic or manual fire suppression. This loss
determination should include all direct and indirect
costs associated with the fire and clean-up operations.
In addition, there may be intangible costs such as
mission interruption, erosion of public support, and
local economic impact. All of these may need to be
considered to ensure that appropriate levels of fire
protection are included in a facility. Direct and
indirect costs that should be included are:
a. Replacement cost of building and building systems
or contents within the fire area
b. Replacement cost of contents
c. Cost of lost time (considered mission interruption
costs)
d. Cost of environmental clean-up
e. Exposure damage to other buildings, structures and
property
f. Costs for re-establishing operations; e.g.,
redesign approval and start-up
8. If redundant automatic fire protection systems are
provided in the area, only the system that causes the
most vulnerable condition is assumed to fail. Passive
fire protection features, such as blank fire-rated
walls or continuous fire-rated cable wraps, are assumed
to remain viable for their rated fire endurance period
to the extent that they are properly constructed and
maintained.
9. The focus of the FHA should be the individual fire
areas that comprise the facility. A fire area is
defined as a location bounded by fire-rated
construction, having a minimum fire resistance rating
of two hours, with openings protected by equivalently-
rated fire doors, dampers or penetration seals. The
boundaries of exterior fire areas (yard areas) should
be as determined by the AHJ or delegated authority.
Where a facility is not subdivided by fire-rated
construction, the fire area should be defined by the
exterior walls and roof of the facility.
10. An important element of an acceptable FHA for nuclear
facilities is an inventory of all safety class and
safety significant systems within the fire area that
are susceptible to fire damage. This includes those
primary and supporting mechanical and electrical
systems that must function effectively during and after
a fire event to ensure safety. For example, loss of
the building ventilation system in a fire (due to
damage of power cables) may result in an ambient air
temperature rise, which may cause the failure of
sensitive electrical components, such as relays. Such
safety systems may include, but are not limited to,
process monitoring instrumentation, instrument air,
hydraulic systems, and emergency lighting systems.
11. All credible fire-related failure modes of safety
systems should be considered. For example, it is
insufficient to assume that fire will merely cause the
loss of function of safety equipment when power cables
to that equipment are within the fire area. It is also
necessary to consider the potential for spurious
signals that may cause the inadvertent operation of
such equipment. Similarly, fire-induced electrical
faults may trip upstream electrical disconnect devices
in such a way as to render inoperable other safety
systems that may not even be located within the fire
area. In addition, the effects of combustion products,
manual fire-fighting efforts, and the activation of
automatic fire suppression systems should be assessed.
12. Fire propagation and the potential for fire-induced
radiological dispersal through the facility should be
considered. These effects should be considered for the
normal operating mode of the air distribution system as
well as alternate modes, such as shutdown, that may
result from the fire.
13. A tool that may be used in the development of an FHA is
a fire model, such as those developed by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, as applied by
qualified fire protection engineers, and approved for
DOE use as a Toolbox code. This includes the CFAST
Fire Model and other models in the following web site:
http://www.hss.energy.gov/csa/csp/sqa/. All
assumptions used in a model should be listed in the FHA
and limiting conditions of operation or specific
administrative controls established to assure that
these assumptions produce reasonably conservative
results compared to applicable codes and standards.
Also note that small variations in an assumption can
have a major impact on the outcome. For example,
assuming a door is closed can reduce fire intensity by
half, but there is no assurance that the door will
remain closed throughout the life of the facility.
Because of their potential errors, model results should
be approved by a qualified fire protection engineer who
is knowledgeable on the use of the model.
14. Additionally, FHA analysis may include reliance on
actual fire testing or historical data on fire events
both inside and outside the DOE Complex, provided that
adequate documentation of such information is available
for the AHJ’s review. Alternately, an assumption can
be made that all potentially vulnerable systems will be
damaged within the fire area. Acceptable exceptions to
this assumption are water-filled steel pipes, tanks,
and similar components of adequate structural integrity
with welded fittings and adequate pressure relief.
15. The quantity and associated hazards of flammable and
combustible materials that are often found within the
fire area should be factored into the analyses.
Consideration should also be given to the presence of
transient combustibles associated with storage and
maintenance activities. Where a facility is fully
protected as required by directives and prescriptive
codes and standards, combustibles can usually be
characterized in general terms and limited through
normal housekeeping programs. However, when conditions
prevent employment of normal fire protection features
such as automatic sprinklers, noncombustible
construction, and fire resistant boundaries, the FHA
should quantify fixed combustibles and their locations
and determine limits and locations of transient
combustibles. These limits are usually enforced
through formal combustible loading programs with
permits for each combustible material brought into the
area. Averaging combustible loading as a means to
characterize the fire severity is not considered an
acceptable technique over localized combustible
loading.
16. FHAs for high-bay locations should consider the effects
of smoke/hot gas stratification that may occur at some
intermediate point below the roof or ceiling as well as
the potential for delayed sprinkler response.
Similarly, the effect of smoke movement through doors
and dampers held open by fusible links should be
addressed.
4.7 FHA Incorporation
Information in this section pertains to Section 3b(6) of
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and the corresponding CRD
section in Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
1. The FHA, including all assumptions, should be
documented. When both an FHA and a DSA are developed
for a facility, the developmental effort should be
coordinated to the maximum extent possible to avoid
duplication of effort. It is recognized, however, that
because an FHA is based on the premise that a fire will
occur and considers fire safety issues (property loss
and program discontinuity potential) that are not
normally considered in the DSA, the conclusions of the
FHA may be more conservative than would normally be
developed by a DSA alone. Nevertheless, the FHA and
its conclusions should be addressed in the facility DSA
in such a manner as to reflect all relevant fire safety
objectives as defined in Chapter II, Section 1 of DOE O
420.1B.
2. Information related to emergency response (number of
emergency responders, number and types of apparatus,
response time, etc.) should be incorporated into the
DSA as a means of clearly establishing a “floor” below
which this level of capability should not be reduced.
4.8 Personnel
Information in this section pertains to Section 3b(7) of
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and the corresponding CRD
section in Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
1. A sufficient number of qualified fire safety
professionals (fire protection engineers, fire
department management personnel and technicians) should
be on staff to develop, implement and maintain the fire
protection and emergency response program. Staffing
levels should be based on a BNA, "work load analysis"
or similar analysis that provides a technical basis for
the fire safety staff. In those instances where a site
is of insufficient size to warrant a fire protection
staff or emergency response force, such capability
should be achieved by other means, such as reliance on
off-site fire departments or fire brigades and fire
protection engineering support contractors.
2. Established industry criteria, such as those
promulgated by the NFPA, as supplemented by DOE fire
safety criteria, should be the basis for site and
facility fire safety and emergency response training
and qualifications. Emergency services organization
officers and personnel may additionally meet the
minimum requirements for training and certifications as
established by the state or local jurisdiction, as an
alternative to DOE directives or applicable NFPA
standards, provided those state and local requirements
are substantially equivalent and approved by the AHJ.
(Although State and local requirements do not apply on
Federal reservations, it may be selectively desirable
to apply them to facilitate mutual assistance
agreements with nearby jurisdictions.)
3. Sites should provide appropriate support personnel for
escort or oversight responsibilities when using off-
site fire departments, brigades and fire protection
engineering support contractors who need to gain access
to areas with classified material.
4. An appropriate level of individualized safety and
health training is expected to be provided to all
workers and emergency responders in accordance with the
provisions of 10 CFR Part 851 and the incorporated
training requirements of 29 CFR 1910 and 1926.
Particular attention is directed at the HAZWOPER
training requirements. Such training and
familiarization also applies, as appropriate, to
managers and decision makers to the extent that they
are involved in directing the actions of their
subordinates in the face of known fire hazards and in
conjunction with hazardous materials incidents and
fires.
5. All DOE Federal and contractor employees should be
provided with a basic level of fire safety and response
to emergency training initially, with refresher
training provided in conjunction with other general
federal and contractor training programs. (This can
include the distribution of printed matter and public
address announcements.)
6. Members of the public, including visiting students and
scientists, should be provided with suitable
orientation on the fire hazards (if any) that they may
encounter while on site and the appropriate personal
response if they should find themselves in an emergency
situation.
4.9 Baseline Needs Assessment
Information in this section pertains to Section 3b(8) of
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and the corresponding CRD
section in Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
1. DOE site emergency services organizations are
considered to be career fire departments in the
application of NFPA Standards including the Standard
for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression
Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special
Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments
(NFPA 1710). Additionally, such organizations are
expected to meet the DOE O 420.1B requirement for the
completion of a BNA. In developing the BNA, the intent
is that this be a coordinated effort involving the AHJ
and the representatives of the site emergency services
organization. Additional expertise in unique emergency
response or fire prevention issues, legal matters,
labor-related issues, emergency medical protocols,
etc., may be required to assist in the development of
the BNA.
2. A BNA is required for each site that maintains a
staffed fire department or fire brigade. A BNA or an
evaluation in documented form of comparable scope is to
be developed by contractors at sites where emergency
response is achieved by a capability other than a site
fire department or brigade. The intent is to define,
for all sites, the minimum capability to achieve a
timely and effective response to fires and related
events.
3. The BNA should be based on conformance with applicable
NFPA standards, promulgated by the NFPA, as well as
supplementary requirements and guidance developed by
DOE. It should include organizational
responsibilities, collateral duties, facility hazards,
response time requirements, personnel levels, required
apparatus and equipment. In addition, the document
should describe the organization's various programs
that support its personnel. This should include
training, physical fitness, and medical programs
relating to emergency responders.
4. In developing a comprehensive needs assessment, the
basic assumption should be that there is only one
emergency incident (such as a fire) occurring on site,
with a casualty requiring emergency medical assistance.
However, the document should also describe how the fire
department would respond if a second incident occurred
while the first was underway. The second response
capability could be based on documented mutual aid
agreements and utilization of some percentage of off-
duty personnel overtime. To the extent that an
insufficient response capability is determined to exist
for this second emergency, the BNA should address the
required supplemental emergency response resources that
would be needed to respond to this event.
5. A critical factor in any such analysis is the minimum
response time necessary to begin active intervention
(fire suppression, emergency medical, technical rescue,
etc.) activities. The determination of a minimally
acceptable response time should be based on risk and
should reflect categories, such as alarm, call
processing, dispatch, response, and turnout times that
have been established in NFPA 1710. DOE expects that
the response time requirements of NFPA 1710 be the
starting point in the determination. Site specific
conditions, such as the widespread installation of
automatic fire suppression systems, could be used to
extend response time to structural fires through the
NFPA 1710 accepted equivalency process. Similarly, the
provision of localized Automated External
Defibrillators (AEDs) and first-aid supplies, along
with appropriate employee training, could be used, in
part, as a basis for extending Emergency Medical
Service response times.
6. The minimum number of trained firefighters necessary to
begin interior structural fire-fighting should be five,
in line with the longstanding DOE guidelines on NFPA
1500 implementation. (It is recognized that, where
lives may be at risk, the Incident Commander has the
authority and responsibility to initiate rescue with
less than this minimum if, in his judgment, it is safe
to do so, for instance, in properties fully protected
by automatic sprinkler systems.) Additional emergency
response personnel will be necessary where multiple
hose lines are required to suppress a fire and to
support other fire ground activities such as search and
rescue.
a. The minimum number of personnel required for
exterior fire fighting, hazardous material
incidents, specialized rescue or other related
events should be based on DOE fire protection
guidelines, pre-incident fire planning where
possible, and the judgment of trained and
experienced Incident Commanders.
b. When no site fire department or brigade exists and
when reliance will be placed on off-site fire
departments, a plan should be developed that
details how such forces will be expected to
respond in conjunction with the site emergency
plan and how appropriate training and site
familiarization will be provided to ensure that
the off-site fire departments will be prepared for
fires that occur on site. Appropriate drills
should be performed periodically to verify the
effectiveness of the plan.
c. Training of emergency responders may be based on
existing requirements such as those used by the
state in which the site is located, those
delineated in 29 CFR Parts 1910 and 19263, as well
as criteria developed by the NFPA. In addition,
emergency responders should be provided with
sufficient site-specific training and
familiarization necessary to effectively respond
to the unique conditions that characterize DOE
facilities. As part of this effort, regular
facility tours should be conducted utilizing
current pre-incident fire plans as well as to
verify that plans are accurate.
d. Drills and exercises should be structured to
emphasize realistic scenarios and feature standard
fire department tactical evolutions. Such drills
should also be scheduled, as appropriate, during
weekends and evening shifts when normal activities
are reduced.
7. Emergency radio communication should be compatible with
other organizations involved with emergency response
and should be designed to be effective in areas subject
to structural interference.
8. Fire department apparatus should reflect all site-
specific response requirements, including those
described in the first paragraph above. Other examples
include hazardous material response, heavy rescue,
rough terrain rescue, chemical or large flammable
liquid spills, and wildland fire response. Reserve
apparatus, if utilized, should be properly maintained
and equipped to provide its intended response
capabilities whenever first-line apparatus is out-of-
service. Periodic replacement programs for apparatus
should be structured to avoid excessive "down time" and
repair costs and should reflect the industry norm of
useful life cycles (e.g., 20 years).
9. DOE Site fire stations, where provided, should be
designed to provide sufficient capacity for mobile
apparatus, including maintenance functions. Living
quarters should provide a comfortable, private and safe
environment for personnel, consistent with state or
NFPA requirements. This includes adequate sleeping
quarters where necessary (when personnel are working
more than a 12-hour shift), kitchen facilities,
training rooms, physical fitness areas, and other
ancillary needs. To the extent that related
occupancies such as alarm rooms, maintenance rooms, and
personnel areas are co-located within the same
facility, appropriate fire-rated physical separation,
ventilation and exhaust, and other fire protection
features should be provided to prevent interference and
to ensure the viability of individual areas in the
event of a fire. All sleeping quarters should also be
protected with automatic sprinklers (quick response),
smoke detection and carbon monoxide (CO) detection that
are connected to transmit alarms locally and to the
site central reporting location.
10. Fire stations should be "centrally" located to the
facilities protected so as to minimize response time.
Station location should also reflect prevailing traffic
patterns, climatic conditions, railroad tracks and
other sources of delay.
11. Consistent with the training needs identified above,
adequate facilities should be provided for training.
This includes "live fire" training, confined space
entry, vehicle extrication, hazardous material
response, and other site-specific conditions. Where on-
site training facilities are unavailable, arrangements
should be made for appropriate training for fire
department personnel off-site.
4.10 BNA Incorporation
Information in this section pertains to Section 3b(9) of
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and the corresponding CRD
section in Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
Information related to the site emergency services
organization, such as the number of emergency responders,
number and types of apparatus, response time, etc. should be
incorporated into the site emergency plans, FHAs, and DSAs,
as appropriate, to clearly establish a “floor” below, which
this level of capability should not be reduced without
appropriate compensating safeguards and/or the restriction
of hazardous operations. This information can be inserted
in summary fashion or the BNA can be incorporated directly
into the above-referenced documents.
4.11 Pre-Incident Fire Activities
Information in this section pertains to Section 3b(10) of
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and the corresponding CRD
section in Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
It is expected that pre-incident fire plan documents (or
comparable software) be developed in accordance with
standard practices within the emergency services community,
applicable NFPA standards, and DOE expectations, as
reflected in published guidelines. For additional
information and to access “model” documents that can be
downloaded and edited, refer to the DOE fire protection web
site at
http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/nsea/fire//models/mo
dels.html
4.12 Unique Fire-fighting Activities
Information in this section pertains to Section 3b(11) of
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and the corresponding CRD
section in Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
Procedures on unique fire-fighting activities can be
developed and maintained in conjunction with efforts
governing fire department procedures in general. DOE and
contractor management should be kept routinely informed if
fire department emergency operations for these special
circumstances represent deviations from the norm. FHAs
and DSAs should reflect unique fire fighting strategies
where rapid intervention may not be possible (moderation
controlled areas) and where fixed fire protection systems
may no longer be applicable, e.g., certain transitional
facilities (See Section 4.16 for further information).
4.13 Assessments
Information in this section pertains to Section 3b(13) of
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and the corresponding CRD
section as well as Section 3b(14) in Attachment 2 of DOE O
420.1B).
1. The principal objective of a fire safety assessment is
to identify deficiencies that would prevent the
achievement of DOE's fire safety policy objectives.
2. Facility and programmatic assessments should be
performed under the supervision of a qualified fire
protection engineer as defined by DOE. Personnel
conducting such assessments should have an appropriate
level of knowledge and experience in the application of
fire safety codes and standards to diverse facilities.
Assessments should, as a minimum, encompass the
following elements of the fire protection program:
a. Program Related (performed by both DOE and
contractors):
• Comprehensiveness of the fire protection
program
• Procedures for engineering design and review
• Procedures for maintenance, testing, and
inspection of installed fire protection systems
and features
• Fire protection engineering staff (number,
qualifications, training)
• Emergency Services Organizations including the
BNAs
• Management support
• Exemptions and documented equivalencies or
deviations
b. Facility Related (principally, but not exclusively
contractor self-assessments and DOE operational
readiness reviews):
• Fire protection of safety class and safety
significant equipment
• Life safety considerations
• Fire protection of vital programs
• Fire protection of high-value property
• Fire suppression equipment
• Water runoff
• Facility fire prevention planning documents
(evacuation plan/fire wardens extinguisher
training)
• Fire apparatus accessibility
• Completeness of fire hazards analyses
• Fire barrier integrity
• Completeness of fire loss potential (MPFL)
determinations
• Fire safety training
• Potential for toxic, biological and /or
radiological incident due to fire
c. Combined Aspects (Program and Facility):
• Conformance with applicable Orders, codes and
standards
• Inspection, testing, and maintenance reports
• Adequacy of facility appraisal reports
• Tests, inspections, procedures, and records for
maintaining fire protection systems and
features
• Administrative controls
• Temporary protection and compensatory measures
3. The frequency of assessments should be as follows:
a. Annual fire protection assessments should be made
of facilities valued in excess of $100 million,
facilities considered a high hazard, or those in
which vital programs are involved as defined by
DOE.
b. Remaining facilities should be assessed at least
every three years or at frequencies determined by
the AHJ. (Note: Low and ordinary hazard facility
assessments in adjacent areas may be combined.)
c. Comprehensive assessments of fire protection
program elements by DOE and by contractors should
be made every three years. (These should be
staggered in anticipation of contractor-initiated
enhancements.)
4. Assessment reports should include a description of what
was accomplished during the effort (areas toured,
documents reviewed, and people interviewed). It should
feature a "baseline" description of the facility,
hazards and other occupancy considerations, and fire
protection features. In addition, the report should
document changes of significance that have occurred
within the facility since the last assessment that
affect fire safety, and it should list all noted
deficiencies, along with a recommendation for
remediation and interim compensatory measures, if
necessary, pending resolution. A "model" assessment
report is available at the following web site:
http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/nsea/fire//mode
ls/models.html.
5. DOE self-assessments and assessments of contractors are
intended to confirm that comprehensive fire protection
programs are in place site-wide. They should include a
select review of facility and site fire protection
features, fire safety policies and procedures, the
qualifications of contractor fire safety professionals,
the adequacy of self-assessments, fire hazards
analyses, and program performance as detailed in this
guidance and other DOE Orders/ Manuals such as
DOE O 226.1, Implementation of DOE Oversight Policy,
and Table F-2 (Program Performance Measures) of DOE M
231.1-1A, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting
Manual.
6. Additionally, it is expected that DOE assessments
include the capabilities to respond in a timely and
effective manner to site fire emergencies and related
events. This assessment responsibility extends to
contractors where there is no site fire department or
brigade and where effective emergency response is
predicated on other resources, such as occupant
emergency organizations and offsite fire departments.
In other words, the heads of field elements should
determine the adequacy of the emergency response
capability at all of the sites for which they have
responsibility.
4.14 Corrective Action Processes
Information in this section pertains to Section 3b(14) of
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and CRD Section 3b(15) in
Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
1. It is expected that the corrective action process will
encompass all fire protection "findings"; i.e., all
issues requiring action, e.g., facility, program, and
emergency response. When modifications that are
necessary to correct significant fire safety
deficiencies will be delayed beyond one week, it is
expected that interim compensatory measures (such as
fire watchers) be adopted until the modifications are
complete. Compensatory measures should be initiated
without delay commensurate with the finding and at the
discretion of the AHJ.
2. Significant findings (life threatening or with a
serious injury potential) from these assessments will
be the basis, in part, for contractor entries into the
Noncompliance Tracking System that is a component of
the enforcement process required through 10 CFR Part
851.
4.15 Exemptions Variances & Equivalencies (Approved Requirement
Relief)
Information in this section pertains to Section 3b(15) of
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and CRD Section 3b(16) in
Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
The DOE directives system and the requirements of 10 CFR
Part 851 impose a range of explicit direction in the
development, review, and approval of exemptions, variances
and equivalencies as delineated below. Contractors are
advised to consult with the AHJ before proceeding with a
request for relief. One goal is to avoid unnecessary
duplication of effort and the generation of unnecessary
paperwork.
1. DOE M 251.1-1B, Departmental Directives Program
Manual, states:
If the Order, Notice, or Manual includes specific
provisions for exemptions, equivalencies, or other
forms of relief from the requirements in the
document, then those provisions must be applied.
If the document does not include specific
provisions for relief, the process in this chapter
[of DOE M 251.1-1B] applies to granting permanent
or temporary relief from the applicable
requirements in those documents.
With respect to exemptions to the provisions of DOE O
420.1B, paragraph 6a of that Order states:
Exemptions to this Order (DOE O 420.1B) must
follow the process defined for exemptions in DOE M
251.1-1B, Departmental Directives Program Manual,
except for the approval authority defined in the
responsibilities paragraphs of this Order.
DOE O 420.1B assigns the authority to grant exemptions
to the provisions of DOE O 420.1B to the Secretarial
Officer, unless delegated. Furthermore, a granted
exemption to DOE O 420.1B is not considered an
exemption from all other DOE directives or statutory
requirements, such as 10CFR 851, that may be affected
by such relief. Please refer to the DOE directive or
statutory requirements for information on exemption
processing of the affected document.
With respect to requests for relief from NFPA Code
provisions, paragraph 6b of DOE O 420.1B states:
Exemptions, exclusions, and equivalencies to
standards or other documents referenced in this
Order should follow the provisions explicitly set
forth in those documents; for example: the
equivalency, alternative, and modification
provisions in the NFPA Code.
Paragraph 5d(10) of DOE O 420.1B assigns the AHJ
responsibility, and therefore the authority to approve
equivalency decisions in accordance with those
provisions, to the head of field elements with a
notation to ensure that fire protection SME comments
are addressed.
2. The process for requesting and approving variances from
the provisions of 10 CFR Part 851 are delineated in the
Rule and in supplemental guidance promulgated by DOE.
Consult the following web site for this information:
http://www.hss.energy.gov/HealthSafety/wshp/rule851/851
final.html
3. Most codes and standards of the NFPA are silent on
exemptions to their requirements but allow for an
equivalent or alternate means of achieving compliance
with the code or standard. Where no equivalent or
alternate means for achieving compliance is provided,
noncompliance to an applicable NFPA code or standard
should be processed as an exemption to DOE O 420.1B
according to the provisions in DOE O 420.1B for
exemptions to that Order, including the referenced
provisions in DOE M 251.1-1B.
4. Documented requests for relief should be developed by a
qualified fire protection engineer or certified fire
department officer and submitted through the AHJ to the
appropriate reviewing authority. Documented approvals
should be kept on file in an auditable form. Multiple
conditions that can be resolved on the basis of such
relief can be grouped by individual code or standard,
provided that the specific conditions are explicitly
identified.
5. The level of documentation necessary to support a
request for relief will vary depending on the issue.
As a minimum, each request should identify the specific
site location or condition at issue and the
paragraph/section of the code or standard which
addresses the issue; discuss why the requirements of
the code or standard that cannot or should not be met;
and justify the conclusion that the alternate
configuration is acceptable from a safety,
environmental, property damage, or program continuity
perspective to what is stipulated in the code or
standard. All functions should also be addressed. For
example, an automatic sprinkler system provides
detection, local alarms, fire department notification,
and fire suppression. The description of alternatives
in an equivalency should address each of these
functions. Additionally, relief under one source
document is not considered relief from another. All
codes and standards with similar requirements should be
identified and any differences addressed accordingly.
For example, sprinklers may be required for life safety
by NFPA 101 and for nuclear safety by NFPA 801.
6. When a positive determination is made in support of
relief, then documentation should include signatures of
all those involved in the decision, including that of
the cognizant DOE fire protection engineer.
7. A change in use or occupancy will require the re-
evaluation and approval of all documented requests for
relief within the structure to assure that these are
valid under the building’s new use or occupancy.
8. Regarding FHAs, all approved variances and exemptions
to DOE directives and/or equivalencies should be
provided or referenced within the FHA document itself
along with all supporting information. Documentation
related to approved relief should be reviewed during
the FHA update to verify that conditions have not
changed and the justifications are still valid.
Additionally, such considerations may have other
conditions for review according to a specified
schedule, which should also be documented in the FHA.
If there is no FHA for the facility, appropriate
reviews and documentation should be consolidated and
maintained with the fire protection staff for review by
the AHJ or representative.
9. Regarding BNAs, those responsible for managing site
fire protection emergency service programs may decide
to request relief from the provisions of NFPA and
similar industry standards, provided that the NFPA or
industry standards allows the use of an alternative
approach and the proposed alternative achieves an
equivalent level of safety. Appropriate documentation
that justifies the alternative should be submitted to
the AHJ for review and approval prior to the
implementation of the alternate. If such relief
relates to the site’s emergency services program, then
such documentation should be included within the BNA
discussed in Section 4.9 of this Guide.
4.16 Transitional Facilities
Information in this section pertains to Section 3b(16) of
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and CRD Section 3b(17) in
Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
1. Transitional facilities are those that have been placed
in a safe-shutdown condition and abandoned, or are
undergoing decontamination and decommissioning (D&D)
work and ultimately demolition or abandonment.
The need for fire protection features in these
structures is governed by the consequences of a fire to
the public, workers, and fire fighters as well as the
potential release of hazardous and radiological
materials while the facility is in the transition
process. Since property protection and program
continuity are not always factors to consider in a
transitional facility, all fire protection requirements
may not be appropriate. Factors, which should be
considered, center on the transition itself, such as
fire protection equipment removal, and the impact that
this transition has upon fire protection features and
activities. Such factors are additionally important if
the facility possesses a definable value and/or mission
as determined by the DOE program office; or, if a fire
would significantly increase the cost of the D&D
process, such as destroy vital equipment required for
D&D activities, delay transition commitments, or
undermine public confidence.
2. Fire safety and emergency response for transitional
facilities are governed by the requirements contained
in 10 CFR Part 851 (including 29 CFR Part 1926) and the
provisions of NFPA Standard 241, Safeguarding
Construction, Alteration and Demolition Operations.
(See also Factory Mutual Data Sheet 1-0 Safeguards
During Construction, and Chapter 8 of NFPA 801, Fire
Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive.)
3. Decisions relating to fire safety of such facilities
should be made on the basis of the following
principles:
a. The evaluation of fire risks imposed by the work
in relation to the need for traditional fire
safety features. This can be accomplished through
a graded transitional facility fire hazard
analysis or assessment (TFHA) that has been
reviewed and concurred with by the AHJ. Approved
relief from normal DOE requirements should be
listed on the signature page. All requests for
relief should be processed in accordance with DOE
procedures. The facility’s fire protection
assessment or FHA may be utilized where applicable
to complete this evaluation.
b. Fire hazards within these facilities may change
over time, such as an increase in combustible
loading during abatement activities. Fire
protection should be adequate to deal with these
changes. The TFHA together with updated pre-
incident plans should account for this either
through a phasing schedule, or be revised as
appropriate when significant changes in occupancy
or hazard occur that affect fire safety.
c. Fire safety features that have originally been
required by DOE may be rendered inoperable or
considered no longer needed if justified by the
TFHA on the basis that the safety of D&D workers
and emergency responders will not be compromised.
Such features may be abandoned in place (and
properly identified as being out of service) until
they are dismantled as part of planned demolition
activities.
d. The decision to deactivate automatic fire
suppression systems in large facilities should
reflect the possibility that the fire department
may not be able to safely enter the facility to
effect manual fire suppression. A defensive
tactical approach, which features exterior fire
attack and protection of exposures, should be a
part of the BNA described in Section 4.9 of this
Guide and written into the fire department’s
updated pre-incident plan. Such approach
necessitates additional emphasis on maintaining
communication and cooperation between facility
personnel and the fire department so that
emergency responders are aware of changes in
occupancy and fire protection system status.
e. Retained fire protection features in these
facilities are not required to comply with all of
the design and installation criteria of the
governing NFPA standard if the AHJ concurs that
the system will function adequately during a fire
in its current design mode. The AHJ concurrence
should be documented in accordance with site
procedures.
f. Retained fire protection features should be
inspected, tested and maintained to ensure that
the features will function adequately during fire
incidents, based on the mission of the facility.
g. Transitional facilities should be routinely
inspected and reviewed by representatives of the
fire department and fire protection engineering
staffs consistent with established standard
operating procedures and fire protection program
criteria. Tours of facilities should also be
conducted by the fire department to familiarize
them with existing conditions and to revalidate
pre-incident plans. Drills and training exercises
should also be conducted at these locations at an
appropriate frequency commensurate with the fire
risks and complexity of the facility.
h. Prior to commencement of work activities in a
facility, appropriate procedures should be
approved and implemented (including worker
training) governing the control of potentially
hazardous operations including, but not limited
to, cutting and welding, storage and handling of
flammable or combustible liquids, transient
combustibles, and sources of ignition such as
temporary wiring and heating equipment. Smoking
areas, when allowed on the premises, should also
be established.
i. The fire risks associated with materials and
processes used as part of the transition process
should be evaluated by a fire protection engineer.
Fire protection features should be adequate to
limit these risks to an acceptable level.
j. The deactivation of process lines containing
hazardous materials as well as flammable or
combustible liquids should be preceded by an
analysis or performed under a work plan that
addresses the methods used to control related
hazards during the deactivation process.
Appropriate safeguards need to be in place to
control and minimize the release of residual
materials that may remain in piping and tanks.
k. Safeguards to assure D&D worker and emergency
responder safety and health are expected to
conform to the requirements in 10 CFR Part 851,
and the requirements for buildings under
construction or demolition, as provided in NFPA
241, Standard for Safeguarding Construction,
Alteration, and Demolition Operations, unless
relief has been granted by the AHJ. In buildings
where regular tours and inspections are conducted,
adequate exits and lighting must be provided as a
minimum as required by NFPA 101. Compensatory
measures should be established whenever routine
surveillance is being performed in these
facilities. These measures should be approved by
the site fire authority. Locked and abandoned
facilities where there is no human occupancy do
not need to maintain emergency egress features.
l. Where no automatic system exists, an effective
means for manually summoning the fire department
and for communicating with personnel inside of a
building is required. This can take the form of
an exterior fire alarm pull station or call box,
telephone (fixed or mobile), radio or some
combination of the above based on the
accessibility of the devices to all personnel and
their reliability. However, in accordance with
NFPA 101, all egress features must be reviewed
once the facility is reopened for actual
demolition activities. Stairwells should be
inspected on a routine basis and maintained
accessible, clear and dry in the event
firefighting activities are required.
m. All retained interior fire protection systems
should be maintained operational to the extent
possible while interior work activities are taking
place. The sequence of removal of these systems
should be clearly spelled out in contractor
requirement documents and the TFHA. Verification
of operable status should include appropriate
inspection and testing in accordance with
established procedures. Sprinkler systems should
be retained until all fixed and transient
combustible materials have been removed. Wet
sprinkler systems may be converted to dry systems
to minimize heating needs. Any temporary
deactivation of fire protection features during
transition operations should be treated as an
impairment, with appropriate interim compensatory
measures implemented until the feature is returned
to full operational mode pending final demolition.
n. The site and facility fire water distribution
system, including hydrants, fire department
connections, and interior standpipe systems,
should be maintained in an operable mode. Access
for mobile apparatus for emergency response should
be maintained and verified on a frequent basis.
(Refer to fire department pre-incident fire
plans.)
o. To the extent that the TFHA validates the need to
maintain fire protection features during
transition activities, such features should be
inspected, tested and maintained, consistent with
established procedures, sufficient to ensure that
they will function effectively during a fire,
based on their intent during transition. This
implies that defects or design deficiencies that
are not essential to ensure liability and
effective performance, as determined by the AHJ,
may remain as is.
4. Firefighting procedures may be developed and maintained
in conjunction with efforts governing fire department
procedures in general. DOE and contractor management
should be kept routinely informed if fire department
emergency operations for these special circumstances
represent deviations from the norm. TFHAs and/or DSAs
should reflect unique fire-fighting strategies where
rapid intervention may not be possible (moderation
controlled areas) and where fixed fire protection
systems may no longer be applicable.
4.17 Fire Protection Design
Information in this section pertains to Section 3c of
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and the corresponding CRD
section in Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
1. Design aspects of new DOE facilities as well as
modifications to existing facilities must be based on
the provisions of the applicable requirements of the
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), DOE directives, the
model building codes, and the applicable NFPA codes and
standards. Refer also to DOE-STD-1066-99 for
supplemental design guidance of DOE facilities. The
design process should include appropriate oversight by
a qualified fire protection engineer of plans,
specifications, and testing of fire protection
features.
2. In accordance with DOE O 420.1B, DOE facilities, sites,
and activities (including design and construction) must
have a level of fire protection that is sufficient to
fulfill the requirements of the best protected class of
industrial risks (commonly referred to as "Highly
Protected Risk " or "Improved Risk") and should be
provided protection to achieve "defense-in-depth."
This includes meeting the applicable building code and
NFPA Codes and Standards, and exceeding them when
necessary to meet safety objectives. The applicable
codes and standards are those in effect when facility
design commences ("code of record"). In accordance
with DOE O 420.1B, when significant modifications to a
facility occur, as determined by the AHJ, the current
edition of the code or standard must apply to the
modification.
3. Life safety provisions fall within the jurisdiction of
10 CFR Part 851 and DOE O 440.1B. Refer to DOE G 440.1-
8 for additional guidance. Additional or modified
exiting requirements for toxic and explosive
environments should be as determined by the appropriate
authorities defined within the above stated documents.
In addition, for explosive environments, exits should
reflect the criteria contained in the DOE Explosives
Safety Manual (DOE M 440.1-1A).
4. It may be necessary to exceed or supplement the
requirements of the applicable NFPA code or standard
when designing fire protection systems designated as
safety class in the DSA. Such additional design
requirements would be required when justified on the
basis of the conclusions of the DSA or FHA.
5. Except for systems designated as safety class or safety
significant, existing sprinkler systems installed under
the 'pipe schedule' rules of NFPA 13, Standard for the
Installation of Sprinkler Systems, do not require
hydraulic verification, provided that: the sprinkler
system is adequately maintained; there has been no
increase in occupancy hazard classification; there has
been no significant degradation in available water
supply as determined by the AHJ; it is reliably
maintained; and meets the water supply requirements of
NFPA 13 for pipe schedule systems. Refer to
Section 4.21 for guidance when considering a change in
the safety classification of any existing sprinkler
system.
4.18 Water Supply
Information in this section pertains Section 3c(1) of
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and the corresponding CRD
section in Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
It is expected that the emergency services organization for
DOE sites will be either directly involved with or sent the
results of routine water supply tests that are required by
NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and
Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems.
Similarly, the emergency services organization for DOE sites
should be immediately informed of any water line breaks or
other water supply outages that would adversely affect its
ability to respond to fires and related events.
4.19 Automatic Fire Suppression
Information in this section pertains to Section 3c(4) of
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and the corresponding CRD
section in Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
1. A fundamental precept of the DOE Fire Protection
Program is that all facilities of significance (new and
existing), including facilities where a fire could
cause unacceptable off-site and/or on-site consequences
to health, safety, or the environment should be
protected by automatic fire suppression systems
(usually sprinkler systems).
2. The need for an automatic fire suppression system may
be based on conclusions resulting from an FHA, a DSA,
or state or local building codes. The FHA should be
predicated on the assumption that a fire will occur.
The nature of that fire depends on the hazards present
at any given time within the facility. The resulting
protection should be designed to ensure that a fire
would be successfully controlled until such time that
emergency response forces arrive to complete
extinguishment.
3. DOE has an obligation to provide protection for its
facilities such that a fire will not result in an
unacceptable program delay or property loss.
Consequently, the Department considers any facility in
excess of 5,000 square feet total floor area, or in any
facility with a MPFL of $3 million as warranting
protection by a supervised automatic fire suppression
system. Private sector practice in recent years has
expanded sprinkler system use in smaller and less
hazardous facilities as well. Additionally, when the
MPFL exceeds $50 million, a redundant fire protection
system should be provided that, despite the failure of
the primary fire protection system, would limit the
loss to below $50 million. Redundant protection may be
a fire-rated barrier system or a smoke detection system
in conjunction with a fully capable fire department,
among other options.
4.20 Fire Suppression System Confinement or Containment
Information in this section pertains to Section 3c(10) of
Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and the corresponding CRD
section in Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
The intent of this requirement is to contain any potentially
contaminated fire suppression system water in an area until
such time as it can be tested and determined safe to release
to the environment. Such containment could include
specifically constructed tanks, ponds, or dikes to hold the
effluent; or it could consist as emergency response
procedures to “build” such a containment system as necessary
to prevent an offsite release. The capacity of such a
system should be based upon a calculated and reasonable
approach to determining water volume, such as the
anticipated flow rate from sprinkler systems and hose
streams along with the expected duration necessary to
respond, control and extinguish the fire. Additionally,
such systems should be configured with overflow capability
and established procedures developed to prevent any offsite
overflow release
4.21 Fire Protection Systems Classification
Information in this section pertains to Section 3c(5) and
3c(6) of Chapter II in DOE O 420.1B (and the corresponding
CRD section in Attachment 2 of DOE O 420.1B).
1. Determination of the need for redundant [exceeding what
is necessary or normal in the interest of preventing
failure of the structure, system, or component (SSC)]
fire protection SSCs, rests with the FHA and DSA
process described in this Guide. This section
addresses cases (for both new and existing fire
protection systems) wherein DOE takes credit for fire
protection SSCs in meeting mandatory worker and public
protection guidelines applicable to a nuclear facility
(i.e., 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management; and DOE O
420.1B). In these situations, the DSA may identify the
fire protection system either safety significant
(needed for defense in depth and worker protection) or
safety class (needed for protection of the public).
The objective of this identification might be to reduce
the frequency and/or consequences of an analyzed fire.
Methods to achieve these calculated objectives might
include enhanced reliability of detection and
suppression systems, minimization of ignition sources
and transient combustible loading, and increased
reliance on the integrity of fire barriers,
penetrations, and filter plenums.
2. Safety classification is handled according to the
methodology prescribed in DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation
Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear
Facility Documented Safety Analyses, and DOE Guide
420.1-1, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and
Explosives Safety Criteria Guide for use with DOE O
420.1, Facility Safety. For new and major modification
to existing systems, safety class, or safety
significant systems are to meet requirements of DOE O
420.1B Chapter 1, Nuclear and Explosives Safety Design
Criteria, as well as any further applicable guidance
provided in both DOE G 420.1-1 and this Guide.
3. For existing fire protection SSCs, a certain inherent
level of reliability is established in the application
of the appropriate codes and standards when such
systems were originally built. It is, however, the
responsibility of the fire protection engineer, system
engineer, and the safety analyst to ensure that
functional requirements of the DSA are adequately
achieved when reclassifying an existing system.
Optimally, an existing safety system to be designated
as safety class or safety significant should satisfy
the criteria for a newly designed system. However, if
differences between current standards and an existing
system are significant, designation of the system as
safety class or safety significant is still possible if
adequate enhancements are implemented.
4. The criteria used to evaluate the ability of existing
systems to meet the appropriate conditions to be
classified as safety class or safety significant is
provided in Chapter 1 of DOE O 420.1B and its
accompanying guidance document G 420.1-1. This can
also be accomplished by performing a design adequacy
review using guidance provided by the Energy Facility
Contractors Group (EFCOG) Engineering Practices Working
group available at
http://efcog.org/wg/ep/docs/archive/Safety%20System%20D
esign%20Adequacy.pdf.
5. In reviewing the vulnerabilities of the existing
system, the responsible fire protection engineer
(working with the system engineering manager for the
system and the safety analyst) should consider the
topics below:
a. What is actual performance requirement to be
imposed on the fire protection system?
The fire protection engineer should understand
exactly how the system must perform to meet the
requirements of the DSA. This understanding is
acquired by focusing on the performance
requirement for the system as described in
specific accident scenarios. If the system to be
reclassified is a sprinkler system, the fire
protection engineer should ask questions such as:
• What accident scenarios is the sprinkler system
to be relied on for mitigation?
• What range of fires does the system have to
control?
• Is the system expected to control the fire to a
theoretical maximum size for a specified
period?
• Does the system have to function for fire
control?
• Is there radiological or other concerns related
to inadvertent system actuation?
If the system at issue is a passive one such as
barriers, a sample question might be: If a fire
barrier is relied upon to limit the material at
risk, is the main concern the fire rating of the
barrier, the integrity of penetration seals, or
something else? (These questions are intended as
examples.)
The first step in this analysis is complete when
the fire protection engineer thoroughly
understands (in a qualitative way) the specific
performance requirements for the system that would
serve as a basis for reclassification to safety
class or safety significant.
b. What is the required reliability for the system?
Required safety functions for the system will
normally be established in the approved safety
basis. This stage of the inquiry is needed to
determine whether this level can be substantiated
from the performance standpoint. Particularly
where safety class designation is sought, adoption
of industry benchmarks may not be sufficiently
probative of reliability.
Taking as an example the reliability on demand of
a sprinkler system, one can find NFPA sprinkler
system data from the late 1960s (the last time
NFPA published reliability date) suggesting an on-
demand reliability of 96 percent.4 DOE has
published study asserting sprinkler system
reliabilities as high as 99 percent,5 while other
studies offer figures as low as 85 percent.6 But
a DSA will require that the assumptions used in
developing any benchmark be available. It is
possible that in some cases the assumptions
underlying a study would conflict with the
assumptions of the safety analysis.
There is no answer applicable to all cases. Each
reliability study should be evaluated on the basis
of the assumptions made, the type of data
collected, maintenance of the systems studied,
etc. The reliability of the system needed to
mitigate accident scenarios may not be adequately
demonstrated based on available data. In such
cases, reclassification of the system cannot
proceed without appropriate alternative measures
such as system enhancements, reduction of
combustibles, or reduction of material at risk.
The second step in this analysis is complete when
the fire protection engineer understands the
reliability goal established by the DSA and has
identified data that does or does not support
reliability at that level. Reliability can be
increased, but some baseline should first be
established in order to quantify the effects of
design changes or changes in inspections, tests,
and maintenance.
c. What are the limits of the designated fire
protection system? What support systems are
needed to guarantee its functionality?
This next step is to define the limits of the fire
protection system being considered and to identify
all support systems needed for the system to
function on demand. The system boundary limits
should include all SSCs and support systems
necessary to guarantee its functionality. With
respect to a sprinkler system, for example, how
far does that system extend? To the base of the
riser, the post indicator valve outside the
building, the connection to the water supply loop,
or the water source and pumps?
Assuming for a moment that the system is being
traced all the way back to the fire pumps and if
these pumps are electrically powered, is the power
supply a required support system? The issue of
system boundary can also arise for passive
systems. For example, if safety credit is to be
taken for a fire-rated wall assembly, does the
assembly extend only from the floor to the ceiling
of a given area or does it extend through multiple
floors? If the barrier is supported by structural
steel, could a failure of the structural steel
lead to a failure of the fire barrier?
This third step in the analysis is complete when
the fire protection engineer is in a position to
write out a definition of the system for which
safety credit is to be taken, and can identify all
support systems that are relied upon for the
system to function upon demand.
d. In the accident scenarios of interest, what events
or conditions could threaten the ability of the
fire protection system to perform its intended
function?
An example of this factor is the attempt to rely
on a fire protection system to mitigate a design
basis fire initiated by an earthquake. In this
case, it is possible that a suppression system is
expected to survive and remain functional after
such a seismic event. Whether credit can be taken
for the system in the safety analysis of post-
earthquake fire scenarios will be dependent not
only on the continued integrity of the in-building
system, but on all other supporting components
leading back to the water supply.
In general, the fire protection engineer (having
already identified the system to be analyzed and
having a full understanding of the scenarios in
which it might be called upon to function) should
proceed in this step to look for the system’s
vulnerabilities as a result of the initiating
event. This investigation should be done in
coordination with the assigned system engineer and
the safety analyst to ensure that all potential
vulnerabilities are identified and their impact on
functionality assessed. The outcome might be that
safety class or safety significant credit can be
taken with the system in as-found condition, or
that design changes will be needed to prevent
system failure in the scenarios for which safety
credit is to be taken.
e. Is the system as designed (or installed in the
case of an existing system) adequate to meet the
required safety function? Are modifications or
upgrades required?
DOE does not specify the design expectations of
fire protection systems relied upon in safety
analysis documentation, except for the following:
(1) seismic requirements on sprinkler systems set
forth in Section 7.3 of DOE-STD-1066-99, (2)
general infrastructural (Mechanical/Electrical)
requirements in Chapter 5 of DOE G 420.1-1; and
(3) Chapter II, Section 3c(12) of DOE O 420.1B
which states: “Fire protection systems designed
such that their inadvertent operation,
inactivation, or failure of structural stability
will not result in the loss of vital safety
functions or inoperability of safety class systems
as determined by the DSA.” The fire protection
engineer will need to assess the overall adequacy
of the system to mitigate the fire scenarios of
concern. For a new system, this effort may be
minimal, such as verifying that the design basis
performance characteristics match those described
in the safety basis documents. For an existing
system, this effort may be more extensive. DOE O
420.1B, Chapter I, Section 3b(7) requires SSCs to
be “designed, commensurate with the importance of
the safety functions performed, to perform their
safety functions when called upon and to meet the
quality assurance program requirements of either
10 CFR 830, Subpart A, or DOE O 414.1C, Quality
Assurance, as applicable.”
Useful guidance to perform this design adequacy
review has been provided by the EFCOG. For
example, hydraulic calculations, in lieu of
scheduled design, may be needed to demonstrate
that an installed sprinkler system can deliver the
water discharge density required by NFPA 13 and
otherwise meets the code’s criteria for spacing
and obstructions to water discharge. Where the
existing system cannot be shown adequate to meet
the requirements of the safety analysis, design
upgrades may be needed or the system’s reliability
adjusted downward to reflect the less-than-optimum
design.
f. What level of inspection, testing, maintenance and
surveillance is appropriate to ensure the required
performance of the system?
Meeting the inspection, testing, maintenance and
surveillance requirements of NFPA codes applicable
to the system in question should be considered a
minimum to guarantee the functionality and
performance of the system on demand. In most
cases, this level of attention should be adequate
to justify classifying the fire protection system
as safety significant. Where the higher
designation of safety class is desired, however,
the fire protection engineer may need to consider
substantial increases over basic NFPA criteria.
Among the additional steps that might be taken are
increased quality assurance (e.g., procurement
procedures, 100% pre-installation inspection and
documentation of equipment, additional training
for installation, maintenance, and testing
personnel) and more frequent intervals for
inspections, tests, and maintenance.7
g. Is the fire protection system’s operability
protected by a technical safety requirement (TSR)?
The final step in the analysis, assuming the steps
above have shown that a fire protection system may
be reclassified as safety class or safety
significant, is for the fire protection engineer
to develop, in coordination with the system
engineer and the safety analyst, a TSR. Such
requirement will specify, among other things,
required intervals for inspections, tests, and
maintenance, a definition of operability for the
system, action statements for instances where the
system becomes unavailable, and compensatory
actions to be taken. In addition, any
surveillance testing imposed by TSR should have
acceptance criteria for tested parameters
supported by calculations or other engineering
documents to ensure that design bases assumptions
are met.
In addition, the development of the TSR will
require the evaluation of systems interactions,
i.e., how the failure of other systems could
induce a failure in the fire protection system
covered by a TSR. For example, the water supply
for a safety class sprinkler system may be
provided by a site-wide water system. This system
may need TSRs to ensure maintenance performed on
the underground piping will not inadvertently
impact the safety class function. The TSR is a
critical factor in ensuring that a fire protection
system for which safety analysis credit is taken
will perform on demand and as designed.
NFPA CODES AND STANDARDS
1. As a minimum, all of the following NFPA codes and standards
(or their current equivalents) are likely to be applicable
to all DOE elements and contractors that have responsibility
for fire safety programs per the requirements of CFR 851 and
DOE O 420.1B:
NFPA 1 Uniform Fire Code
NFPA 10 Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers
NFPA 13 Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler
Systems
NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
NFPA 51B Standard for Fire Prevention During Welding,
Cutting, and Other Hot Work
NFPA 55 Standard for the Storage, Use, and Handling of
Compressed Gases and Cryogenic Fluids in
Portable and Stationary Containers, Cylinders,
and Tanks
NFPA 70 National Electrical Code
NFPA 70E Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace
NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm Code
NFPA 80 Standard for Fire Doors and Other Operating
Protectives
NFPA 90A Standard for the Installation of
Air-Conditioning and Ventilating Systems
NFPA 101 Life Safety Code
NFPA 101B Code for Means of Egress for Buildings and
Structures
NFPA 241 Standard for Safeguarding Construction,
Alteration, and Demolition Operations
NFPA 780 Standard for the Installation of Lightning
Protection Systems
NFPA 801 Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities
Handling Radioactive Materials
NFPA 1144 Standard for Reducing Structure Ignition
Hazards from Wildfire
2. As a minimum, the following NFPA codes and standards (or their
current equivalents) are likely to be applicable to contractors
that have responsibility for site emergency response programs
(fire department, fire brigade, etc.):
NFPA 1000 Standard for Fire Service Professional
Qualifications Accreditation and Certification
Systems
NFPA 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional
Qualifications
NFPA 1002 Standard on Fire Apparatus Driver/Operator
Professional Qualifications
NFPA 1005 Standard on Professional Qualifications for
Marine Fire Fighting for Land-Based Fire
Fighters
NFPA 1006 Standard for Rescue Technician Professional
Qualifications
NFPA 1021 Standard for Fire Officer Professional
Qualifications
NFPA 1037 Standard for Professional Qualifications for
Fire Marshals
NFPA 1041 Standard for Fire Service Instructor
Professional Qualifications
NFPA 1051 Standard for Wildland Fire Fighter Professional
Qualifications
NFPA 1061 Standard for Professional Qualifications for
Public Safety Telecommunicator
NFPA 1071 Standard for Emergency Vehicle Technician
Professional Qualifications
NFPA 1081 Standard for Industrial Fire Brigade Member
Professional Qualifications
NFPA 1141 Standard for Fire Protection Infrastructure for
Land Development in Suburban and Rural Areas
NFPA 1142 Standard on Water Supplies for Suburban and
Rural Fire Fighting
NFPA 1143 Standard for Wildland Fire Management
NFPA 1221 Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and
Use of Emergency Services Communications
Systems
NFPA 1403 Standard on Live Fire Training Evolutions
NFPA 1404 Standard for Fire Service Respiratory
Protection Training
NFPA 1410 Standard on Training for Initial Emergency
Scene Operations
NFPA 1451 Standard for a Fire Service Vehicle Operations
Training Program
NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety
and Health Program
NFPA 1521 Standard for Fire Department Safety Officer
NFPA 1561 Standard on Emergency Services Incident
Management System
NFPA 1581 Standard on Fire Department Infection Control
Program
NFPA 1582 Standard on Comprehensive Occupational Medical
Program for Fire Departments
NFPA 1583 Standard on Health-Related Fitness Programs for
Fire Department Members
NFPA 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and
Business Continuity Programs
NFPA 1670 Standard on Operations and Training for
Technical Search and Rescue Incidents
NFPA 1710 Standard for the Organization and Deployment of
Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical
Operations, and Special Operations to the
Public by Career Fire Departments
NFPA 1851 Standard on Selection, Care, and Maintenance of
Protective Ensembles for Structural and
Proximity Fire Fighting
NFPA 1852 Standard on Selection, Care, and Maintenance of
Open-Circuit Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
(SCBA)
NFPA 1901 Standard for Automotive Fire Apparatus
NFPA 1906 Standard for Wildland Fire Apparatus
NFPA 1911 Standard for the Inspection, Maintenance,
Testing, and Retirement of In-Service
Automotive Fire Apparatus
NFPA 1912 Standard for Fire Apparatus Refurbishing
NFPA 1931 Standard for Manufacturer’s Design of Fire
Department Ground Ladders
NFPA 1932 Standard on Use, Maintenance, and Service
Testing of In-Service Fire Department Ground
Ladders
NFPA 1936 Standard on Powered Rescue Tools
NFPA 1951 Standard on Protective Ensembles Technical
Rescue Incidents
NFPA 1961 Standard on Fire Hose
NFPA 1962 Standard for the Inspection, Care, and Use of
Fire Hose, Couplings, and Nozzles and the
Service Testing of Fire Hose
NFPA 1963 Standard for Fire Hose Connections
NFPA 1964 Standard for Spray Nozzles
NFPA 1965 Standard for Fire Hose Appliances
NFPA 1971 Standard on Protective Ensembles for Structural
Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting
NFPA 1975 Standard on Station/Work Uniforms for Fire and
Emergency Services
NFPA 1976 Standard on Protective Ensemble for Proximity
Fire Fighting
NFPA 1977 Standard on Protective Clothing and Equipment
for Wildland Fire Fighting
NFPA 1981 Standard on Open-Circuit Self-Contained
Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) for Emergency
Services
NFPA 1982 Standard on Personal Alert Safety Systems
(PASS)
NFPA 1983 Standard on Life Safety Rope and Equipment for
Emergency Services
NFPA 1989 Standard on Breathing Air Quality for Fire and
Emergency Services Respiratory Protection
NFPA 1991 Standard on Vapor-Protective Ensembles for
Hazardous Materials Emergencies
NFPA 1992 Standard on Liquid Splash-Protective Ensembles
and Clothing for Hazardous Materials
Emergencies
NFPA 1994 Standard on Protective Ensembles for First
Responders to CBRN Terrorism Incidents
NFPA 1999 Standard on Protective Clothing for Emergency
Medical Operations
NFPA 2113 Standard on Selection, Care, Use, and
Maintenance of Flame-Resistant Garments for
Protection of Industrial Personnel against
Flash Fire
3. Individual NFPA codes and standards from the list below may be
applicable to DOE and its contractors based on their respective
responsibilities and scope of work:
NFPA 11 Standard for Low-, Medium-, and High-Expansion
Foam
NFPA 12 Standard on Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing
Systems
NFPA 12A Standard on Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing
Systems
NFPA 14 Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and
Hose Systems
NFPA 15 Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire
Protection
NFPA 16 Standard for the Installation of Foam-Water
Sprinkler and Foam-Water Spray Systems
NFPA 17 Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems
NFPA 17A Standard for Wet Chemical Extinguishing Systems
NFPA 20 Standard for the Installation of Stationary
Pumps for Fire Protection
NFPA 22 Standard for Water Tanks for Private Fire
Protection
NFPA 24 Standard for the Installation of Private Fire
Service Mains and Their Appurtenances
NFPA 25 Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and
Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection
Systems
NFPA 30A Code for Motor Fuel Dispensing Facilities and
Repair Garages
NFPA 31 Standard for the Installation of Oil-Burning
Equipment
NFPA 33 Standard for Spray Application Using Flammable
or Combustible Materials
NFPA 37 Standard for the Installation and Use of
Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines
NFPA 45 Standard on Fire Protection for Laboratories
Using Chemicals
NFPA 51 Standard for the Design and Installation of
Oxygen-Fuel Gas Systems for Welding, Cutting,
and Allied Processes
NFPA 52 Vehicular Fuel Systems Code
NFPA 54 National Fuel Gas Code
NFPA 58 Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code
NFPA 59 Utility LP-Gas Plant Code
NFPA 59A Standard for the Production, Storage, and
Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
NFPA 68 Standard on Explosion Protection by
Deflagration Venting
NFPA 69 Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems
NFPA 75 Standard for the Protection of Information
Technology Equipment
NFPA 82 Standard on Incinerators and Waste and Linen
Handling Systems and Equipment
NFPA 85 Boiler and Combustion Systems Hazards Code
NFPA 86 Standard for Ovens and Furnaces
NFPA 88A Standard for Parking Structures
NFPA 90B Standard for the Installation of Warm Air
Heating and Air-Conditioning Systems
NFPA 91 Standard for Exhaust Systems for Air Conveying
of Vapors, Gases, Mists, and Noncombustible
Particulate Solids
NFPA 96 Standard for Ventilation Control and Fire
Protection of Commercial Cooking Operations
NFPA 99 Standard for Health Care Facilities
NFPA 99C Standard on Gas and Vacuum Systems
NFPA 102 Standard for Grandstands, Folding and
Telescopic Seating, Tents, and Membrane
Structures
NFPA 105 Standard for the Installation of Smoke Door
Assemblies and Other Opening Protectives
NFPA 110 Standard for Emergency and Standby Power
Systems
NFPA 111 Standard on Stored Electrical Energy Emergency
and Standby Power Systems
NFPA 115 Standard for Laser Fire Protection
NFPA 204 Standard for Smoke and Heat Venting
NFPA 211 Standard for Chimneys, Fireplaces, Vents, and
Solid Fuel-Burning Appliances
NFPA 214 Standard on Water-Cooling Towers
NFPA 220 Standard on Types of Building Construction
NFPA 221 Standard for High Challenge Fire Walls, Fire
Walls and Fire Barrier Walls
NFPA 232 Standard for the Protection of Records
NFPA 318 Standard for the Protection of Semiconductor
Fabrication Facilities
NFPA 326 Standard for the Safeguarding of Tanks and
Containers for Entry, Cleaning, or Repair
NFPA 385 Standard for Tank Vehicles for Flammable and
Combustible Liquids
NFPA 407 Standard for Aircraft Fuel Servicing
NFPA 408 Standard for Aircraft Hand Portable Fire
Extinguishers
NFPA 409 Standard on Aircraft Hangars
NFPA 415 Standard on Airport Terminal Buildings, Fueling
Ramp Drainage, and Loading Walkways
NFPA 418 Standard for Heliports
NFPA 430 Code for the Storage of Liquid and Solid
Oxidizers
NFPA 432 Code for the Storage of Organic Peroxide
Formulations
NFPA 434 Code for the Storage of Pesticides
NFPA 472 Standard for Competence of Responders to
Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction
Incidents
NFPA 473 Standard for Competencies for EMS Personnel
Responding to Hazardous Materials/WMD Incidents
NFPA 484 Standard for Combustible Metals
NFPA 490 Code for the Storage of Ammonium Nitrate
NFPA 495 Explosive Materials Code
NFPA 496 Standard for Purged and Pressurized Enclosures
for Electrical Equipment
NFPA 497 Recommended Practice for the Classification of
Flammable Liquids, Gases, or Vapors and of
Hazardous (Classified) Locations for Electrical
Installations in Chemical Process Areas
NFPA 498 Standard for Safe Havens and Interchange Lots
for Vehicles Transporting Explosives
NFPA 502 Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other
Limited Access Highways
NFPA 505 Fire Safety Standard for Powered Industrial
Trucks Including Type Designations, Areas of
Use, Conversions, Maintenance, and Operations
NFPA 520 Standard on Subterranean Spaces
NFPA 560 Standard for the Storage, Handling, and Use of
Ethylene Oxide for Sterilization and Fumigation
NFPA 600 Standard on Industrial Fire Brigades
NFPA 601 Standard for Security Services in Fire Loss
Prevention
NFPA 654 Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust
Explosions from the Manufacturing, Processing,
and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids
NFPA 655 Standard for Prevention of Sulfur Fires and
Explosions
NFPA 664 Standard for the Prevention of Fires and
Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking
Facilities
NFPA 701 Standard Methods of Fire Tests for Flame
Propagation of Textiles and Films
NFPA 703 Standard for Fire-Retardant Treated Wood and
Fire Retardant Coatings for Building Materials
NFPA 704 Standard System for the Identification of the
Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response
NFPA 750 Standard on Water Mist Fire Protection Systems
NFPA 820 Standard for Fire Protection in Wastewater
Treatment and Collection Facilities
NFPA 853 Standard for the Installation of Stationary
Fuel Cell Power Systems
NFPA 909 Code for the Protection of Cultural Resources
Properties – Museums, Libraries, and Places of
Worship
NFPA 914 Code for Fire Protection of Historic Structures
NFPA 2001 Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing
Systems
NFPA 5000 Building Construction and Safety Code
_______________________________
1 DOE G 440.1-8 states that “Complete guidance on the
development, adoption and maintenance of a fire safety and
emergency response program that satisfies the provisions of the
Rule can be found in DOE G 440.1-5, Fire Safety Program for use
with DOE O 420.1 and DOE O 440.1.” This Guide (DOE G 420.1-3) is
based upon and replaces DOE G 440.1-5 and includes some
additional guidance on the development, adoption and maintenance
of a fire safety and emergency response program to support
implementation of the 10 CFR 851 rule. However, as experienced
is gained in implementing 10 CFR 851, further guidance may be
determined to be needed to support its implementation; and either
DOE G 440.1-8 or DOE G 420.1-3 will be updated as appropriate.
2 The Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) is defined by Section
5.d.10 of DOE O 420.1B and Section 4 of DOE-STD-1066 as the
decision making authority in matters concerning fire protection
as defined by the National Fire Protection Association Codes and
Standards. The DOE head of field organization or designee is the
AHJ unless otherwise directed by the Secretarial Officer.
3 Contractors subject to 10 CFR Part 851 must adhere to 29 CFR
Parts 1910 and 1926 if these regulations are applicable to the
hazards at their covered workplace. See 10 CFR § 851.23 (a)(3)
and (7).
4 NFPA, “Automatic Sprinkler Performance Tables, 1970 Edition,”
Fire Journal, July 1970, pp. 35-39.
5 Maybee, W.W., “Summary of Fire Protection Programs in the U.S.
Department of Energy—Calendar Year 1987,” U.S. Department of
Energy, August 1988.
6 For a summary of sprinkler reliability studies, see Koffel,
W., “Reliability of Automatic Sprinkler Systems,” available on
the website of the Alliance for Fire Safety:
http://www.afscc.org/ReliabilityofSprinklerSystemsRJan2006.html
(Checked August 2007).
7 See safety documentation developed by Westinghouse Savannah
River Company in connection with the Tritium Consolidation
Project, described in letter and attached report, John Conway
to Ernest Moniz, March 18, 1999.