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ORDER
DOE O 142.2A
Approved: 12-15-06
SUBJECT: VOLUNTARY OFFER SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOL WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
1. OBJECTIVES.
a. To define requirements for Department of Energy (DOE)
compliance with—
(1) the Agreement between the United States of America and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of
Safeguards in the United States (Agreement),
(2) the Protocol to the Agreement (Original Protocol),
(3) the Additional Protocol to the Agreement (Additional
Protocol), and
(4) the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Agreement and Additional
Protocol (Subsidiary Arrangements).
NOTE: Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) will be used for
references to both the Agreement and the Original
Protocol.
b. To prescribe policies and responsibilities for ensuring
compliance with the VOA, Additional Protocol, and Subsidiary
Arrangements.
2. CANCELLATION. DOE O 142.2, Safeguards Agreement and
Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency,
dated 1-7-04. Cancellation of an Order does not, by itself,
modify or otherwise affect any contractual obligation to
comply with the Order. Contractor requirement documents
(CRDs) that have been incorporated into or attached to a
contract remain in effect until the contract is modified to
either eliminate requirements that are no longer applicable
or substitute a new set of requirements.
3. APPLICABILITY.
a. DOE Elements. Except for exclusions in paragraph 3c,
this Order applies to all Departmental elements
with responsibility for programs that must
adhere to protocols associated with
Agreement, Original Protocol, Additional Protocol, and
Subsidiary Arrangements. See Attachment 1.
The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) will assure that NNSA employees
and contractors comply with their respective
responsibilities under this Order. Nothing in this
Order will be construed to interfere with the NNSA
Administrator’s authority under section 3212(d) of
Public Law (P.L.) 106-65 to establish Administration
specific policies, unless disapproved by the Secretary.
b. DOE Contractors. Except for the exclusions in
paragraph 3c, the CRD (Attachment 2) sets forth
requirements for contractors whose missions include
adherence to protocols associated with the Agreement,
Original Protocol, Additional Protocol, and Subsidiary
Arrangements. The CRD will apply to the extent set
forth in each contract.
c. Exclusions. In accordance with the responsibilities
and authorities assigned by Executive Order 12344
and to ensure consistency throughout the joint
Navy/DOE Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program,
the Director will implement and oversee
requirements and practices pertaining to
this Order for activities under the Director’s
cognizance.
4. REQUIREMENTS. Specific references are available in the
VOA, Additional Protocol, and Subsidiary
Arrangement at locations cited. See references
(paragraph 7) for online availability.
a. General.
(1) Under the VOA, all DOE facilities where source or special
fissionable material is stored or used in operations are eligible
for application of traditional IAEA safeguards. [See definitions
in paragraphs 6y and 6z of this Order and VOA articles 1(b),
2(a), 2(c), and 3(b)]
(2) National security facilities, activities, and information
associated with activities with direct national security
significance to the United States are excluded from IAEA
inspection and complementary access. (VOA, article 2; Additional
Protocol, articles 1b and 1c; P.L. 109-401, Section 261(a)])
(3) Every reasonable effort will be made to ensure that IAEA
inspections and complementary access visits can be carried out
even when increased security condition (SECON) levels are in
effect at DOE facilities [DOE M 470.4-1, Safeguards and Security
Program Planning and Management, dated 8-26-05 and NNSA Policy
Letter (NAP)- 9A, SECON Implementation, dated 1-31-05]
NOTE: Complementary access visits will be
considered inspections (to comply with
requirements of DOE O 142.3, Unclassified
Foreign Visits and Assignments,
dated 6-18-04). For the purposes of this
Order, however, inspections are formal
visits by the IAEA associated with the VOA
and complementary access visits are formal
visits associated with the Additional
Protocol.
(4) All activities subject to declaration1 under Article 2(a) of
the Additional Protocol taking place at locations owned,
operated, or leased by or for DOE, including NRC-licensed or
certified locations on DOE installations and non-military
locations on installations where naval reactor fuel is stored or
processed, shall be included on the DOE portion of the Additional
Protocol. For purposes of implementing the AP at the latter
locations, DOE shall act in coordination with the Department of
Defense. (Additional Protocol, article 2a).
NOTE: The declaration excludes activities with
direct national security significance to the
United States or locations or information
associated with such activities.
(5) Implementation of VOA, Additional Protocol, and Subsidiary
Arrangements will be consistent with prudent management practices
(e.g., avoiding unnecessary interference in operations at DOE
facilities, sites, or locations and minimizing costs). [VOA,
articles 4(c) and 6(c)].
b. IAEA Access.
(1) IAEA inspectors will be entitled to carry out activities
according to the provisions of the VOA, Additional Protocol,
Subsidiary Arrangements, and applicable facility attachments.
(2) IAEA inspectors will be notified of applicable health,
safety, security, and export control procedures that they must
observe as well as procedures for DOE inspection of IAEA
equipment.
(3) Complementary access and inspections by the IAEA will be
authorized under the terms of the VOA and the Additional Protocol
and in accordance with appropriate legislation, interagency
guidance, and U.S. Government and DOE regulations when the
following requirements have been met. [VOA, article 1(a);
Additional Protocol, articles 1c and 7; P.L.109-401, United
States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act 2006, Title
II, Subtitle G]
(a) Security and counterintelligence training and preparation
have been completed for declared locations of direct national
security significance to the United States. (P.L. 109-401,
Subtitle B, sections 221, 222, 223, 224)
(b) Security assessments of activities, locations, and
information of direct national security significance to the
United States have been completed. [P.L. 109-401,
section 273(1)]
(4) IAEA inspectors will not be provided access to DOE
facilities or activities and associated locations of direct
national security significance to the United States. [VOA,
article 1(a); Additional Protocol, article 1(b);
P.L 109-401, Section 261(a)]
NOTE: Exceptions can be permitted where managed
access measures are applied. [Additional
Protocol, articles 1(c) and 7]
(5) Environmental sampling will be governed by applicable
Presidential guidance, laws, and DOE directives. (Additional
Protocol, article 9; P.L. 109-401, Subtitle E, sections 251, 252,
253, 254)
c. Information Security.
(1) National security information may be transmitted to the IAEA
only on a controlled basis and then only at the minimum necessary
to comply with the VOA (for an example, see VOA, article 8; for
the definition of national security information, see Executive
Order 12958, as amended).
(2) Release of classified and sensitive unclassified information
is restricted as follows.
(a) Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data must not be
revealed, released, or transmitted to the IAEA. [Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, P.L. 83-703, as amended; P.L. 109-401 section
261(c)]
(b) Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information is restricted
from release or transmittal except as prescribed in
DOE M 471.1-1, Identification and Protection of Unclassified
Controlled Nuclear Information Manual, dated 10-23-01.
(c) Sensitive nuclear technology information must not be
revealed or released except as authorized in Title 10 Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) 810, “Assistance to Foreign Atomic
Energy Activities.”
(d) Export controlled information and information controlled
under the Department of State’s (State’s) International Traffic
in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Department of Commerce’s
(Commerce’s) Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission’s Export and Import of Nuclear Equipment
and Materials Regulations, and the Department of Energy’s
regulations on Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities
(Part 810) must not be revealed or released except as authorized
under the relevant regulations. (22 CFR 120-129, “International
Traffic in Arms Regulations”; 15 CFR 730-774, “Export
Administration Regulations”; 10 CFR 110, “Export and Import of
Nuclear Equipment and Materials”; 10 CFR 810, “Assistance to
Foreign Atomic Energy Activities.”)
(e) Information identified as “Confidential Foreign Government
Information—Modified Handling Required” must be protected as
mandated in DOE M 470.4-4, Information Security, dated 8-26-05
and then, only with the express approval of the applicable
foreign government.
d. Access Authorization Exceptions. Although heads
of DOE field elements are not authorized to
either approve or deny IAEA inspections or
complementary access visits at DOE facilities,
locations, or sites, some exceptions do apply, and the
following requirements must be met. (See Additional
Protocol, article 5 for access requirements.)
(1) When inspection or complementary access activities would
result in compromise of Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted
Data, the head of the field element is authorized to temporarily
suspend the inspection and immediately notify the NNSA Office of
International Regimes and Agreements,
(a) the cognizant Program Secretarial Officer (PSO) or
(b) the NNSA Deputy or Associate Administrator, and the
Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security.
(2) The Office of International Regimes and Agreements will
notify the IAEA when an inspection or complementary access must
be terminated or suspended pending implementation of an
acceptable security plan that protects the information from
disclosure.
5. RESPONSIBILITIES.
a. NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation.
(1) Represents DOE before other Federal agencies, Congress, and
the IAEA on matters pertaining to the VOA, Additional Protocol,
and Subsidiary Arrangements.
(2) Participates in resolving proposed changes to the list of
DOE facilities eligible for the application of safeguards under
the VOA or the list of DOE activities and associated locations
declared under the Additional Protocol.
(3) Addresses issues on proposed changes that have not been
resolved by the Assistant Deputy Administrator of the Office of
Nonproliferation and International Security, the PSO or the NNSA
Deputy or Associate Administrator, and the Associate
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security.
(4) When resolution is not achieved, refers the matter to the
Under Secretary for Nuclear Security for resolution.
(5) If the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security is unable to
reach resolution, the matter is referred to the Office of the
Secretary of Energy.
b. NNSA Assistant Deputy Administrator, Office of
Nonproliferation and International Security.
(1) Approves plans and procedures developed by the Director of
the Office of International Regimes and Agreements for
implementing the VOA, Additional Protocol, and Subsidiary
Arrangements.
(2) Participates in or designates representatives to participate
with other Federal agencies and the Director of the Office of
International Regimes and Agreements in policy development and
decision making related to areas in which the VOA, Additional
Protocol, or Subsidiary Arrangements can affect programs,
activities, facilities, sites, or locations for which the
Assistant Deputy Administrator is responsible.
(3) Maintains the option to concur or not concur on all
notifications to offices external to DOE regarding implementation
of the VOA, Additional Protocol, or Subsidiary Arrangements
affecting programs, activities, facilities, sites, or locations
under his/her cognizance.
(4) Represents DOE on the IAEA Steering Committee (ISC).
(5) For the resolution of proposed changes to the list of DOE
facilities eligible for the application of safeguards under the
VOA or the list of DOE activities and associated locations
declared under the Additional Protocol, participates with
(a) the cognizant PSOs (for non-NNSA facilities) or
(b) the NNSA Deputy or Associate Administrator (for NNSA
facilities), and the Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Security.
c. Director, NNSA Office of International Regimes and
Agreements.
(1) Serves as the primary DOE information resource on
implementation of the VOA, Additional Protocol, and Subsidiary
Arrangements.
(a) Provides policy and technical guidance on IAEA safeguards.
(b) Coordinates with cognizant PSOs, NNSA Deputy and Associate
Administrators, and the Associate Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Security on implementation plans, procedures, and policy
development related to implementation of the VOA, Additional
Protocol, and Subsidiary Arrangements.
(c) Coordinates with cognizant PSOs, NNSA Deputy and Associate
Administrators, and the Associate Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Security in participation on formulating Presidential
guidance and interagency implementing procedures.
(d) Coordinates preparation of the initial DOE declaration and
the annual, quarterly, and ad hoc updates to the declaration.
(Additional Protocol, articles 2 and 3)
(e) Coordinates DOE certification of national security
exclusion, managed access, declared locations, site security
assessments, and added locations. (P.L. 109-401 Subtitle G)
(f) Provides assistance, outreach, education, and training
programs for implementing the VOA, Additional Protocol, and
Subsidiary Arrangements.
(2) Monitors international safeguards aspects of VOA, Additional
Protocol, and Subsidiary Arrangement implementation to ensure
that potential problems are identified and referred to
responsible and cognizant DOE elements for resolution.
(3) Serves as the DOE representative to the ISC Subcommittee on
International Safeguards and Monitoring (SISM) and designates the
DOE representative to the Subgroup on IAEA Safeguards in the
United States (SISUS).
(a) Leads the DOE Negotiating Team delegation to establish
Subsidiary Arrangements for DOE facilities selected by the IAEA
for the application of VOA safeguards.
(b) Leads the DOE Negotiating Team in any bilateral discussions
with the IAEA regarding implementation of the VOA or the
Additional Protocol.
(c) Requests the participation of other potentially affected DOE
organizations in Negotiating Team activities, as appropriate.
NOTE: The Director may delegate these
responsibilities to staff of the Office of
International Regimes and Agreements.
(4) Participates with other Federal agencies and appropriate DOE
organizations (e.g., PSOs; NNSA Deputy and Associate
Administrators; field element representatives; and/or the offices
of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence, Counterintelligence, and
Defense Nuclear Security) in policy development and decision
making related to the VOA, Additional Protocol, or Subsidiary
Arrangements, including—
(a) designation and acceptance of IAEA inspectors;
(b) IAEA inspectors’ access to DOE activities, facilities,
locations, and sites; and
(c) scope of inspection, complementary access, and inspector
activities.
(5) Provides channels for communication between DOE and other
entities such as State, Commerce, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), and DoD regarding application of the VOA,
Additional Protocol, and Subsidiary Arrangements.
(6) Establishes channels for transmission of VOA safeguards
documents to State.
(7) Establishes channels for transmission of Additional Protocol
declarations, amplifications, and clarifications to Commerce and
other Federal agencies.
(8) Provides concurrent notification of upcoming IAEA
inspections, complementary access visits, or reporting
obligations to—
(a) the PSOs or NNSA Deputy or Associate Administrators
responsible for affected DOE facilities, locations, and sites and
(b) managers of affected DOE facilities, locations, and sites.
NOTE: Notification of upcoming complementary
access visits will be given by the DOE
Office of Emergency Operations.
(9) Participates with the Chief Financial Officer and other
heads of Headquarters elements in developing policies and
procedures for recovering the costs of special requests from the
IAEA. (VOA, article 14)
(10) As appropriate and with due regard to the effectiveness and
efficiency of representation, ensures that interested DOE
organizations are provided the opportunity to participate in
interagency policy meetings related to implementing the VOA,
Additional Protocol, and Subsidiary Arrangements. In addition to
the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security,
organizations represented may include—
(a) potentially affected PSOs,
(b) NNSA Deputy and Associate Administrators,
(c) the Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security,
and
(d) managers of DOE field elements responsible for affected
activities, facilities, locations, or sites.
(11) Maintains a current list of DOE facilities eligible for the
application of VOA safeguards. (VOA, article 39)
(a) Informs affected PSOs, NNSA Deputy and Associate
Administrators, and the Associate Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Security of proposed additions to or deletions from the
list.
(b) Notifies the responsible PSO or NNSA Deputy or Associate
Administrator responsible for affected DOE facilities of IAEA
selections for application of VOA safeguards.
(12) Maintains current and past DOE declarations under the
Additional Protocol and a list of locations associated with
activities included in the declarations.
(13) Advises appropriate PSOs, NNSA Deputy and Associate
Administrators, and heads of DOE field elements of actions
necessary to satisfy DOE’s obligations under the VOA, Additional
Protocol, and Subsidiary Arrangements.
(14) Issues guidance for accepting IAEA inspectors’ accreditation
credentials and for hosting and escorting IAEA inspectors at DOE
facilities, locations, and sites.
(15) Receives from heads of DOE field elements safeguards
documents and Additional Protocol declarations that have been
prepared and approved pursuant to paragraph 5h of this Order.
(a) Transmits safeguards documents and Additional Protocol
declarations to State and/or Commerce, as appropriate, for
transmittal to the IAEA.
(b) Reviews and coordinates safeguards documents and Additional
Protocol declarations with the Associate Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Security and with cognizant PSOs (for non-NNSA
locations and facilities) or NNSA Assistant or Associate
Administrator (for NNSA locations and facilities) before release
from DOE.
(16) Ensures that nuclear material declared under the VOA is at
all times at least equivalent in amount and composition to any
material that would be subject to IAEA safeguards under other
suspended agreements between the United States, the IAEA, and
possibly other parties. (VOA, article 22)
(17) Prepares and issues guidance documents as required to
facilitate implementation of this Order.
(18) Has lead DOE responsibility for fulfilling duties assigned
to DOE as a responsible Agency under the Interagency Procedures.
(19) Obtains agreement with the PSO (for non-NNSA facilities) or
the NNSA Deputy or Associate Administrator (for NNSA facilities)
and the Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security in
response to an organization’s request that—
(a) a DOE facility or activity be added to the list of
facilities eligible for the application of safeguards under the
VOA (VOA, articles 2 and 34) or
(b) a DOE activity previously undeclared under the Additional
Protocol be considered for addition to the Additional Protocol
declaration. (Additional Protocol, articles 2 and 3)
NOTE: When agreement is not obtained, refers the
matter to the Assistant Deputy
Administrator, Office of Nonproliferation
and International Security.
(20) Notifies the SISUS of proposed additions to the list of DOE
facilities eligible for application of safeguards under the VOA
or the list of DOE activities declared under the Additional
Protocol and their associated locations. [paragraph 5c(21),
below]
(21) Obtains agreement with the PSO (for non-NNSA activities,
facilities, locations, or sites) or the NNSA Deputy or Associate
Administrator (for NNSA activities, facilities, locations, or
sites) and the Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Security in response to an organization’s request for deletion
of—
(a) a DOE facility from the list of DOE facilities eligible for
application of safeguards under the VOA (VOA, article 34) or
(b) a DOE activity and/or its associated location from
declarations under the Additional Protocol because it is
scheduled to be engaged in activities with direct national
security significance to the United States. (Additional
Protocol, article 1b)
NOTE: When agreement is not obtained, refers the
matter to the Assistant Deputy Administrator
of the Office of Nonproliferation and
International Security.
(22) Notifies the SISUS of proposed deletions from the list of
DOE facilities eligible for application of VOA safeguards or the
list of DOE activities and associated locations available for
complementary access, per paragraph 5c(23), below. (Additional
Protocol, article 5)
(23) Maintains procedures for issuing notifications regarding
upcoming IAEA inspections and complementary access visits at DOE
facilities, locations, or sites.
(24) Participates with the PSOs, NNSA Deputy or Associate
Administrators, and heads of DOE field elements to ensure that
new facility planning will include, from inception, IAEA
safeguards requirements and determination of whether the facility
would be placed on the eligible facilities list.
(25) Transmits the current list of IAEA inspectors formally
designated for service in the United States to heads of DOE field
elements responsible for DOE facilities, locations, and sites
subject to IAEA inspections or complementary access visits.
(VOA, article 9; Additional Protocol, article 11)
(26) Notifies heads of DOE field elements when site/facility
management contractors are affected by this Order and the
accompanying CRD (Attachment 2).
(27) Where complementary access to declared DOE activities cannot
be granted without disclosing protected information, determines,
in cooperation with the PSO (for non-NNSA locations) or the NNSA
Associate or Deputy Administrator (for NNSA locations) and the
Assistant Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security, whether all
reasonable efforts have been made to satisfy IAEA requirements at
adjacent locations or through other means without delay.
(Additional Protocol, articles 1c and 7)
(28) Verifies the portion of the DOE declaration concerning
export and import of uranium, thorium, and specified equipment
and non-nuclear material. [Additional Protocol,
articles 2a(vi)(b), 2a(vi)(c), 2a(ix)(a), and 2a(ix)(b)]
(29) Provides assistance, outreach, education, and training
programs for implementing declaration requirements as described
in the Additional Protocol, articles 2a(vi)(b), 2a(vi)(c),
2a(ix)(a), and 2a(ix)(b).
(30) Provides guidance and responds to questions concerning the
application of DOE export regulations and U.S. export control
laws to DOE activities involving the IAEA.
(31) Conducts reviews concerning the release of nuclear
technology and information or other export controlled information
to the IAEA. (10 CFR 810)
(32) Develops procedures for the release of export-controlled
information to the IAEA.
(33) Participates in resolving questions regarding the
appropriateness of providing specific export controlled
information or technology to the IAEA.
d. Director, Office of Security and Safety Performance
Assurance develops and maintains policies
and procedures for reportingnuclear materials
transactions, material balances, and
inventory information to and from the Nuclear Materials
Management and Safeguards System, as necessary for
reporting such information to the State for transmittal
to the IAEA. (VOA, articles 7 and 8)
e. Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security (NNSA).
(1) Develops and maintains procedures for controlled release of
classified national security information and other sensitive DOE
information to the IAEA.
(2) Provides safeguards and security program guidance to DOE
field elements to facilitate IAEA activities while protecting and
accounting for nuclear materials and sensitive information.
(3) Apprises the Office of International Regimes and Agreements
of interactions with other Federal agencies relative to the VOA
or the Additional Protocol, as appropriate.
(4) In consultation with the Office of International Regimes and
Agreements, develops and maintains procedures for controlled
release of sensitive nuclear technology and export-controlled
information to the IAEA.
(5) Reviews and provides to the head of the field element
comments on site safeguards and security plans for IAEA
inspections and complementary access visits to DOE facilities,
locations, and sites.
(6) Monitors implementation of domestic safeguards and security
requirements as they pertain to VOA, the Additional Protocol, and
Subsidiary Arrangements and ensures that potential problems are
identified to responsible PSO’s, NNSA Deputy or Associate
Administrators, and to field elements.
(7) Participates with the Director of the Office of
International Regimes and Agreements and the responsible PSO’s
NNSA Deputy or Associate Administrator in determining whether a
facility should be placed on or deleted from the list of DOE
facilities eligible for application of safeguards under the VOA
or whether an activity should be added to or deleted from the
list of DOE activities and associated locations declared under
the Additional Protocol.
(8) Participates with the Office International Regimes and
Agreements to certify NNSA declared activities for national
security exclusion, managed access, declared locations, site
security assessments, and added locations. (P.L. 109-401
Subtitle G)
(9) When complementary access to declared activities cannot be
granted without disclosing protected information, consults with
the responsible PSO or NNSA Deputy or Associate Administrator and
the Office of International Regimes and Agreements to determine
whether reasonable efforts have been made to satisfy IAEA
requirements at adjacent locations or through other means,
without delay. (Additional Protocol, articles 1b, 1c, 5b, and 7)
f. Director, Office of Counterintelligence. For non-NNSA
facilities, locations, and sites, provides graded
level of counterintelligence support to headquarters
and field elements involved in IAEA activities in
accordance with potential risks.
g. Chief, Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence
(NNSA). For NNSA facilities, locations, and sites,
provides graded level of counterintelligence support
to headquarters and field elements involved in IAEA
activities in accordance with potential risks.
h. Program Secretarial Officers and NNSA Deputy and Associate
Administrators.
(1) Oversee field implementation of the VOA, Additional
Protocol, and Subsidiary Arrangements to ensure effectiveness
without adverse impact on DOE facility, location, or site
operations, programs, or activities.
(2) Participate in meetings of the SISM or SISUS on matters that
can significantly affect DOE programs, activities, facilities,
locations, and sites, as necessary and appropriate.
(3) Apprise the Office of International Regimes and Agreements
of interactions with other Federal agencies on VOA and Additional
Protocol matters.
(4) Participate, as necessary and appropriate, with DOE
representative on the Negotiating Team.
(5) Participate, as appropriate, with the Office of
International Regimes and Agreements in preparing certifications
for DOE activities declared under the Additional Protocol
regarding the national security exclusion, managed access,
declared locations, site security assessments, and added
locations as specified in Subtitle G of P.L. 109-401.
(6) Where complementary access to declared DOE activities cannot
be granted without disclosing protected information (Additional
Protocol articles 1(b), 1(c), and 7), consults with or the
Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security and the
Office of International Regimes and Agreements to determine
whether all reasonable efforts have been made to satisfy IAEA
requirements at adjacent locations or through other means without
delay. [Additional Protocol, article 5b];
(7) Upon notification of IAEA actions from the Director of the
Office of International Regimes and Agreements, direct
responsible heads of DOE field elements to implement appropriate
responses consistent with VOA, Additional Protocol, Subsidiary
Arrangements, and DOE regulations and directives.
(8) Review and approve safeguards documents and input for
Additional Protocol declarations prepared by DOE field elements.
(9) For programs under the PSO’s or NNSA Deputy or Associate
Administrator’s responsibility whose activities trigger
application of safeguards under the VOA or the Additional
Protocol, ensure that field resources and budgets are adequate to
meet—
(a) DOE’s IAEA responsibilities under the VOA, Additional
Protocol, Subsidiary Arrangements, and applicable facility
attachments and
(b) the cost of satisfying IAEA obligations to the extent that
the PSO’s or NNSA Deputy or Associate Administrator’s activities
are the basis for the IAEA obligations.
(10) Upon initiation of a procurement request or at any time that
it is known that a contract will fall within the scope of this
Order, advise heads of DOE field elements to ensure that
appropriate IAEA- provisions are included in contracts.
(11) Ensure that employees and subordinate field elements comply
with the requirements of this Order and the VOA, Additional
Protocol, Subsidiary Arrangements, and Interagency Procedures.
(12) Participate with the Director of the Office of International
Regimes and Agreements and the Associate Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Security, in determining whether a DOE facility
should be placed on or deleted from the list of DOE facilities
eligible for application of IAEA safeguards under the VOA or
whether an activity should be added to or deleted from the list
of DOE activities and associated locations declared under the
Additional Protocol.
(13) Give written notice to the Director of the Office of
International Regimes and Agreements whenever a facility under
the PSO’s or NNSA Deputy or Associate Administrator’s purview can
be added to or should be deleted from the list of DOE facilities
eligible for application of IAEA safeguards or should be deleted
from the list because the facility will be involved in activities
with direct national security significance to the United States.
(14) Give written notice to the Director of the Office of
International Regimes and Agreements whenever a DOE activity and
associated location under the PSO’s or NNSA Deputy or Associate
Administrator’s purview can be added to the list of DOE
activities and associated locations declared under the Additional
Protocol or should be deleted from the list because of the
initiation of activities with direct national security
significance to the United States.
i. Chief Financial Officer.
(1) Participates with the Director, Office of International
Regimes and Agreements, and other appropriate PSOs in developing
principles and procedures for recovering eligible costs of IAEA
special requests. (VOA, article 14)
NOTE: In general, the United States will bear the
expenses incurred in implementing VOA,
Additional Protocol, and Subsidiary
Arrangement responsibilities. However, if
DOE or its contractors incur extraordinary
expenses in responding to a specific
request, DOE may request that the IAEA
reimburse those expenses, provided the IAEA
has agreed in advance to do so.
(2) Ensures that field budget calls will include the requirement
that field elements identify and budget for costs associated with
DOE implementation of the VOA, Additional Protocol, and
Subsidiary Arrangements.
j. Heads of DOE Field Elements.
(1) Prepare safeguards documents and input for IAEA safeguards
under the VOA, and site declarations for inclusion in DOE
declarations under the Additional Protocol, in accordance with
the VOA, Additional Protocol, and Subsidiary Arrangements. (VOA
articles 8, and 42-66; Additional Protocol, articles 2 and 3)
(2) Review and approve VOA safeguards-related documents and
input to the relevant PSOs or NNSA Deputy or Associate
Administrators for review and then submit the documents and input
to the Office of International Regimes and Agreements through
appropriate channels.
(3) Review and approve site Additional Protocol declarations for
field element review for technical accuracy, information
classification issues, proprietary and export controlled
information, security concerns, and application of the national
security exclusion (Additional Protocol, article 1b) before the
information is submitted [Additional Protocol, articles 1b, 1c,
2, 3, and 7; P.L. 109-401, Subtitle G] to the Office of
International Regimes and Agreements, which will coordinate the
review and approval process by
the cognizant PSO and or the cognizant Deputy or
Associate Administrator, and the Associate
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security.
(4) Provide to the Office of International Regimes and
Agreements documentation certifying that—
(a) managed access provisions will be implemented in accordance
with the appropriate and necessary interagency guidance and
regulations [Additional Protocol, articles 1c and 7; P.L. 109-
401, Subtitle G];
(b) necessary security and counterintelligence training and
preparation have been completed for declared locations of direct
national security significance to the United States (P.L. 109-
401, Subtitle G) and
(c) necessary site security assessments activities, locations,
and information of direct national security significance to the
United States have been completed before the site declaration is
submitted for review by Headquarters elements. (P.L. 109-401,
Subtitle G)
(5) For heads of non-NNSA field elements, provide direction to
and oversight of non-NNSA contractors to ensure compliance with
the VOA, Additional Protocol, Subsidiary Arrangements, applicable
facility attachments, and the Interagency Procedures.
(6) For heads of NNSA field elements, provide direction to and
oversight of NNSA contractors to ensure compliance with the VOA,
Additional Protocol, Subsidiary Arrangements, applicable facility
attachments, and the Interagency Procedures.
(7) Follow direction from the responsible PSO or NNSA Deputy or
Associate Administrator with responsibility for activities,
facilities, locations, or sites that are eligible for application
of IAEA safeguards or inclusion in declarations.
(8) Refer questions on how to respond to actions or requests
under the VOA, Additional Protocol, and Subsidiary Arrangements
to the Director of Office of International Regimes and Agreements
and the Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security.
(9) Designate to the Office of International Regimes and
Agreements DOE field element participants and contractor
representatives to serve as a team that addresses IAEA safeguards
matters.
(a) The team is to include one or more points of contact and an
Additional Protocol coordinator for the field element.
(b) The point of contact and coordinator can be the same person.
(10) Ensure that implementation of VOA, Additional Protocol, and
Subsidiary Arrangements requirements are consistent with prudent
management practices (e.g., avoiding unnecessary interference in
site operations of DOE facilities, locations, and sites and
minimizing costs).
(11) Ensure that site/facility management contractors notify
responsible DOE or NNSA field elements when—
(a) facilities excluded from inspection or reporting under the
VOA because of activities with direct national security
significance to the United States terminate those activities and
the facility can be considered for addition to the list of DOE
facilities eligible for application of IAEA safeguards;
(b) negotiations or plans are initiated that could lead to a
facility being judged to be engaged in activities with direct
national security significance to the United States and therefore
requiring deletion from the list of DOE facilities eligible for
application of IAEA safeguards;
(c) locations or sites where declarable activities were excluded
from complementary access by IAEA because of application of the
national security exclusion in article 1b of the Additional
Protocol but the reasons for applying article 1b of the
Additional Protocol no longer exist, and the declarable activity
can be considered for addition to the site Additional Protocol
declaration; or
(d) negotiations or plans are initiated for deleting an activity
and associated location from the DOE declaration list because of
the presence of activities with direct national security
significance to the United States.
(12) Ensure that management contractors at facilities, locations,
or sites with declarable activities collect, review, and submit
site declarations for approval (via the Additional Protocol
Reporting System). (Additional Protocol, articles 2 and 3)
(13) Following field element approval, submit site declarations
to the Office of International Regimes and Agreements, which will
coordinate—
(a) technical review and approval by the PSO (for non-NNSA
locations) or the NNSA Deputy or Associate Administrator approval
(for NNSA locations) and
(b) security review and approval by the Associate Administrator
for Defense Nuclear Security.
(14) Upon initiating the procedure for possible addition of new
or existing DOE facilities to the list of DOE facilities eligible
for VOA safeguards, inform the responsible PSO or NNSA Deputy or
Associate Administrator and the Director of the Office of
International Regimes and Agreements when DOE facilities under
the field element’s cognizance are not associated with activities
with direct national security significance to the United States.
(15) Review the field element’s information included in the DOE
Additional Protocol annual, quarterly, and ad hoc declarations,
as applicable.
(16) Ensure compliance with relevant provisions of the
Implementing Legislation (P.L. 109-401 Section 261 and Subtitle
G):
(a) Ensure that all activities proposed for inclusion in the DOE
declaration are thoroughly reviewed for activities with direct
national security significance to the United States.
(b) Conduct security assessments to determine whether
application of managed access can acceptably mitigate risks of
disclosing activities, information, and associated locations with
direct national security significance to the United States.
(17) Ensure that appropriate written notice is given to the
responsible PSO or NNSA Deputy or Associate Administrator
whenever a DOE facility on the list of those facilities eligible
for VOA safeguards is to be deleted because of scheduled for
activities with direct national security significance to the
United States. (VOA, article 35)
(18) Ensure that appropriate written notice is given to the
Office of International Regimes and Agreements whenever an
activity and associated location included in the Additional
Protocol declaration should be deleted because of scheduled
activities with direct national security significance to the
United States, and notify
(a) the responsible PSO or
(b) the NNSA Deputy or Associate Administrator, and the
Assistant Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security.
(19) Before notice is given, conduct a security assessment to
determine whether managed access can be used to mitigate risks
associated with such activities.
(20) Notify managers of affected DOE activities, facilities,
locations, and sites of upcoming IAEA inspections and
complementary access visits, and direct affected managers to—
(a) prepare for the inspection or complementary access visit as
soon as practical to avoid hindrance to IAEA activities;
(b) keep files of current information readily available for the
identification of IAEA inspectors designated for inspections and
complementary access visits in the United States; and
(c) maintain current arrangements for IAEA inspectors’ ready
access and departure.
(21) Notify and direct managers of affected DOE activities,
facilities, locations, and sites to prepare appropriate
information to satisfy upcoming IAEA reporting obligations.
(22) Ensure that before IAEA inspectors enter a DOE facility,
location, or site they are identified properly and are free to
carry out activities as authorized by the VOA, Additional
Protocol, Subsidiary Arrangements, and applicable facility
attachment.
(a) Ensure that IAEA inspectors and personnel comply with
applicable health, safety, and security procedures.
(b) Ensure that a plan and procedures are in place to provide
security, health, and safety training to IAEA inspectors before
commencing inspections or complementary access visits.
(23) Exercise care to ensure that classified and other sensitive
information provided to the IAEA and its inspectors is limited to
information that must be provided under the terms of the VOA,
Additional Protocol, Subsidiary Arrangements, and facility
attachments.
(a) Under ordinary circumstances, classified information
provided to the IAEA will be limited to information on nuclear
material accounting (e.g., nuclear materials transactions,
material balances, and inventory information) for facilities on
the list of facilities eligible for application of safeguards
under the VOA.
(b) When questions arise as to whether providing specific
classified, export-controlled, or proprietary information is
appropriate, the proposal for resolution will be coordinated with
the Director of the Office of International Regimes and
Agreements and the Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Security.
(c) Classified matter may not be given directly to an IAEA
inspector or official. All classified matter must be subjected
to classification and security review and transmitted by the
Office of International Regimes and Agreements to the IAEA via
diplomatic channels. Sensitive unclassified information will be
transmitted to the IAEA in accordance with applicable regulations
and procedures.
(d) Recipients of classified information or other sensitive
information provided to the IAEA and its inspectors will be
informed that the information is classified or protected by DOE
and is to be protected by the IAEA using “safeguards
confidential” or “safeguards highly confidential” designations,
as appropriate.
(24) Ensure that during inspections and complementary visits,
IAEA inspectors and other personnel are hosted and escorted by
trained DOE and/or contractor personnel who have been trained in
applicable managed access provisions.
NOTE: Managed access provisions must be applied
as needed to protect activities with
national security significance; prevent
dissemination of classified, proliferation
sensitive information, and export-controlled
information; meet safety or physical
protection requirements; and protect
business confidential, proprietary, or
commercially sensitive information.
(25) Ensure that escorts have appropriate background
qualifications and clearances, training (including
counterintelligence training), and are aware of applicable
health, safety, and security procedures and procedures for
inspecting IAEA equipment.
(26) Ensure that IAEA inspectors and personnel carrying out
functions under the VOA, Additional Protocol, and Subsidiary
Arrangements are subject to the safety and radiation protection
measures in effect at the facility, location, or site being
inspected or visited, including emergency assistance, medical
care in case of accidents, and all other health and safety
protection that is provided to other visitors as required by U.S.
laws and DOE directives or practices.
(27) When unusual incidents or circumstances affect or involve
loss of nuclear material subject to safeguards or the inadvertent
loss or compromise of classified or sensitive information during
an IAEA inspection, complementary access visit, or data
transmission under the VOA or Additional Protocol inform the
Director of the Office of International Regimes and Agreements,
the Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security, and the
cognizant Deputy or Associate Administrator or cognizant PSO.
(28) For any issue that may result in the need to terminate IAEA
safeguards on DOE nuclear materials or at particular DOE
facilities, sites, or locations, inform the Director of the
Office of International Regimes and Agreements, the Associate
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security, and the cognizant
Deputy or Associate Administrator or cognizant PSO.
NOTE: Notification must include information on
the particular material or DOE facility,
location, or site where safeguards are
applied and the associated reasons for the
need to terminate IAEA safeguards.
(29) In conjunction with the responsible PSO or NNSA Deputy or
Associate Administrator with applicable programmatic
responsibility, provide funding and other resources to satisfy
DOE’s obligations under the VOA, Additional Protocol, Subsidiary
Arrangements, and facility attachments, and specifically the
costs of meeting IAEA obligations to the extent that activities
under the responsibility of the field element are the basis for
the obligations.
(30) Upon initiation of a procurement request or at any time when
it is known that a contract will fall within the scope of this
Order, advise contracting officers that appropriate provisions
and the CRD (Attachment 2) are to be included in contracts.
(31) Refer to the Director of the Office of International Regimes
and Agreements any questions, complaints, or requests related to
IAEA inspections or complementary access visits.
(32) Inform managers of affected DOE facilities, locations, or
sites of their responsibilities and obligations as necessary for
successful implementation of the VOA, Additional Protocol, and
Subsidiary Arrangements.
(33) Refer to the Director of the Office of International Regimes
and Agreements questions relating to the application of
10 CFR Part 810 to DOE interactions with the IAEA.
(34) Participate with the PSO or NNSA Deputy or Associate
Administrator to ensure that planning for new DOE activities and
facilities will take into account applicable requirements and
responsibilities associated with IAEA safeguards.
6. DEFINITIONS. In addition to the listing below, terms
defined in article 90 of the VOA and article 18 of
the Additional Protocol also apply to this Order.
a. Additional Protocol Declarations. Information
provided to the IAEA in accordance with the
Additional Protocol, articles 2 and 3.
b. Complementary Access. IAEA inspectors’
visits to facilities, locations, and sites in
accordance with the provisions of the Additional
Protocol. A complementary access visit is not the same
as an inspection, which is defined in paragraph 6k.
c. Design Information Questionnaire. An IAEA form
used to provide to the IAEA information on
facilities selected by the IAEA for the application of
safeguards in accordance with the VOA. There are
different forms for the various types of facilities.
d. Effective Kilogram. A unit of measure applied
to quantities of nuclear material
defined under the Agreement as follows:
(1) for plutonium, its weight in kilograms;
(2) for uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1 percent) and
above, its weight in kilograms multiplied by the square of its
enrichment;
(3) for uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1 percent) and
above 0.005 (0.5 percent), its weight in kilograms multiplied by
0.0001;
(4) for depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5
percent) or below; and
(5) for thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005.
For example, 10 kilograms of uranium with an enrichment
of 0.03 (3 percent) would equal 0.009 effective
kilograms (10 kilograms × 0.0009).
e. Export-Controlled Information. Certain unclassified
Government information for which DOE is
accountable and responsible and which requires a
specific license or authorization to export. Export
controlled information must be protected consistent
with U.S. laws and regulations. Unrestricted
dissemination of export-controlled information could
reasonably be expected to have adverse effect on U.S.
national security and nonproliferation objectives.
f. Facility.
(1) A reactor, critical facility, conversion plant, fabrication
plant, reprocessing plant, isotope separation plant, or separate
storage installation.
(2) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than
one effective kilogram is customarily used.
For purposes of the VOA and the Additional Protocol,
the term applies to facilities that have been
described in a design information questionnaire
submitted to the IAEA. [Additional Protocol Article
18(i); VOA Article 90(i)]
g. Facility Attachment. That portion of the
Subsidiary Arrangements that
pertains to an installation. [Agreement,
article 39(b)]
h. Field Element. A non-Headquarters DOE organization;
area offices, support offices, operations offices,
regional offices, site offices, or
offices located at environmental restoration,
construction, or termination sites.
i. Formerly Restricted Data.
Classified information that the Department of Energy
and the Department of Defense jointly determined to
be related primarily to the military use of atomic
weapons and removed by the Department of Energy from
the category of Restricted Data under section 142(d)
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended).
j. IAEA Steering Committee (ISC).
An interagency group that coordinates IAEA-related
policy for the United States. The ISC coordinates
U.S. assistance in improving IAEA safeguards
effectiveness and resolves interdepartmental issues
relating to the VOA, Additional Protocol, or
Subsidiary Arrangements. Members are representatives
from the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State;
the Office of Management and Budget; the NRC; and the
National Security Council.
k. Inspection. A formal visit by IAEA inspectors to verify U.S.
declarations under the VOA. An inspection is not the
same as a complementary access visit (defined in
paragraph 6b, above).
l. List of Facilities Eligible for Safeguards.
A list, provided to the IAEA by the United States of
facilities within the United States, containing
source or special fissionable material that are not
associated with activities with direct national
security significance to the United States and,
hence, eligible for application of safeguards under
the VOA. [VOA, article 1(b)]
m. Location. A site, facility, laboratory, center,
building, room, area, or subpart thereof that is
controlled by or operated for DOE.
n. Location-Specific Environmental Sampling.
The collection of environmental samples (e.g., air,
water, vegetation, soil, and smears) collected at and
in the immediate vicinity of a location specified by
the IAEA for the purpose of drawing conclusions about
the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear
activities at the specified location. [Additional
Protocol, Article 18(f)]
o. National Security Information. Information pertaining
to the national defense and foreign relations
of the United States and classified in accordance
with Executive Order 12958, as amended.
p. Negotiating Team. Members of the Subgroup on IAEA
Safeguards in the United States or their designees
who form a group to negotiate with the IAEA to arrive at
mutually-agreed-upon Subsidiary Arrangements and
transitional Subsidiary Arrangements to the VOA and
Additional Protocol and undertake other such
responsibilities as may be designated by the IAEA
Steering Committee or its Subcommittee on
International Safeguards and Monitoring.
q. Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System.
The national database and information support system
for nuclear materials controlled by the U.S.
Government and created to support national safeguards
and management objectives in the domestic and foreign
use of nuclear resources. The system—
(1) stores data on nuclear material transactions and inventories
and produces a wide range of printed reports for DOE, including
NNSA, and NRC uses;
(2) satisfies the nuclear materials information obligations in
agreements between the United States and foreign entities;
(3) provides the reporting interface between DOE facilities,
locations, and sites selected for the application of safeguards
under the provisions of the VOA and the Additional Protocol; and
(4) serves as a centralized computer database that processes
data received by way of unclassified and classified electronic
links including the Secure Information Management and Exchange
Network (SIMEX) used by a number of facilities, DOE elements and
organizations, and NRC offices in the United States.
r. Proprietary Information. Trade secrets
developed at private expense outside of a
cooperative research and development agreement and
commercial or financial information defined as
privileged or confidential under the Freedom of
Information Act, Title 5 United States Code (U.S.C.)
Part 552(b)(4), and which is marked as proprietary
information.
s. Restricted Data. As defined in the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, all information concerning—
(1) the design, manufacture, or use of atomic weapons;
(2) the production of special nuclear material; and
(3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of
energy.
Restricted data does not include information that has
been declassified or removed from the Restricted Data
category as defined in section 142 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954.
t. Safeguards. Measures applied under the VOA
and Additional Protocol to enable IAEA to detect
diversion of nuclear material and
undeclared nuclear activities.
u. Safeguards Documents. Design information
questionnaires; draft facility
attachments; nuclear material transaction, material
balance, and inventory reports; special reports;
amplifications; and clarifications.
v. Sensitive Nuclear Technology. Any information
(including information incorporated in a
production or utilization facility or important
component part thereof) which is not available to the
public and is important to the design, construction,
fabrication, operation, or maintenance of a uranium
enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a
facility for the production of heavy water; but does
not include Restricted Data controlled pursuant to
Chapter 12 of the Atomic Energy Act. The information
may take a tangible form such as a model, prototype,
blueprint, or operation manual or an intangible form
such as technical services. (10 CFR 810)
w. Site. That area delimited by the United States in
the relevant design information for a facility, including a
closed-down facility, and in the relevant information
on a location outside facilities, including a
closed-down location outside facilities (this is
limited to locations with hot cells or where activities
related to conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication or
reprocessing were carried out); all installations,
co-located with a facility or site, for the provision
or use of essential services, including hot cells for
processing irradiated materials not containing nuclear
material; installations for the treatment, storage and
disposal of waste; and buildings associated with
specified items identified by the United States.
[Additional Protocol, article 2a(iv)]
x. Site Declaration. The set of all line items in an
declaration from a DOE or NNSA site under the purview
Additional Protocol of a field element.
y. Source Material. In the context of this Order and
IAEA programs—
(1) uranium containing the mixture of isotopes
occurring in nature;
(2) uranium depleted in the isotope 235;
(3) thorium; and
(4) any of the foregoing in the form of metal,
alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate.
Source material does not include ore or ore residue.
z. Special Fissionable Material. Plutonium-239, uranium-233,
uranium enriched in the
isotopes 235 or 233, and any material containing one
or more of the foregoing, but not including source
material.
aa. Special Nuclear Material. Plutonium, uranium-233,
or uranium enriched above 0.711
percent by weight in the isotope uranium-235.
bb. Subgroup on IAEA Safeguards in the United States (SISUS).
A division of the ISC Subcommittee on International
Safeguards and Monitoring (SISM), which monitors
implementation of the VOA, Additional Protocol, and
Subsidiary Arrangements; carries out responsibilities
specifically prescribed in the VOA and Additional
Protocol; and undertakes other working level
activities as designated by the SISM or ISC.
cc. Subsidiary Arrangements. Documents setting
forth details that have been mutually
agreed upon by the United States and the IAEA for
implementing the VOA and Additional Protocol, as
required by the Agreement (article 39). The
Subsidiary Arrangements to the VOA include a general
part applicable to those facilities in the United
States identified by the IAEA for the application of
safeguards in accordance with the VOA. The general
part identifies the substance of communications
between the United States and the IAEA, format of
documents, procedures to be followed, and time limits
for various actions. A separate facility attachment
defines all other necessary arrangements specified in
sufficient detail to permit the IAEA to fulfill its
responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner
for each facility selected by the IAEA for the
application of safeguards under the VOA.
dd. Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information. Certain
unclassified Government information the unauthorized
dissemination of which is prohibited under
section 148 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as
amended), and DOE O 471.1A, Identification and
Protection of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear
Information, dated 6-30-00.
7. REFERENCES.
a. P.L. 83-703, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42
U.S.C. 2011 et seq., online at
www.nrc.gov/who-we-are/governing-laws.html).
b. U.S. Department of State, Interagency Procedures for the
Implementation of the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, Federal
Register, Vol. 63 (28), 7041-7044, February 11, 1998 (online at
www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/retrieve.html).
c. Agreement Between the United States of America and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application
of Safeguards in the United States, with Protocol.
Done at Vienna November 18, 1977;
entered into force December 9, 1980 (online at
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/treaties/usiaea1.htm).
d. Subsidiary Arrangements to the Agreement Between the
Government of the United States of America and the International
Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the
United States of America, June 1, 1978.
e. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United
States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for
the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America,
International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors Document
GOV/1998/25, May 14, 1998. Signed June 12, 1998 by the IAEA and
the United States of America (online at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_con
g_documents&docid=f:td007.107.pdf).
f. P.L. 109-401 United States and India Nuclear Cooperation
Promotion Act 2006, Title II United States Additional Protocol
Implementation passed December 8, 2006. (online
at http://.thomas.loc.gov/).
g. DOE M 470.4-1, Safeguards and Security Program Planning and
Management, dated 8-26-05.
h. NNSA Policy Letter (NAP)-9A, SECON Implementation,
dated 1-31-05.
i. DOE O 142.3, Unclassified Foreign Visits and Assignments
Program, dated 6-18-04. (DOE directives are available online at
www.directives.doe.gov.)
j. DOE O 475.1, Counterintelligence Program, dated 12-10-04.
k. DOE M 471.1-1, Identification and Protection of Unclassified
Controlled Nuclear Information Manual, dated 10-23-01.
l. DOE M 470.4-4, Information Security, dated 8-26-06.
m. 10 CFR 810, “Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy
Activities.”
n. 22 CFR 120-129, “International Traffic in Arms Regulations.”
o. 15 CFR 730-774, “Commerce and Foreign Trade, Chapter
VI—Bureau of Export Administration, Department of Commerce.”
p. 10 CFR 110, “Export and Import of Nuclear Equipment and
Materials.”
q. P.L. 106-65, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2000, as amended.
r. Executive Order 12958, as amended, Classified National
Security Information, (online at
www.archives.gov/federal_register/executive_orders/disposition_ta
bles.html).
8. NECESSITY FINDING STATEMENT. Sec. 3174, Orders relating
to the execution of environmental restoration,
waste management, or technology development
activities at a defense nuclear facility under the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq), may be imposed
by the Secretary at the defense nuclear facility only if the
Secretary finds that the Order is necessary for the
protection of human health and the environment or safety,
the fulfillment of current legal requirements, or the
conduct of critical administrative functions.
9. CONTACT. Questions concerning this Order should be addressed to the
Office of International Regimes and Agreements at (202)
586-8460.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY:
CLAY SELL
Deputy Secretary
DOE ELEMENTS TO WHICH DOE O 142.2A IS APPLICABLE
Office of the Secretary
National Nuclear Security Administration
Office of the Chief Financial Officer
Office of the Chief Information Officer
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs
Office of Environmental Management
Office of General Counsel
Office of Health, Safety and Security
Office of Human Capital Management
Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
Office of Legacy Management
Office of Management
Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology
Office of Policy and International Affairs
Office of Science
Secretary of Energy Advisory Board
DOE ELEMENTS TO WHICH
DOE O 142.2A IS NOT APPLICABLE
Energy Information Administration
Office of Economic Impact and Diversity
Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
Office of Fossil Energy
Office of Hearings and Appeals
Office of the Inspector General
Office of Public Affairs
Bonneville Power Administration
Southeastern Power Administration
Southwestern Power Administration
Western Area Power Administration
CONTRACTOR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT
DOE O 142.2A, Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement and
Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency
Regardless of the performer of the work, the contractor is
responsible for complying with the requirements of this CRD. The
contractor is responsible for flowing down the requirements of
this CRD to subcontractors at any tier to the extent necessary to
ensure the contractor’s compliance with the requirements. In
doing so, the contractor must not flow down requirements to
subcontractors unnecessarily or imprudently. That is, the
contractor will ensure that it and its subcontractors comply with
the requirements of this CRD and incur only those costs that
would be incurred by a prudent person in the conduct of
competitive business.
1. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS.
a. This CRD establishes requirements for Department of Energy
(DOE) contractors, including National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) contractors, whose contracts involve
activities potentially subject to application of safeguards by
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
b. In the performance of DOE contract obligations, each
contractor must assist as directed in meeting DOE’s obligations
under [Note: for references see paragraph 7 of Order 142.2A]—
(1) the Agreement Between the United States of America and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of
Safeguards in the United States (Agreement),
(2) the Original Protocol to the Agreement (Original Protocol),
(3) the Additional Protocol to the Agreement (Additional
Protocol,
(4) the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Agreement and Additional
Protocol (Subsidiary Arrangements), and
(5) the Interagency Procedures for the Implementation of the
U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement.
NOTE: The Agreement and Original Protocol, combined,
will be referred to as the Voluntary Offer
Agreement (VOA).
c. DOE contractors do not have approval or denial authority for
IAEA inspectors, inspections, or complementary access visits at
DOE facilities, locations, or sites.
2. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS.
a. Provide information and reports to the DOE field element as
requested to assist in meeting DOE’s obligations under the VOA,
Additional Protocol, Subsidiary Arrangements, and Interagency
Procedures.
b. Carry out security reviews, prepare security plans, and
conduct security assessments as requested by the field element.
c. Upon notification of an upcoming IAEA inspection or
complementary access visit, affected contractors must:
(1) prepare for the inspection or visit within required time
constraints,
(2) keep readily available a file of current information for the
identification of IAEA inspectors designated for inspections and
complementary access visits in the United States, and
(3) maintain current arrangements for IAEA inspector’s ready
access and departure.
d. Ensure that IAEA inspectors and personnel are identified
properly before they enter a DOE facility, location, or site.
e. Ensure that IAEA inspectors are informed of health, safety,
and security requirements applicable to the DOE facility,
location, or site to be inspected or visited.
f. Ensure that hosts and escorts assigned to IAEA inspectors
for inspections and complementary access visits are trained
appropriately and are aware of applicable access procedures and
managed access provisions.
(1) Apply managed access provisions where needed to protect
activities of national security significance; prevent
dissemination of proliferation sensitive information; meet safety
or physical protection requirements; and protect business
confidential, proprietary, or commercially sensitive information.
(2) Ensure that escorts have appropriate background
qualifications and clearances and are knowledgeable of health,
safety, and security procedures applicable to the DOE facilities,
locations, and sites to be inspected or visited.
(3) Ensure that hosts and escorts are aware of DOE procedures
for inspection of IAEA equipment before an inspection or
complementary access visit begins.
g. As directed by the responsible DOE field element, provide
IAEA inspectors access to DOE facilities that the IAEA has
selected for inspection under the VOA or to DOE activities and
associated locations that are available for complementary access
under article 5 of the Additional Protocol.
h. Ensure that IAEA inspectors are free to carry out
inspections and visits at the facility, location, or site as
authorized and in compliance with any restrictions defined in the
VOA, Additional Protocol, Subsidiary Arrangements, applicable
facility attachment, and procedures established by the head of
the responsible DOE field element.
i. Exercise care to ensure that classified information provided
to IAEA inspectors is limited to information defined under the
terms of the VOA, Additional Protocol, Subsidiary Arrangements,
and facility attachments.
(1) Under ordinary circumstances, classified information
provided to the IAEA is to be limited to information on nuclear
material accounting, nuclear materials transactions, material
balances, and inventory for DOE facilities on the list of those
eligible for application of safeguards under the VOA.
(a) Classified matter may not be given directly to an IAEA
inspector or official. All classified matter must be subjected
to classification and security review and transmitted by the
Office of International Regimes and Agreements to the IAEA via
diplomatic channels Sensitive unclassified information will be
transmitted to the IAEA in accordance with applicable regulations
and procedures.
(b) Recipients of classified information or other sensitive
information provided to the IAEA and its inspectors will be
informed that the information is classified or protected by DOE
and is to be protected by the IAEA using “safeguards
confidential” or “safeguards highly confidential” designations,
as appropriate.
(2) The following limits apply to classified information.
(a) Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data must not be
revealed, released, or transmitted to the IAEA.
(b) Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information must not be
revealed, released, or transmitted to the IAEA except as
authorized in DOE M 471.1-1, Identification and Protection of
Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information Manual,
dated 10-23-01.
(c) Sensitive nuclear technology must not be revealed, released,
or transmitted to the IAEA except as authorized under 10 CFR 810.
(d) Export controlled information and information controlled
under the Department of State’s (State’s) International Traffic
in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Department of Commerce’s
(Commerce’s) Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission’s Export and Import of Nuclear Equipment
and Materials Regulations, and the Department of Energy’s
regulations on Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities
(Part 810) must not be revealed or released except as authorized
under the relevant regulations. (22 CFR 120-129, “International
Traffic in Arms Regulations,” and 15 CFR 730-774, “Export
Administration Regulations”;10 CFR 110, “Export and Import of
Nuclear Equipment and Materials”; 10 CFR 810, “Assistance to
Foreign Atomic Energy Activities.”)
(e) Information deemed to be “Confidential Foreign Government
Information—Modified Handling Required” must be protected as
mandated by DOE directives and must not be revealed, released or
transmitted to the IAEA without the express approval of the
foreign government (DOE M 471.2-1C, Classified Matter Protection
and Control Manual, dated 7-14-04).
(3) When questions arise on the appropriateness of providing
classified, export-controlled, proprietary, or other specific
information, to the IAEA, resolution will be coordinated with the
DOE field element.
(4) When classified information provided to an IAEA inspector is
to be protected under the IAEA “safeguards confidential”
designation, the inspector is to be informed that the information
is classified by DOE.
j. Ensure that IAEA inspectors and other personnel have the
benefit of safety and radiation protection measures in effect at
each DOE facility, location, or site that is visited or inspected
including emergency assistance, medical care in case of
accidents, and all other health and safety protection required
for other visitors to DOE facilities, locations, or sites under
U.S. laws or DOE directives or practices.
k. Inform the DOE field element of unusual incidents or
circumstances involving the loss of nuclear material that is
subject to safeguards under the VOA, the inadvertent loss or
compromise of classified or sensitive information occurring
during an IAEA inspection or complementary access visit, or data
transmission that is not authorized under the VOA or Additional
Protocol.
l. Direct questions, complaints, and requests related to IAEA
inspections or complementary access visits to the DOE field
element.
m. Notify the DOE field element when negotiations or plans are
initiated that could lead to a DOE facility, location, or site
being judged to be engaged in activities with direct national
security significance to the United States and therefore
requiring deletion from the list of DOE facilities
eligible for the application of safeguards under the
VOA or the list of DOE activities and associated
locations previously declared under the Additional
Protocol. Consider whether application of managed
access can acceptably mitigate risks of disclosing
activities with direct national security significance.
n. Notify the DOE field element when a DOE facility, location,
or site excluded from IAEA inspection because of associated
activities with direct national security significance to the
United States can be considered for addition to the list of DOE
facilities eligible for application of safeguards under the VOA
or the list of DOE activities and associated locations declared
under the Additional Protocol because of the termination of
activities with direct national security significance or because
the application of managed access can acceptably mitigate risks
of disclosing activities with direct national security
significance.
o. Notify the DOE field element when activities that are
potentially reportable to the IAEA under the required declaration
are planned or initiated. (Additional Protocol, article 2)
p. Designate a point of contact for matters relating to IAEA
inspections and complementary access visits and keep the DOE
field element informed of the person’s name and current contact
information. Participate, as requested by the DOE field element,
on the team assigned to cover.
_______________________________
1 A general description of facilities, information, sites,
operations, activities, materials, and locations to be made
available for IAEA inspection. Activities of direct national
security significance and associated locations and activities
are excluded from declaration. Article 2 of the Additional
Protocol defines specific elements of a declaration.